University of Miami Law School University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository Articles Faculty and Deans 2000 Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution A. Michael Froomkin University of Miami School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/fac_articles Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Internet Law Commons Recommended Citation A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 Duke L.J. 17 (2000). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty and Deans at University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. WRONG TURN IN CYBERSPACE: USING ICANN TO ROUTE AROUND THE APA AND THE CONSTITUTION A. MICHAEL FROOMKINt ABSTRACT The Internet relies on an underlying centralized hierarchy built into the domain name system (DNS) to control the routing for the vast majority of Internet traffic. At its heart is a single data file, known as the "root." Control of the root provides singular power in cyber- space. This Article first describes how the United States government found itself in control of the root. It then describes how, in an attempt Copyright © 2000 by A. Michael Froomkin. t Professor, University of Miami School of Law. E-mail: [email protected]. Research and writing of this Article was supported by a Summer Grant from the University of Miami School of Law. Thank you to Karl Auerbach and Richard Sexton for technical information, to Tony Rutkowski for help with DNS history, to Jonathan Weinberg for a number of very helpful con- versations, to all the members of the BWG+ mailing list for an education, to James Boyle for including me in this symposium, to Julie Dixson for research assistance, and especially to Caro- line Bradley. Kind readers who helped me correct and improve drafts included Alan Davidson, John Hart Ely, Bret A. Fausett, Patrick Gudridge, David Johnson, David Post, Ellen Rony, Tony Rutkowski, Joe Sims, and Jonathan Weinberg. Remaining errors are my own uninten- tional contribution to further obfuscating ICANN's history. Readers have a right to know that I participate in activities that touch on the subject of this Article. I served as a member of the so-called Panel of Experts that advised the World In- tellectual Property Organization on its Domain Name Process. See infra note 13. Currently, I am a director of disputes.org, which, in partnership with eResolution.ca, is one of the dispute resolution providers accredited by ICANN. See Approved Providersfor Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at http'/www.icann.orgludrplapproved-providers.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2000) (providing a link to the eResolution website) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). I am also a co-founder of ICANNWatch.org, a group founded to increase awareness of ICANN's activities. The views expressed in this article are my own and should not be attrib- uted to either disputes.org or ICANNWatch.org. An earlier version of this paper was delivered in Durham, N.C., on March 3, 2000. Un- less otherwise noted, this Article aims to reflect technical and legal developments as of October 1,2000. DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:17 to meet concerns that the United States could so dominate an Internet chokepoint, the U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC) summoned into being the Internet Corporationfor Assigned Names and Num- bers (ICANN), a formally private nonprofit California corporation. DoC then signed contracts with ICANN in order to clothe it with most of the U.S. government's power over the DNS, and convinced other parties to recognize ICANN's authority. ICANN then took regulatory actions that the U.S. Department of Commerce was unable or un- willing to make itself, including the imposition on all registrants of Internet addresses of an idiosyncraticset of arbitrationrules and pro- cedures that benefit third-party trademarkholders. ProfessorFroomkin then argues that the use of ICANN to regu- late in the stead of an executive agency violates fundamental values and policies designed to ensure democratic control over the use of government power, and sets a precedent that risks being expanded into other regulatory activities. He argues that DoC's use of ICANN to make rules either violates the APA's requirement for notice and comment in rulemaking and judicial review, or it violates the Consti- tution's nondelegation doctrine. ProfessorFroomkin reviews possible alternatives to ICANN, and ultimately proposes a decentralized structure in which the namespace of the DNS is spread out over a transnationalgroup of "policypartners" with DoC. TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ............................................................................................... 20 I. The Domain Name System ...................................................... 37 A. Domain Names and Their Uses ...................................... 37 1. Domain Name Basics .................................................... 37 2. The Registration Hierarchy ....................................... 41 3. The Domain Name Resolution Hierarchy ................ 42 B. The Source and Import of Control of the Legacy R oot ........................................................................ 43 II. The DNS: A Contractual History ............................................. 50 A. Before ICANN .................................................................. 51 1. Early Days (1972-94) ................................................... 51 2. The NSF-NSI Cooperative Agreement (1993-95) ......... 57 3. The TM Community Awakens .................................. 59 4. PGP Media Lawsuit (1997) ......................................... 61 5. The Road to the White Paper (1997-98) ................... 62 B. Contractual Basis of ICANN's Authority (October 1998-present) ..................................................................... 70 2000] WRONG TURN IN CYBERSPACE 1. ICANN Formed (October 1998) ................................ 72 2. ICANN Opens Shop & DoC-ICANN Memorandum of Understanding (November 1998) ..... 82 3. ICANN Takeover of the IANA Function (1999) ......... 85 4. ICANN's Search for Revenue .................................... 87 5. The Tripartite Agreements (November 1999) .......... 89 III. DoC's Relationship with ICANN Is Illegal ........................... 93 A. ICANN Is Engaged in Policymaking ............................... 94 B. DoC's Relationship with ICANN ....................................... 105 1. DoC's Continuing Control over the Legacy Root ...... 106 2. Nature of DoC's Authority to Review ICANN's D ecisions .......................................................................... 110 3. The State Actor Question .............................................. 113 C. A PA Issues ............................................................................ 125 1. Do APA Exceptions Apply? ........................ ................. 126 2. Consequences of APA .................................................... 129 3. Is ICANN an "Advisory Committee"? .............. .......... 138 D. Constitutional Issues ............................................................. 141 1. Origins and Purpose of the Nondelegation D octrine ........................................................................... 143 2. Modem Reception of Private Nondelegation D octrine ........................................................................... 150 E. Due Process Issues ................................................................ 153 F. Structural Failures/Self-Dealing .......................................... 160 1. Tim e .................................................................................. 160 2. M oney ............................................................................... 161 IV. Reforming the U.S. DNS Policy ................................................. 165 A. The Policy Problem .............................................................. 166 B. ICANN Sets a Terrible Precedent ...................................... 168 C. A Better DNS Policy is Within Our Grasp ........................ 171 1. Limit ICANN to Technical Policymaking? ........... ....... 171 2. Full Privatization? ................................... ........................ 174 3. Give the DNS to an International Body9 ............. ........ 176 4. True Stewardship? .................................. ........................ 177 C onclusion ............................................................................................... 182 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:17 The availability of judicial review is the necessary condition, psy- chologically if not logically, of a system of administrative power which purports to be legitimate, or legally valid. LouIs L. JAFFE' INTRODUCTION The United States government is managing a critical portion of the Internet's infrastructure in violation of the Administrative Proce- dures Act (APA) and the Constitution. For almost two years, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) has been making domain name policy under contract with the De- partment of Commerce (DoC).2 ICANN is formally a private non- profit California corporation created, in response to a summoning by U.S. government officials, to take regulatory actions that