THE DEVELOPMENT OF LARGE CORPORATE HOUSEHOLDS ALONG THE NORTH PACIFIC RIM Herbert D. G. Maschner, Department of Anthropology, Campus Box 8005, Idaho State University, Pocatello, Idaho 83209. Brian W. Hoffman, Department of Anthropology, Hamline University, 1536 Hewitt Avenue, Saint Paul, Minnesota 55104 Abstract: The North Pacific supported three different ethnic groups of complex hunter-gatherers: the Aleut of the eastern Aleutian Islands, the Koniag or Alutiiq (Pacific Eskimo) of the Kodiak Archipelago, and the Tlingit, Haida, and Tsimshian of the northern Northwest Coast. The archaeology and ethnohistory of these regions provide our best data for investigating aspects of the transition from small, egalitarian households to ranked, corporate households. We argue that this transition occurs in all areas when three conditions are met. First, corporate groups beyond the nuclear or extended family must form. Second, there must be social or reproductive means to create differential corporate group size. And third, there must be a reason why smaller corporate groups cannot or will not fission from larger villages. Key words: Households, Hunter-gatherers, Social Inequality, North Pacific INTRODUCTION One of the most important transitions in the history The question becomes: what were the social and of humanity is a systemic shift from achieved status dif- environmental conditions that allowed striving headmen ferences to hereditary status differences or rank. In the to put themselves in a position of power and get away archaeological literature theories as to the origins of with it (following Binford 1983:220)? There are three or- ranked societies have included population pressure ganizational characteristics critical to the rise of heredi- (Binford 1969, 1983), scalar stress (Ames 1985; Johnson tary social inequality. The first is founded in village size 1982), competitive feasting (Hayden 1990, 1995, 1997), and household size (Hayden and Cannon 1982; Hayden control of resources (Coupland 1985a, 1985b, 1988a, and Gargett 1990). We see this as important to under- 1988b), control of labor (Arnold 1993, 1996a), warfare standing social and political ranking because, as has been (Carneiro 1970), control of trade (Bishop 1983, 1987), shown in a number of studies, there is a strong correla- economic intensification (Croes and Hackenberger 1988; tion between corporate group size, village population size, Matson 1983, 1985), storage (Testart 1982), and many resource abundance, and hereditary inequality (Coupland others (e.g., Arnold 1996b; Price and Feinman 1995). 1988b; Donald and Mitchell 1975; Hayden et al. 1985; Within these explanations are two primary themes: Maschner 1990, 1991, 1992). Thus, there must be an eco- groups and/or societies creating a new adaptation (nobil- system capable of supporting a reasonably large popula- ity for example) because of some external pressure tion, there must be a reason for nucleation, and there must (Ames 1985; Binford 1969, 1983; Croes and be a reason for the formation of multi-family corporate Hackenberger 1988; Johnson 1982), or individuals tak- groups. Second, it is clear that almost unilaterally, the ing advantage of either internal or external pressures for headman of the largest corporate group (or any other their own (or their kinsmen’s) self interest (Arnold 1992; multi-family organizing unit) in an independent commu- Hayden 1992, 1997; Maschner 1990, 1991, 1992; nity is most likely the headman of the village (Chagnon Maschner and Patton 1996). We take the latter approach. 1975, 1979a, 1979b, 1988; Maschner 1992, 1996a; Theoretically, following Hayden (1992, 1995, 1997), Maschner and Patton 1996). This is so because the leader Flannery (1986), Clark and Blake (1994) and Maschner of the largest social, political, or economic faction has the (1990, 1992; Maschner and Patton 1996), we argue that greatest number of political supporters to substantiate his individuals striving for status and prestige results in he- or her aspirations. And third, circumscription (either en- reditary social inequality when certain conditions are met. vironmental [e.g., Carneiro 1970] or social [e.g., Chagnon This model relegates all other explanations to the level of 1975]) has an important role in the rise of hereditary in- symptoms of inequality. equality in early villages because ranking does not de- 44 Alaska Journal of Anthropology Volume 1, Number 2 velop until small corporate groups no longer have the de- ranked household in the community. But not all societies sire or option to leave. Thus, when villages form with with high status headmen have hereditary inequality, which multiple kingroups or other corporate entities, when there brings up a precondition. There must be a reason for a is opportunity for differential corporate group size to de- number of corporate groups to live in the same location velop, and when small, less powerful groups have little (village) and it must be more expensive to leave the com- opportunity to leave, hereditary inequality will develop. munity than to be a member of a low status corporate group. Thus, when there is differential corporate group We apply this approach to the northern Northwest size, and smaller lineages cannot fission to new locations Coast, the Kodiak archipelago, and the lower Alaska or less hierarchical communities, ranking develops be- Peninsula areas inhabited at contact by Tlingit/Haida/ cause the headmen of the largest lineages can put them- Tsimshian, Pacific Eskimo (Alutiiq), and Aleut (Unangan), selves in a position of leadership and get away with it. respectively. These are excellent locations for this form of study because village surface features are readily ap- One of the biggest criticisms we have with theories parent, there is an excellent ethnographic record, and be- of labor control, trade control, resource control, or any cause in all three areas we see ranking developing along other kind of materialist manifestation of inequality is that similar trajectories. no one is willing to take a stand on the actual process by which individuals gain that control. Hayden’s competitive To put the conclusions first, we find specific simi- feasting argument is perhaps the closest, yet he does not larities in the development of villages in all three regions. indicate why some individuals are able to compete and Villages are argued to first form in all areas as a product others not (1992, 1997). Hayden argues that the largest of resource abundance. Later, intensification in village and most powerful corporate groups developed because formation and the formation of a ranked social organiza- they control some critical resource such as salmon tion appears to correlate with increasing levels of either (1997:25) that is in turn used to put others in debt through violent conflict or inter-ethnic interaction as seen through feasting. But there is no explanation of why individuals the construction of defensive fortifications and long dis- allow themselves to be put in debt or what this might tance trade. Diachronically, increasing house floor size actually mean for the distribution of power. Since Hayden and house floor size variability (together), are shown to is discussing the control of labor in the harvesting of the be good indicators of the development of hereditary in- controlled resource (as does Arnold 1996a), we are left equality and occurs between AD 200 and AD 1200. with a situation where a headman is controlling the labor of people who are most likely kinspeople who work for THEORY the headman only because they expect some return on their investment. Control of a resource is only interesting Maschner (1990, 1992) has argued that in all societ- if you are strong enough to prevent other kingroups from ies there are some individuals who strive for status and taking it away. One does not maintain control in these this status striving results in differential access to mates, societies by controlling external labor, but rather, by con- prestige, and wealth (see also Alexander 1979; Barkow, vincing your kinspeople that it will be a great investment Cosmides and Tooby 1992; Goldschmidt 1991; and many to support one’s own political aspirations. While the head- others). While strivers, aggrandizers, achievers, and des- man does indeed, at least in the social world, control re- pots have all been invoked in recent years (Flannery 1986; sources, he or she does so at the whim of their followers. Clark and Blake 1994; Hayden 1992; Maschner 1990, Feasting is just one of many expressions of rank that are 1992; Maschner and Patton 1996), little attention has been not used against one’s own group, but rather, against com- given to the actual process by which individuals put them- peting groups. Feasting is simply a means of demonstrat- selves in a position of high status and maintain it, even ing economic, political, and military prowess to avoid di- beyond death. rect confrontation over day to day affairs (cf. Rosman and Rubel 1971). Since it is only the largest corporate We argue that there is only one way in which this is groups that are usually able to give competitive feasts, possible – by having the largest corporate group (or some feasting is perhaps just another symptom of differential other supra-family integrating entity such as lineage, clan, corporate group size and status striving between head- or whatever). In nearly every society surveyed where men. Thus, to be a successful leader, one must convince differential lineage size has been documented (Maschner