THE CONSENSUS CONSTITUTION Justin Driver* An ascendant view within constitutional law contends that the Supreme Court almost inevitably interprets the Constitution in a manner that reflects the “consensus” beliefs of the American public. Given that many of the Constitution’s key provisions contain indeterminate language, this view claims that Supreme Court Justices imbue those phrases with the prevailing sentiments of the times. This increasingly influential approach—one that is articulated by some of the most prominent voices within modern legal academia—aims to correct what it deems a romantic myth regarding the Court’s ability to protect minority rights. This Article challenges the ascendant view by identifying and critiquing the defining features of what it labels “consensus constitutionalism.” De- spite being grounded in history, consensus constitutionalism reveals no familiarity with a defining debate that flourished among American historians that stretches back to the 1950s—a debate that resulted in conflict-based history supplanting its consensus-based counterpart. Consensus constitu- tionalism offers an unsatisfying understanding of history, as it obscures the deep cleavages that often divide Americans regarding constitutional questions. Consensus constitutionalism also offers an unsatisfying understanding of law, as it invites a foreordained conception of constitu- tional decisionmaking and an anemic notion of the Court’s countermajoritarian capabilities. Reexamining Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia, this Article provides an alternate approach to exploring legal history—contested constitutionalism—which honors the significance of both ideological conflict and the Court’s counter- majoritarian capacities. * Assistant Professor, The University of Texas School of Law. I received particularly helpful comments on earlier drafts from Katharine Bartlett, Stuart Banner, Mitchell Berman, Alan Brinkley, Alfred Brophy, Josh Chafetz, Sherry Colb, Karen Engle, Laura Ferry, Cary Franklin, Joseph Fishkin, William Forbath, David Garrow, Jacob Gersen, Julius Getman, Jamal Greene, Ariela Gross, Lani Guinier, Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Pamela Harris, Bert Huang, Amy Kapczynski, Sanford Levinson, Jennifer Laurin, Richard Markovits, David Oshinsky, James T. Patterson, Lucas A. Powe, Jr., David Pozen, John Robertson, David Rabban, Lawrence Sager, Suzanna Sherry, Reva Siegel, Kevin Stack, Jordan Steiker, Gerald Torres, and Mark Tushnet. I also received useful feedback from faculty workshop participants at the University of Chicago, the University of Texas, and Vanderbilt University. Charles Mackel, Michael Raupp, Christine Tamer, and Mark Wiles provided excellent research assistance. 756 Texas Law Review [Vol. 89:755 Introduction Fifteen years ago, Professor Michael Klarman issued a clarion call urging his fellow law professors to examine the Supreme Court’s twentieth- century constitutional decisions from an external vantage point.1 In contrast to scholarship that analyzes doctrinal developments in hermetic isolation, the “external perspective” places judicial decisions within their larger social and political context.2 Although externalists long ago succeeded in illuminating some nineteenth-century constitutional decisions,3 Klarman lamented what he perceived as the method’s near abandonment regarding constitutional de- cisions of more recent vintage.4 In Klarman’s assessment, legal academics— besotted by the Warren Court’s landmark decisions—rejected externalism because they were dedicated to advancing the wrongheaded notion that the Court possessed a robust capacity for issuing decisions that protect margin- alized groups. “It is my belief that the myth of the Court as countermajoritarian savior is largely responsible for this gap in the literature,” Klarman contended.5 “It is time for constitutional historians to explode that myth, to identify and describe the parameters within which judi- cial review actually operates, and to create a richer and more credible account of the twentieth century’s civil rights and civil liberties revolutions.”6 In many respects, it would appear that legal academia has heeded Klarman’s call. External examinations of twentieth-century constitutional law, though never as neglected as Klarman suggested,7 now constitute nothing less than a dominant mode of understanding Supreme Court decisionmaking. Indeed, many of the most distinguished professors writing 8 today view modern constitutional law through the external lens. 1. Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 67 (1996). 2. Id. at 66–67. 3. See id. at 66 (citing DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978); STANLEY I. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE (1971)). 4. Id. at 66. 5. Id. at 67. 6. Id. 7. The Court’s shifting response to New Deal legislation—perhaps the most closely examined period of twentieth-century constitutional law—has often been attributed to external forces. Many scholars have suggested that President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s outside political pressure played a role in Justice Owen Roberts’s “switch in time.” See, e.g., William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Supreme Court “Packing” Plan, in ESSAYS ON THE NEW DEAL 69, 69–95 (Harold M. Hollingsworth & William F. Holmes eds., 1969). Professor Barry Cushman’s account of this period is revisionist precisely because it seeks to understand the Court’s response to the New Deal from an internal, law-based perspective rather than an external, politics-based perspective. See Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201, 206–07, 257–61 (1994). 8. See infra notes 79–83 and accompanying text. 2011] THE CONSENSUS CONSTITUTION 757 In other respects, though, the clarion call has not yet been answered—or even fully heard. Though Klarman sought “a richer and more credible account” of constitutional decisions from the last century,9 the leading scholarship employing externalism is notable for neither its richness nor its credibility. Today’s external legal history is marred by what this Article labels “consensus constitutionalism,” the claim that the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution in a manner that reflects the “consensus” views of the American public. This view is exemplified in recent major works by prominent legal academics including Klarman,10 Barry Friedman,11 Jeffrey Rosen,12 and Cass Sunstein.13 Those scholars—with their fixations on societal “consensus”—paint American legal history with a disfiguringly broad brush, obscuring the deep divisions that typify public response to con- stitutional questions. This consensus school of constitutional interpretation results in scholarship with two primary deficiencies. First, it makes for bad history. Second, it makes for worse law. The flight to consensus among law professors during the last decade eerily echoes a movement to consensus among history professors that began in the wake of World War II. In reaction to what they asserted was an over- emphasis on the role that conflict played in prior examinations of the past, a group of scholars led by Richard Hofstadter contended that historical inquiries should instead focus upon American commonality.14 The search among historians for unity rather than division burned incandescent during the 1950s, but its heyday proved brief. In 1959, historian John Higham wrote a devastating article deriding the “consensus school” of American history for its homogeneous conception of the past, a conception that elided the profound disagreements that have shaped the nation’s history.15 Higham’s article succeeded in restoring conflict to its central place in histori- cal interpretation, ultimately convincing even the founder of consensus-based 16 history of the school’s severe methodological limitations. 9. Klarman, supra note 1, at 67. 10. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004). 11. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009). 12. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA (2006). 13. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS: WHY THE FOUNDING DOCUMENT DOESN’T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE (2009). 14. See infra text accompanying notes 27–30. 15. See John Higham, The Cult of the “American Consensus”: Homogenizing Our History, 27 COMMENT. 93, 94 (1959) (“[C]urrent scholarship is carrying out a massive grading operation to smooth over America’s social convulsions.”). 16. See infra text accompanying notes 60–72. 758 Texas Law Review [Vol. 89:755 Although consensus constitutionalists (to varying extents) ground their scholarship in historical matters, their work bears no trace of the central de- bate that roiled history departments for many years. That debate among historians would seem to contain essential lessons regarding the potential pitfalls of external legal history, and it generated conclusions that are per- fectly adverse to the way that law professors invoke “consensus” today. Part I reviews that debate in some detail because many modern legal aca- demics either never learned its lessons or once knew but have now forgotten them. The regrettable consequences of consensus-based scholarship are, moreover, of even greater significance for law than they were for history. The consensus school of constitutional interpretation