DEBATE PAPERS JUNE 2005 no 12 Drugs and Democracy Programme Downward Spiral T Banning Opium in Afghanistan N and Burma I TRANSNATIONAL TNI Briefing Series No 2005/2 CONTENTS AUTHORS: Martin Jelsma ● Editorial 3 To m Kramer ● Banning Opium in Afghanistan 4 EDITORS: The Changed Rules of Engagement David Aronson ◆ Lessons from the Taliban Ban 5 Fiona Dove ◆ Jihad Against Poppies 6 ◆ Getting the Job Done 8 DESIGN: ◆ Competing Structures and Interests 9 Jan Abrahim Vos ◆ Contradictions in the Field 10 ◆ A Humane and Sustainable Approach 12 PRINTING: Drukkerij Raddraaier, ● Banning Opium in Burma (Myanmar) 13 Amsterdam Enterering a Downward Spiral ◆ Impact on Rural Livelihoods 13 FINANCIAL SUPPORT: ◆ Alternative Livelihoods 15 ◆ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Change in SPDC Leadership 16 ◆ (The Netherlands) International Law Enforcement 18 ◆ Renewed Fighting at the Border 19 ◆ CONTACT: Beyond the Deadline 20 Transnational Institute T De Wittenstraat 25 Box: Opium Production in Afghanistan and Burma 21 PO Box 146 56 Box: Drugs Consumption in Afghanistan and Burma 22 1001 LD Amsterdam N Netherlands ● References 23 Tel: -31-20-6626608 I Fax: -31-20-6757176 [email protected] www.tni.org/drugs Europe and Plan Colombia Debate Paper No. 1,April 2001 Fumigation and Conflict in Colombia. In the Heat of the Debate - Debate Paper No. 2, September 2001 Afghanistan, Drugs and Terrorism. Merging Wars Debate Paper No. 3, December 2001 Alternative Development and Eradication.A Failed Balance - Debate Paper No. 4, March 2002 Polarisation & Paralysis in UN Drug Control. Breaking the Contents of this booklet may impasse - Debate Paper No. 5, July 2002 be quoted or reproduced, An Agenda for Vienna. Change of Course provided that the source of Debate Paper No. 6, March 2003 information is acknowledged. Alternative Development and Conflict in Colombia. Cross TNI would like to receive a Purposes - Debate Paper No. 7, June 2003 copy of the document in which Forward Operating Locations in Latin America.Transcending this booklet is used or quoted. Drug Control - Debate Paper No. 8, September 2003 Drugs and Conflict in Burma (Myanmar). Dilemmas for Poli- You may stay informed of TNI cy Responses - Debate Paper No. 9, December 2003 publications and activities by Cocalero movements in Peru and Bolivia. Coca or death? subscribing to TNI’s bi-weekly Debate Paper No. 10,April 2004 e-mail newsletter. Send your request to [email protected] or Drugs and violence in Brasil.A Pointless War Debate Paper No. 11, November 2004 register at www.tni.org All editions of the series are available online in English Amsterdam, June 2005 and Spanish at: www.tni.org/reports/drugs/debate.htm EDITORIAL “People will need other sources of income as soon as with international pressure, but please give us a possible, or we’ll be the witness to a big disaster.” chance for survival,” pleaded Ngo Shui of the Unit- (Gen. Muhammad Daoud, Afghan Deputy Minis- ed Wa State Army. ter of Interior for Counter-Narcotics) Levels of humanitarian and alternative develop- ment aid are very different between the two n Afghanistan and Burma, the two largest countries. The international community has opium producers in the world,local author- pledged significant funds for the reconstruction ities are implementing bans on the cultiva- of Afghanistan, about $4 billion per year. Several tion of poppy. hundred millions of those funds are available for rural development in poppy growing regions in On 26 June 2005,on the International Day against 2005/6. Drug Abuse and Illicit Drug Trafficking,the opium ban comes into force in the Wa region in north- In sharp contrast, pledged support for develop- ern Burma. No poppy planting will be allowed ment in the Kokang and Wa regions in Burma, from this day on.In Afghanistan the 2005 harvest undertaken by UNODC in partnership with was already disrupted through coercive pressure other UN agencies and NGOs, does not exceed on farmers not to plant poppy and some fields $15 million, including emergency food assistance were forcefully eradicated of those who did not and malaria and HIV/AIDS prevention, leaving an comply. urgent shortfall of a similar amount just for pro- jects already planned. T In Afghanistan and Burma combined, 4.3 million people are directly involved in the opium econ- The main reasons for this discrepancy are polit- omy. Many more are indirectly dependent on ical.While Afghanistan is an important partner in N income generated on the illicit market. Banning the US-led war against terror,the US and the EU opium has an immediate and profound impact have advocated a policy of isolation and sanctions I on livelihoods. In Nangarhar province in against the Burmese military government. They Afghanistan early signs indicate one of the have also restricted development assistance,with responses is migration from former poppy areas some exception in the field of humanitarian aid. to the provincial capital or into Pakistan. Expe- riences from the Taliban opium ban back in 2001 Opium growing regions in both countries will showed similar patterns. In the case of the enter into a downward spiral of poverty because Kokang region in Burma,where a ban was imple- of the ban.The reversed sequencing of first forc- mented in 2003,more than a quarter of the pop- ing farmers out of poppy cultivation before ensur- ulation left the region. Other responses include ing other income opportunities is a grave mistake. households selling off livestock and land, with- According to the World Bank,“there is a moral, drawal of children from school, and abandon- political and economic case for having alternative liveli- ment of health services. hoods programs in place before commencing eradi- cation.” If they are not even accompanied by sig- “We are under huge pressure from China,Thailand nificant aid,the reductions will simply not be sus- and the US,” says Vice-Chairman of the Wa Cen- tainable. tral Authority, Xiao Min Liang. “If we do not do something to stop opium production nobody wants Aggressive drug control efforts against farmers to have anything to do with us.” These bans are a and small-scale opium traders, and forced eradi- response to pressure from the international com- cation operations in particular, also have a nega- munity, worried about heroin flowing into their tive impact on prospects for peace and democ- countries,the spread of HIV/AIDS and,in the case racy in both countries. of Afghanistan,about possible financing of terror- ist groups from drugs money. In neither Afghanistan nor Burma have farmers had any say at all in these policies from which they Afghan and Burmese authorities alike urge the stand to suffer most. It is vital that local commu- international community to accompany their nities and organisations that represent them are pressure with substantial aid. “We are doing our given a voice in the decision-making process bit and it is hurting us, donors must do their bit,” the which has such a tremendous impact on their Nangarhar governor emphasised.“We will comply livelihoods. Drugs and Conflict no 12 - June 2005 3 B ANNING OPIUM IN AFGHANISTAN THE CHANGED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT “Today, many Afghans believe that it is not drugs, force in their province.Local officials finally did but an ill-conceived war on drugs that threatens allow the team to destroy limited amounts of their economy and nascent democracy.”1 poppy in designated areas, but after a month Ashraf Ghani, of operations the Central Poppy Eradication former Finance Minister Force had eliminated less than 100 out of the originally targeted 15,000 hectares to be “If you pull at the thread of counter-narcotics the destroyed nationwide this harvest season.The wrong way,because of the sheer proportion of the US embassy sent an angry memo to US State gross domestic product wrapped up in this busi- Secretary Condoleeza Rice.“Although President ness, you should be careful of unintended conse- Karzai has been well aware of the difficulty in try- quences.”2 ing to implement an effective ground eradication General James Jones, program, he has been unwilling to assert strong NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe leadership,even in his own province of Kandahar.”4 In fact,over the past months,many had advised against the use of force at a moment when n 12 April 2005,the Central Poppy alternatives were not yet in place for the Eradication Force, trained and approximately 2.3 million Afghan people accompanied by US private Dyn- (356,000 households) involved in the opium Corp contractors, was deployed economy, roughly 10 percent of the popula- T to Maiwand,Kandahar,for its first major forced- tion.Reluctance to engage in aggressive means eradication operation.Desperate opium farm- of eradication, as pressed for by the US and ers watching their livelihoods being destroyed UK governments, has good reasons behind it N so close to harvest day,exploded into protest. and is widespread in the rest of the interna- “Dense clouds of black smoke hung over the town tional community and within the Afghan gov- I from burning barricades, hundreds of shots rang ernment. President Karzai’s ‘unwillingness’ to out from gun battles,and American helicopter gun- allow the Central Poppy Eradication Force to ships flew low overhead.”3 After a day of fierce rampage unrestricted through the provinces, rioting, leaving several police and farmers is rooted in wisdom. Even more so now that wounded —officials denying local accounts the 2005 harvest is expected to show a sig- about fatalities— the eradication force retreat- nificant decline in opium production already, ed and the operation was suspended. without US/UK-led militarised eradication campaigns. The following days, talks took place to discuss how to proceed between Kandahar governor According to the UN Office on Drugs and Ghul Agha Shirzai, Pashtun elders, mullahs, Crime (UNODC),in Helmand,Nangarhar and local warlords and General Zahir Aghbar,head Uruzgan provinces (jointly accounting for half of the eradication brigade.