Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, 2008 Reviews of Vanuatu and West Papua “elections alone will not bring about are not included in this issue. democracy nor guarantee stability or end all coups” (Fiji Times, 18 Jan Fiji 2008). His statement set the tone for Fiji’s military-backed government what became the core ncbbf mes- dug in its heels during 2008, defying sage—an insistence on far-reaching pressure to hold elections. At home, electoral reforms to eliminate rac- interim Prime Minister Frank Baini- ism recycled as justifi cation for the marama courted popular backing for regime’s resisting pressure to hold a “People’s Charter” and sought to fresh elections by March 2009. Invita- restructure the Great Council of Chiefs tions to join the council were refused (gcc). Externally, relations soured fur- by deposed Prime Minister Qarase’s ther with Australia and New Zealand Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua over the breach of the commitment to (sdl) party and the Methodist hold elections by March 2009, several Church, indicating that the majority death threats directed at Australian of indigenous Fijians remained deeply High Commissioner James Batley, and opposed to the interim government’s the expulsion of additional journalists initiatives. Both of the major North and diplomats. The economy fared Indian organizations, the Arya Samaj poorly, despite the recommencement and the Shree Sanatan Dharm Pra- of gold mining at Vatukoula and some tinidhi Sabha, took up seats on the recovery in tourist arrivals. The inner national council. So too did Mahendra circle around Bainimarama tight- Chaudhry’s Fiji Labour Party, which ened after the Fiji Labour Party (flp) had been backed by the vast major- ministers—including party leader ity of Fiji Indians at the elections two Mahendra Chaudhry—left the cabinet. years previously. A small but vocal In October, a panel of three judges minority of Fiji Indians remained sitting on the high court in the Qarase aloof; the National Federation Party v Bainimarama case ruled that post- refused to participate, as did the main 2006 coup presidential decrees were South Indian organization, the Then lawful, thus legitimizing the actions of India Sanmarga Ikya Sangam, and the the interim government. Fiji Muslim League. In response, the In January 2008, the National regime cultivated rival South Indian Council for Building a Better Fiji and Muslim groups (for details, see (ncbbf) held its fi rst meeting. Open- Prasad 2009). ing the proceedings, Catholic Arch- The draft People’s Charter, released bishop Petero Mataca echoed the in August, proposed a set of core position of his co-chair Frank Baini- shared values including sustainable marama by rejecting calls for a speedy democracy, a common national iden- return to the polls on the grounds that tity, enlightened leadership, poverty 337 338 the contemporary pacifi c • 21:2 (2009) reduction, and economic development reduced from 21 to 18. These were (ncbbf 2008a). Most were grand sensible proposals, which had been statements of principle that could have backed by many in pre-coup Fiji. The been embraced, at least rhetorically, by trouble was that they were now to be all of Fiji’s post-independence govern- introduced under the barrel of a gun, ments, and the document was largely with the regime backed by the Repub- silent on concrete steps to be taken. lic of Fiji Military Forces (rfmf) A few proposals stood out. “Main- urged to do so by Father David Arms streaming of indigenous Fijians in a (a Catholic priest) and others associ- modern, progressive Fiji” was to be ated with the Citizens’ Constitutional promoted by adoption of a common Forum (Arms 2008). “As the military name—“Fijian”—for all citizens (in regime [is] more or less acting out- contrast to the more usual everyday side the Constitution,” Father Arms usage of “Fijian” to refer to the indig- proposed, “the ncbbf should take enous community and “Indian” to the opportunity to push through refer to those descended from migrants the electoral reforms and amend the from the Subcontinent). Indigenous Constitution, by taking advantage of Fijians would henceforth be referred the military authority and ignoring the to as “i-Taukei” rather than “Fijian.” legal constitutional requirements for That sparked a familiar debate and making such changes.” The suggestion was predictably condemned by Qarase was condemned as “treasonous” by and the Methodist Church. In the former Leader of the Opposition Mick mid-1990s reformists had encour- Beddoes, who lamented that “men of aged usage of “Indo-Fijian” for those God” were in cahoots with “a mili- of Indian descent and “Fiji Islander” tary Junta, whose actions to date have for all Fiji citizens. But those terms been against the will of the people” never caught on in everyday speech (FijiLive, 6 June 2008). within Fiji, instead becoming confi ned The multiparty cabinet provision largely to polite liberal and schol- in Fiji’s 1997 constitution, entitling all arly discourse. The new terminology parties with over 10 percent of seats to is unlikely to acquire any greater participate in the cabinet, was also to currency. be dropped. These arrangements had The People’s Charter included not worked well during the 1999– proposals for a radical overhaul of 2000 Chaudhry or 2001–2006 Qarase the electoral system. The complex governments. However, after the May preferential system used at the elec- 2006 polls, Qarase had brought nine tions of 1999, 2001, and 2006 was flp members into the cabinet. For the to be dropped and replaced by an fi rst time since independence, both of open-list, proportional-representa- Fiji’s major parties—one representing tion system, as used in Finland and the ethnic Fijians and the other the Fiji Sri Lanka. Communal constituen- Indians—were cooperating together in cies, in which citizens vote separately government. In the rfmf newsletter, according to ethnic origins, were to Bainimarama had applauded “the evo- be replaced by a fully common roll lution of this great and new concept system, and the voting age was to be of power sharing at the executive level pol i t ical reviews • melanesia 339 of government” and demanded “total that he did not support the coup but support to the multi-party cabinet wanted to provide an ”exit strategy” from each and every member of the for the commander and his Fiji mili- Republic of Fiji Military Forces” tary forces. Yet Samy, like the Catholic (Mataivalu News, July /August 2006, archbishop, accepted that the military 3). In practice, the arrangement turned had every right to reshape Fiji’s future, out to be fraught with diffi culty. and that the country’s elected leaders Labour leader Mahendra Chaudhry and political parties could reasonably had stayed out, seeking at fi rst to be blackmailed—under the threat of retain the opposition leader’s offi ce, continued military control—into sign- then later protesting about the absence ing the charter. of clear “ground rules” for cabinet ncbbf moderates urged that if deliberations, and eventually publicly the People’s Charter was to halt the denouncing his colleagues for col- “coup culture” some discussion of laborating with Qarase. On the eve of the rfmf role was necessary. To this, the 2006 coup, Chaudhry insisted that the commander happily acquiesced: flp ministers follow the party whip the terms of reference for the working and vote against the government’s group on this matter urged extensive budget, while Qarase demanded col- rfmf involvement in government lective responsibility on the part of the deliberations on matters “related to cabinet. Had that experience shown national security” (ncbbf 2008b). that power sharing was unwork- The fi nal document notably dropped able, as many in Fiji and Australia that suggestion, proposing instead that argued? Was the weak design of the the Fiji military be “answerable to the power-sharing laws—which had been government and parliament in accor- belatedly inserted into the otherwise dance with our Constitution” (ncbbf Westminster-based 1997 constitu- 2008a, 7). This was an achievement tion—responsible? Most in Fiji blamed heralded by some as a major triumph the politicians and the soldiers, not the (see, eg, FijiLive, 8 Aug 2008). In design of the institutions. other respects, the charter embraced From the coup-makers’ standpoint, fashionable military phraseology; it the National Council for Building a urged that a “holistic approach to Better Fiji was a legitimizing device, human security be adopted by our and a convenient means for separat- security forces” (ncbbf 2008a, 8), ing collaborators from critics. It also and that this approach fi gure centrally provided a sense of purpose and in a “changing role for the rfmf that direction that was otherwise lack- brings it closer to the people” (ncbbf ing. For some civil society groups, the 2008a, 37). It aimed to “enhance the national council offered a platform for rfmf-community development part- the advancement of laudable objec- nership by strengthening its develop- tives—such as electoral reform, or just mental role to ensure that its profes- treatment for the poor and disadvan- sional, technical and social potential is taged. Director of the ncbbf Techni- fully realised”—a role that was to be cal Secretariat, John Samy, told view- achieved through an “expanded engi- ers of Fiji tv’s Close Up in January neering corps,” provision of “security 340 the contemporary pacifi c • 21:2 (2009) services,” biodiversity conservation, commissioners. The organs of state infrastructure rehabilitation, and were now extensively mobilized in a engagement in youth training pro- nationwide propaganda campaign. grams (ncbbf 2008a, 16). Stories emerged of undue pressure on Public outreach consultations to civil servants, including police and ascertain support for the charter schoolteachers (see, eg, Fiji Sun, 3 were launched in August, with plans Sept 2008).