Volume 41, Number 3, January 2011 assp rt PThe Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Inside... Nixon, Allende, and the White House Tapes Roundtable on Dennis Merrill’s Negotiating Paradise Teaching Diplomatic History to Diplomats ...and much more! Passport The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Editorial Office: Mershon Center for International Security Studies 1501 Neil Avenue Columbus OH 43201 [email protected] 614-292-1681 (phone) 614-292-2407 (fax) Executive Director Peter L. Hahn, The Ohio State University Editor Mitchell Lerner, The Ohio State University-Newark Production Editor Julie Rojewski, Michigan State University Editorial Assistant David Hadley, The Ohio State University Cover Photo President Nixon walking with Kissinger on the south lawn of the White House, 08/10/1971. ARC Identifier 194731/ Local Identifier NLRN-WHPO-6990-18A. Item from Collection RN-WHPO: White House Photo Office Collection (Nixon Administration), 01/20/1969-08/09/1974. Editorial Advisory Board and Terms of Appointment Elizabeth Kelly Gray, Towson University (2009-2011) Robert Brigham, Vassar College (2010-2012) George White, Jr., York College/CUNY (2011-2013) Passport is published three times per year (April, September, January), by the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, and is distributed to all members of the Society. Submissions should be sent to the attention of the editor, and are acceptable in all formats, although electronic copy by email to [email protected] is preferred. Submis- sions should follow the guidelines articulated in the Chicago Manual of Style. Manuscripts accepted for publication will be edited to conform to Passport style, space limitations, and other requirements. The author is responsible for accuracy and for obtaining all permissions necessary for publication. Manuscripts will not be returned. Interested advertisers can find relevant information on the web at: http://www.shafr.org/newsletter/passportrates.htm, or can contact the editor. The opinions expressed in Passport do not necessarily reflect the opinions of SHAFR or of The Ohio State University. The editors of Passport wish to acknowledge the generous support of The Ohio State University, The Ohio State University—Newark, and the Mershon Center for International Security Studies. © 2011 SHAFR Page 2 Passport January 2011 Passport The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Volume 41, Number 3, January 2011 In This Issue 4 Filling the Three-Year Gap: Nixon, Allende, and the White House Tapes Anand Toprani and Richard A. Moss 12 A Roundtable Discussion of Dennis Merrill’s Negotiating Paradise: U.S. Tourism and Empire in Twentieth-Century Latin America Mariola Espinosa, Alan McPherson, Jeffrey Taffet, and Dennis Merrill 20 A Roundtable Discussion of the 60th Anniversary of the Korean War James I. Matray, Brian Clancy, and William Stueck 24 Report of the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, January 1-December 31, 2009 28 History in Action: Teaching Diplomatic History to Diplomats Melissa Jane Taylor and Alexander R. Wieland 31 A Cold War Update for a High School Teacher Ronald Eisenman 34 An Introduction to the Department of State Central Foreign Policy File, 1973-1976 David A. Langbart 48 SHAFR Council Meeting Minutes 52 The Diplomatic Pouch 63 The Last Word Richard Hume Werking Passport January 2011 Page 3 Filling the Three-Year Gap: Nixon, Allende, and the White House Tapes, 1971-73 Anand Toprani and Richard A. Moss1 lmost forty years after the for collaboration between the expropriation, for example, and military coup d’état that United States and other friendly by refusing to renegotiate Chilean ousted the democratically governments in Latin America “to loans at the January 1972 meeting Aelected government of Salvador coordinate efforts to oppose Chilean of the so-called Paris Club.6 The Allende, historians are still striving moves which may be contrary to our tapes shed additional light on the for a thorough and nuanced mutual interests.”3 The tapes also rift that developed between Foggy understanding of U.S.–Chilean corroborate one contention of the Bottom and the White House and relations between 1970 and 1973. Not Church Committee’s investigation Treasury Department after the State surprisingly, many students of the of U.S. covert action in Chile, that Department failed to fall into line period have focused on the more “[e]conomic pressure exerted by the with the president’s directives on dramatic aspects of the story, namely, United States formed an important the U.S. government’s response the role of the Central Intelligence part of the mix” of measures to nationalization of American Agency and Department of State in designed to pressure the Allende business assets and Chilean debt trying to prevent Allende's election government into abandoning its renegotiation. Finally, the tapes via the covert actions known policy of nationalization without offer tantalizing hints that the U.S. as Track I and Track II, and the adequate compensation. The tapes intelligence community played complicity of the CIA and the Nixon also bear out the committee’s an active role in assisting the administration in the military coup observation that U.S. policy administration with its policy of of September 11, 1973 that ushered in towards Chile was largely reactive.4 blocking Chilean loan renegotiation.7 the Pinochet regime. Unfortunately, Consequently, the pivotal moment Nixon’s taping system in the Oval this emphasis has come at the in U.S.–Chilean relations during Office had been in operation less than expense of a thorough examination the Allende era, and the one that two weeks when Kissinger raised of U.S. foreign policy during the ultimately convinced the Nixon the possibility of having the U.S.S. three years of Allende’s presidency. administration to reject any Enterprise call at Valparaiso, Chile. The often-overlooked Nixon tapes, accommodation with Allende, was Although Allende had been in office which cover approximately 85 the Chilean government’s decision only four months, relations between percent of Allende’s tenure in to nationalize the remaining assets the Chilean and U.S. governments office, are one source that can help of the major American copper were already abysmal. Following refocus the debate on U.S. policy companies operating in Chile—the his inauguration, Allende had during these years, particularly as it Anaconda Copper Company, the requested constitutional authority concerns the Nixon administration’s Kennecott Copper Corporation, and to nationalize the American response to the Allende government’s the Cerro Corporation—on July 16, copper companies in Chile. By expropriation policy.2 1971. the time of Nixon and Kissinger’s The tapes indicate that U.S. The Nixon tapes also offer conversation about the Enterprise policy after Allende’s election fascinating insights into the nature visit, the Chilean Senate had already closely followed the guidelines and execution of U.S. foreign policy passed a constitutional amendment established by National Security concerning Chile. For example, the authorizing nationalization.8 Nixon’s Decision Memorandum (NSDM) tapes prove, as Henry Kissinger curt dismissal of Allende’s offer 93 of November 9, 1970, and they argued in his memoirs, White to show U.S. sailors “authentic corroborate several findings from House Years and Years of Upheaval, democracy” as having been the Church Committee Report of that Nixon delegated much of the issued only for the “worst, damn 1975. Following Allende’s election, responsibility for formulating and propaganda purposes” was therefore NSDM 93 dictated that while the implementing U.S. policy concerning probably prompted by his frustration U.S. government’s “public posture” expropriation, both in Chile and at the course of events in Chile.9 towards the Allende government throughout the Third World, to The news was no better two should “be correct and cool,” his brash but capable Treasury months later, when Allende’s Popular Washington could apply economic secretary, John Connally.5 The Unity bloc won a solid victory in the pressure on Santiago by discouraging tapes also demonstrate that Nixon Chilean municipal elections, securing U.S. private investment in Chile evinced a strong personal desire 49.5 percent of the total vote. In one and curtailing both bilateral and to apply economic pressure on the of the earliest conversations recorded multilateral economic assistance. government of Chile in various in the president’s hideaway office Furthermore, NSDM 93 called ways—by taking a tough line on in the Executive Office Building, Page 4 Passport January 2011 Nixon and Kissinger surveyed the the surreptitiously recorded meetings we can impose financial or economic damage and ruminated on future made later that week it appears that sanctions.” Later in the conversation developments. Although Allende there was a policy disagreement Nixon agreed, telling Kissinger that had come to power legally, Kissinger between Connally and Rogers over “the problem, really, in all these opined that he would follow the the U.S. response to expropriation, loans, Henry, is that . pretext or “German strategy” of gradually with the situation in Chile front and no pretext, he doesn’t need ’em . eliminating dissent in order to create center.14 Second, it’s just the fact that if you a “fascist” state. Kissinger then The following morning, Nixon start doing it, it’s going to encourage excoriated the State Department, described the Sequoia meeting to others to do likewise.” He added, which had doggedly supported the Kissinger. “[Connally’s] argument is “And I think John’s point is that Christian Democrats at the expense that, for example . we have $500 some place along, maybe we ought of the conservative candidate (former million worth of contracts with to find a place to kick somebody in president Jorge Alessandri), even Guyana on bauxite and so forth,” the ass.” Connally recommended though in Kissinger's mind the only Nixon explained.