CHAILLOT PAPER 50 What status for Kosovo? Dana H. Allin, Franz-Lothar Altmann, Marta Dassù, Tim Judah, Jacques Rupnik and Thanos Veremis Edited by Dimitrios Triantaphyllou Institute for Security Studies Western European Union Paris - October 2001 ii CHAILLOT PAPER 50 (A French version of this paper is also available from the Institute) The Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union Director: Nicole Gnesotto © Institute for Security Studies of WEU 2001. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo-copying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the Institute for Security Studies of WEU. ISSN 1017-7566 Published by the Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union and printed in Alençon, France, by the Imprimerie Alençonnaise. ii Contents Preface v Introduction 1 Dimitrios Triantaphyllou Chapter One: Unintended consequences – managing Kosovo independence 7 Dana H. Allin The die is cast 7 What is to be done? 10 Fear of further disintegration 14 The ratchet effect and its consequences 16 Chapter Two: The status of Kosovo 19 Franz-Lothar Altmann The existing legal framework 19 The constitutional framework for the provisional self-government 24 Options for the future status of Kosovo 26 A new approach: the Montenegrin platform for a new union and the final status of Kosovo 32 Chapter Three: Statehood and sovereignty – regional and internal dynamics in Kosovo’s future 35 Marta Dassù A hostage issue by definition 36 The need for a reassessment 39 The regional setting: from the Serbian to the Albanian factor 41 The situation in Kosovo: local dynamics and international influence 46 The challenges of the status – and possible solutions 51 Conclusion: the best is the enemy of the good 52 Chapter Four: Kosovo and its status 55 Tim Judah Chapter Five: The postwar Balkans and the Kosovo question 69 Jacques Rupnik After the battle: the change of regime and retreat of radical nationalism 70 The unfinished break-up of rump Yugoslavia 74 The future of Kosovo: four options 78 Chapter Six: The ever-changing contours of the Kosovo issue 85 Thanos Veremis Conclusion: Kosovo independence and regional stability are not incompatible 99 Dimitrios Triantaphyllou A comprehensive approach to the region 101 Direct dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina 103 Summing up 106 About the authors 109 iv Preface There is no doubt that the terrorist attacks of 11 September against America have drastically changed the international strategic order. It is not yet possible to discern the scale of this revolution, as new developments in the coming weeks may have further profound effects on the international system as a whole. Nevertheless, whatever the new priorities that European democracies have been addressing since the attacks, the traditional crises remain, and in the first place, for the Union, the insistent problem of what to do about Kosovo. It is the almost taboo question of the final status of Kosovo that is examined in this Chaillot Paper, edited by Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, a research fellow at the Institute, with the participation of the best known experts on the Balkans. Although written before the tragic events of 11 September, the contributions to this paper are still highly topical and pertinent. Of course the various authors do not all have the same vision of Kosovo’s final status but all agree that, whatever the solution recommended, the issue must now be openly tackled by the international community, in particular EU member countries. On the eve of the elections of 17 November, this Chaillot Paper constitutes a highly detailed survey of all the arguments for and against the independence of Kosovo. Going beyond the immediate future, new questions arising directly from the events of 11 September will of course have a bearing on the future stability of the Balkans and management of the area. The first concerns American policy. Evidently, the priority accorded to the fight against terrorism is de facto going to reduce even further the importance attached by the Bush administration to the Balkans. In the short term an American military withdrawal from all of the region seems probable. If that were indeed the case then the European Union would have the task of continuing the current military operations alone – SFOR, KFOR and Operation Amber Fox in Macedonia. The Europeans of course already assure the main part of the stabilisation tasks in the region, but if such a redeployment of American forces took place in the near future, the Union would find itself faced with the double challenge of on the one hand greatly speeding up its efforts in the realm of common defence and, on the other, forming a global political vision of all outstanding issues. More than ever, the question of what to do in the Balkans would become the v absolute priority for the European Union, and for it alone. Refusing to accept that responsibility in deference to the archaic principle of ‘in together, out together’, or drawing back because of the size of the task, on the pretext that European defence was not prepared, would be catastrophic for the very credibility of the Union. The second likely consequence of the attacks of 11 September concerns the substance of the European Union’s crisis management policy. Nowhere is the combination of weak state structures and prosperous criminal networks so patent as in the Balkans. Whether they like it or not, the Europeans involved in the stabilisation of Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia will from now on have to combine a policy of traditional peacekeeping with an attack on the financial base of terrorist activities, or even their training camps. The role of the police that the EU is supposed to be setting up alongside its military forces will de facto have to be modified. Lastly, on the political level, the consequences of 11 September 2001 are palpable in more than one way. As far as public opinion is concerned, the priority now being given to physical protection against attacks within the Union itself could considerably reduce the political and financial support given up until now to the task of stabilisation of former Yugoslavia. Convincing the public and national parliaments that homeland protection against terrorism begins with the projection abroad of European armed forces will become a new necessity for those responsible for ESDP. And the generally favourable image that the Albanians in the region have enjoyed since 1999 as victims of various exactions and discrimination could be reversed, making the search for a just and lasting solution in Kosovo and Macedonia all the more difficult. More than ever, finding an overall, coherent policy for the Balkans as a whole – making economic and financial aid subordinate to political objectives and reforming the Union’s various institutional structures to that end – will have to prevail in military operations carried out in pursuance of the ESDP. Nicole Gnesotto Paris, October 2001 vi Introduction Dimitrios Triantaphyllou The Kosovo exception, with all its legal and political ramifications, contin- ues to preoccupy the wider Balkan region1 and the international community. After having intervened, on an uncertain legal basis, to ensure that a genocide of Kosovo Albanians would be prevented, the international community, particularly the West, finds itself struggling to deal with the Kosovo exception. The 22,000-man strong operation, which was the biggest wartime deployment in Europe since the Second World War, represents the only case in modern history of the reversal of a systematic removal of ethnic groups. The implications and stakes are many. These can be perceived in terms of a number of concentric circles that have causal relationships with each other. The innermost circle is Kosovo proper, the relations between its ethnic groups and its relations with Serbia; the middle circle embraces the region at large, i.e. Kosovo’s relationship with its neighbours and the prospects of a ‘Greater Albania’ or ‘Greater Kosovo’ as well as the various transnational criminal links; the outer circle encompasses Kosovo’s rela- tions with the world, particularly the EU and the United States, and to a lesser degree Russia and China.2 The Kosovo conundrum principally reflects the contradictions of policy options and choices made by the international community due to the almost impossible task of applying universal precepts and dealing coherently with the consequences. A very important statehood issue is at play as well. Kosovo’s fate hinges on and reflects the continuing disintegration of Yugoslavia. The linkage to Montenegro and Serbia as the triptych holding together the FRY in its present form should not be discounted at a time when the authorities of Montenegro no longer recognise the legitimacy of the federal government. Beyond the fate of the federation and its linkage to the final status of Kosovo, the interethnic situation in Kosovo proper deserves careful study as it also contributes to the merits and demerits of Kosovo’s present and future form. 1 The terms ‘Balkans’ and ‘South-eastern Europe’ are used indifferently in this paper. 2 Modified version of argument presented in Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, ‘Kosovo Today: Is There No Way Out of the Deadlock?’, European Security, vol. 5, no. 2, Summer 1996, pp. 292-5. 2 What status for Kosovo? The handing over of Milosevic to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is also important in this regard as it suggests a willingness willy-nilly by some of the current leaders in Belgrade to move beyond the nationalist policies of the Milosevic regime. The current power play in Belgrade between the Federal President Vojislav Kostunica and the Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic very much reflects this reality.