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University Microfilms 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 A Xerox Education Company 73-11,476 I COOLEY, John Andrew, 1944- j THE UNITED STATES AND THE PANAMA CANAL, j 1938-1947: POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENT- I ATION FRCM MUNICH THROUGH THE EARLY YEARS j OF THE COLD WAR. j The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1972 j History, modem | i University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan I © 1973 JOHN ANDREW COOLEY ALL RIGHTS RESERVED THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED. THE UNITED STATES AND THE PANAMA CANAL, 1938-19^7* POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION FROM MUNICH THROUGH THE EARLY YEARS OF THE COLD WAR DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By John Andrew* Cooley, B,At, M,A. ****** The Ohio State University 1972 Approved by * Adviper / Department of Histo PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received. University Microfilms, A Xerox Education Company To my parents» John William and Ruth Marie Cooley ii PREFACE One of the primary aims of this dissertation is to trace the perceptions that policy makers had of the strategic value of the Panama Canal from I938 through 1947. Another is to examine policy formulation and implementation in light of those perceptions. The final aim is to follow the changes in perception! for­ mulation and implementation and to discern how changes in one caused changes in the others. One could approach these themes in several ways* i The first would be to treat the canal as an isolated strategic entity. A second would he to deal with it essentially within the context of United States- Fanamanian relations. A thirdt and the approach used here# is to examine the role of the canal in the frame­ work of the general sweep of American foreign policy I 1 and the more specific one of hemispheric policy. ! The weaknesses of this approach are three. First! it leads to a certain diffuseness. When one shifts from the general picture to an analysis of strategy and the canal L the elucidation of the general iii necessarily suffers. The implications of hroad judgments about the basic thrusts of American foreign policy are not fully explored and the reader iB asked to accept some conclusions without conclusive proof. Second, the scholarship involving the area of general policy must necessarily be incomplete* many of the viewpoints rest upon the work of other scholars. All of this leads finally to a degree of unevenness. Certain assumptions and implications are stressed. Others, important to the conduct of American foreign policy in general but not particularly germane to hemispheric policy, are either neglected or given little explanation. Yet the weaknesses of this approach are also its strength. Going from the general to the specific gives the reader a perspective that he would otherwise lack. Shifts in perception and implementation would make little sense without dealing with the events and policies that caused them. This is especially the ease in the years from 1938 to 19^7 when the events of World War XI and the coming of the Cold War caused policy makers to change their views of the world, the hemisphere and the Panama Canal, Since the canal bisects the Republic of Panama, relations with that country have been of constant importance to the United States in maintaining and iv protecting the canal. Panama's political stability and international alignment were consequently of great concern to Washington, So United States-Panamanian relations form, in a sense, the first in a series of concentric circles of external factors determining policy perception., formulation and implementation. The second level of analysis concerns United States-Hemispheric relations, exclusive of Canada. This was particularly true of the years under consider­ ation since the United States had adopted a new approach, the Good Neighbor Policy, toward Latin America, The essential tenets of this policy were respect for national sovereignty, reciprocity and multilateralism. This meant, to some degree at least, that what the United States did in the rest of the hemisphere affected what it did in Panama, and thus had an influ­ ence on Washington's policies for protecting and main­ taining the canal. The reverse was also true. The final level of policy concerned the continents of Europe and Asia. Events in these areas caused definite changes in the perceptions of, and policies toward, the Western Hemisphere, Panama and the canal. And since the United States was not a militarily aggressive power, the changes in policy were reactive . and strategically defensive. So while events in Europe v and Asia caused changes in Washington's hemispheric policy, the converse was not true in any significant way. Events and changes involving the canal and the first two circles often interacted and caused further reverberative events and changes in the hemisphere* they did not affect policy toward Europe and Asia, All of this action, reaction and interaction, of course, took place over time. In this study, the Munich Conference of September, 1938 is the point of departure. This is so because that event led Presi­ dent Franklin Roosevelt to the realization that Hitler's Germany had become a potential threat to the United States, One of the initial reactions to this event was to begin fostering, in the spirit of the Good Neighbor Policy, a sense of multilateralism and collec­ tive response among the various American republics. Another American reaction was to begin building up the defenses of the canal. This meant acquiring lands outside the Canal Zone in the Republic of Panama and collaboration with that nation within the framework of the Good Neighbor Policy and hemispheric unity. After Pearl Harbor and American entry into the war, a new set of operating principles came into play. In broadest terms, they were to deter Japan, keep Great Britain in the war at all costs, prepare the vi United States for an active role in Europe and Asia, and to keep the war away from the Western Hemisphere, Although there was fear of an attack upon Latin America until late in 19^2, neither Germany nor Japan really had the capability to launch such an attack. This meant a commitment of all possible United States resources and energy toward Europe first, and then Asia. The consequence of this policy for Latin America was being assigned a low priority status and so little in the way of resources was sent south of the border. But because the threat to the Western Hemisphere was seemingly real enough during the first two years of the war, the United States felt compelled to spend some time to preserve unity, Latin American nations received just enough food and other resources to keep them stable and just enough arms and attention to make hemispheric unity and multilateral participation more than mere words, Panama was both part of this pattern and yet apart from it. As a sovereign American nation, it was involved in all the consultation,. As terri­ torial possessor of the canal, Panama often demanded more aid and displayed a greater sensitivity toward neglect than did other American nations. Confronted with this situation, the United States had to strive for an equation that would equitably balance adequate vii defense of the canal, Panama's unique situation and the preservation of multilateralism. During the final years of the war, Latin America was no longer threatened and so its defense was no longer a high priority consideration. And as an Allied victory seemed ever more imminent and as Washington concentrated its resources increasingly on active theatres, the nations of Latin America became ever more restless. They felt their sacrifices were unappreciated and demanded a greater diversion of resources to themselves at the very time the United States wanted optimal supplying of the active theatres.