Second Quarter 2002 Quarterly Launch Report 8 Launch Activity and Orbital Debris Mitigation INTRODUCTION As indicated above, launch vehicle upper stages and their mechanisms and components Since the start of human space activity, the have proven to be a considerable contributor number of orbital debris, or artificial objects to the orbital debris population. This report orbiting Earth that are no longer functional, shows how launch vehicles and launch activ- has steadily increased. These debris make up ity can create orbital debris and explains what 95 percent of all orbiting space objects and the U.S. and foreign governments and the consist of spent satellites and upper stages, aerospace industry are doing to minimize the separation devices, bolts, paint chips, and still amount of orbital debris generated by launch other spacecraft components. U.S. Space activity. Command tracks more than 9,000 objects larger than ten centimeters wide with ground- LAUNCH ACTIVITY AND ORBITAL based optical and radar telescopes; another DEBRIS CREATION 100,000 objects between one and ten cen- timeters are estimated to be orbiting Earth. Along with derelict spacecraft, upper stages Figure 1 shows computer-generated views of comprise the greatest concentration of mass catalogued space objects, including debris, in Earth orbit. More than 1500 rocket bodies distributed in various Earth orbits. launched by the spacefaring nations of the world currently circle Earth, with nearly half of these in low orbits. The orbital stages of launch vehicles can create hazards to opera- tional spacecraft in two main ways: through collisions and explosions. Collisions involving launch vehicle orbital stages can occur if spent upper stages and their components remain in operational orbits after directly injecting their payloads. While rare, collisions can cause devastation to active spacecraft, as occurred when the Japanese Figure 1: Space objects distributed in low- Earth (left) and geostationary, medium-Earth, ECS-1 (Ayame-1) satellite was incapacitated and Molniya (right) orbits after colliding with the third stage of its own launch vehicle. While the risk of an orbital debris impact to an operational spacecraft is low, the debris Accidental explosions of upper stages are the population continues to grow at 175 metric primary source of the approximately 2200 tons per year and has caused damage to active rocket body debris now in Earth orbit. Upper spacecraft. Indeed, orbital debris' presence is stages may explode when, after the upper apparent in the dings and dents observed on stage successfully delivers satellites to orbit, spacecraft such as the Space Shuttle, the stored energy, such as residual propellants Russian Mir space station, and the Hubble and pressurants, undergoes thermal cycling or Space Telescope. As a result, efforts are is over-pressurized due to solar heating. Such underway in both the government and indus- explosions can generate hundreds of frag- try to mitigate orbital debris. ments of orbital debris and, along with space- craft explosions, account for almost 40 per- Second Quarter 2002 Quarterly Launch Report 9 stage in 1996. Three upper stages and two upper stage components exploded in 2001. The launch industry and U.S. government, along with governments around the world, have recognized the risks associated with upper stage collisions and explosions. The next section shares the efforts the U.S. gov- ernment, international organizations, and the launch industry have made to minimize on- orbit collisions and explosions involving launch hardware, in turn mitigating orbital debris. LAUNCH ACTIVITY AND ORBITAL DEBRIS MITIGATION Figure 2: Notional spread of orbital debris after a Recognizing that keeping the space environ- spacecraft or upper stage explosion ment clean is a common responsibility and cent of all orbiting objects tracked from the desire, spacefaring governments and compa- ground. Figures 2 and 3 depict how orbital nies have worked to develop procedures and debris can spread over time. standards for minimizing the amount of orbital debris they produce in their launch Upper stage explosions are considered to be activities. While some of the government pro- the greatest source of the most hazardous cedures and standards developed pertain debris in Earth orbit. The creation of more specifically to launch hardware, many are debris adds to the risk of collision with an generally applicable to space activity. Though active satellite. While Space Shuttle described in separate sections below, U.S. Discovery successfully avoided debris from government, foreign and international, and an exploded Pegasus upper stage with an in- launch industry orbital debris mitigation orbit maneuver in 1997, the less fortunate efforts have coincided in time and have influ- French military satellite CERISE was struck enced one another. by a fragment of an exploded Ariane upper U.S. Government Efforts In 1988, the Reagan Administration released the first national space policy that called for agencies to "seek to minimize the creation of orbital debris." The following year, the U.S. government issued a report on orbital debris. Noting the lack of good measurements on the orbital debris environment, the report called for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of Defense (DoD) to develop a plan to moni- tor the debris environment. As a result, these Figure 3: Gabbard diagram of the orbital debris agencies embarked on programs to address distribution from a Long March upper stage this recommendation. Figure 4 shows the explosion in March 2000 Haystack radar, a facility operated by the Second Quarter 2002 Quarterly Launch Report 10 Massachusetts Institute of Technology's national space policy reaffirmed the earlier Lincoln Laboratory that NASA and the Air policy by calling for U.S. government agen- Force have used since 1990 to track small cies to minimize space debris. The 1996 pol- orbital debris. icy also required NASA, DoD, the intelli- gence community and the private sector to develop design guidelines for U.S. govern- ment space hardware procurements and stressed a U.S. leadership role in urging other nations to adopt debris minimization prac- tices and policies. Shortly after the issuance of the report, a U.S. interagency working group led by NASA and DoD developed a work plan to study the debris environment and to work with U.S. government agencies and other spacefaring nations and international organizations to design and adopt guidelines to minimize orbital debris. In 1997, the working group created a set of "U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices." Based on a NASA safety standard of proce- Figure 4: The Haystack radar dures for limiting debris, the Standard Practices are intended for government-oper- The Bush Administration took up orbital ated or -procured space systems, including debris mitigation as a formal goal in its 1989 satellites as well as launch vehicles. The national space policy, adding that the United interagency group has shared the guidelines States would also encourage other nations to with the aerospace industry to encourage adopt debris mitigation policies and prac- voluntary compliance. tices. Following the approval of that direc- tive, NASA and DoD adopted policies con- Now forming the foundation of U.S. govern- cerning the mitigation of orbital debris in all ment protocol regarding orbital debris, the of their space activities. Standard Practices support four objectives, presented below. All of the practices apply to The government updated its orbital debris report launch vehicle components and upper stages. in 1995, issuing five recommendations. These recommendations were to: (1) continue and 1. Control of debris released during enhance debris measurement, modeling, and normal operations. Spacecraft as well as monitoring capabilities; (2) conduct a upper stages are to be designed to eliminate focused study on debris and emerging low- or minimize debris released under normal Earth orbit (LEO) systems; (3) develop gov- circumstances. Any planned release of debris ernment/industry design guidelines on larger than five millimeters that remain on orbital debris; (4) develop a strategy for orbit for over 25 years should be evaluated international discussion; and (5) review and and justified on the basis of cost effective- update U.S. policy on debris. These recom- ness and mission requirements. mendations have guided U.S. government activity regarding orbital debris mitigation 2. Minimization of debris generated by since that time. Just one year after the accidental explosions, during and after mis- issuance of this report, President Clinton's sion operations. During missions, spacecraft Second Quarter 2002 Quarterly Launch Report 11 and upper stages should not have any credible by space transportation in several ways. In 14 failure modes for accidental explosions, or Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part the probability of a failure mode's occurrence 415.39, the FAA requires expendable launch should be limited. After missions, on-board vehicle (ELV) launch license applicants to stored energy should be depleted or safed. demonstrate that: (1) there will be no unplanned contact between the vehicle, its 3. Selection of safe flight profile and components, and payload after payload sepa- operational configuration. Spacecraft and ration; (2) no debris will be generated from upper stage design and mission profiles the conversion of chemical, pressure, and should estimate and