Lobster 60 SUCCESS The CIA in Guatemala, 1954 James Lusher On 18 June 1954, following the positive outcome in Iran a year previously, backed by the President, Congress and the State Department, the CIA launched their next interventionist operation. It entailed replacing the Guatemalan left-wing, reformist leader Jacobo Arbenz Guzman – seen by many in the US as a Communist sympathiser – with a leader who would be more suitable to US interests strategically, politically and economically, the dictatorial General Carlos Castillo Armas. The effects of the US-sponsored coup d’état were deep and far reaching. For the CIA and the Eisenhower administration, ‘its triumph confirmed the belief....that covert operations offered a safe, inexpensive substitute for armed force in resisting Communist inroads in the Third World.’ 1 This ultimately led to complacency in tactics and methods, and the subsequent failure in Cuba in 1961. Guatemalan politics was also transformed, but not along the path of ‘success’ – as the CIA operation was codenamed – and democracy but one of bloodshed, dictatorship and tragedy. As the Guatemalan ambassador to the US at the time, Guillermo Toriello, stated in his introduction to the book Guatemala in Rebellion: ‘The complicity and support given by a succession of United States governments to the executioners of our people have drenched 1 Nick Cullather, The CIA’s Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala 1952-1954, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006) 2nd edition, p. 8. 15 Winter 2010 our road to liberation in innocent blood.’ 2 This essay will explore the reasoning behind the CIA intervention in Guatemala, the preparation involved in the operation, how it was carried out, and the aftermath, highlighting the extent to which the CIA was specifically used to meet Eisenhower’s foreign policy objectives. The arrival of Jacabo Arbenz Guzman Following the 1944 revolution, which saw Dictator Jorge Ubico stand down, leading to democratic elections, Juan Jose Arevalo was elected. As Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer explain in their account of the coup, Bitter Fruit, Arevalo set out four main priorities when he took power: ‘agrarian reform, protection of labour, a better educational system and consolidation of political democracy,’3 ideas most notably expressed in his 1947 Work Code, which improved the conditions for labour. In the 1951 elections, following the assassination of his main opponent Francisco Arana, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman emerged victorious. In his inaugural speech he stated his primary objective was ‘to convert Guatemala from a country bound by a predominantly feudal economy into a modern, capitalist one.’4 The difference between Arevalo and Arbenz, essentially, was that Arbenz would go further in applying the role of government in Guatemala’s modernisation. His most striking reform was announced on 17 June 1952: named Decree 900, it aimed to completely restructure and make more equal land ownership in rural Guatemala, converting the vast amounts of unused crops, usually left in the soil, into staple food crops. This would lessen the reliance 2 Guillermo Toriello, ‘Introduction’ in Jonathan L. Fried (ed.) Guatemala in Rebellion, (New York: Grove Press, 1983) p. 17. 3 Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (New York: Doubleday, 1982) p. 37. 4 Jacobo Arbenz, Discourses [Speeches] (Guatemala City: Tipografia, Nacional, 1951) p. 14. 16 Winter 2010 of the Guatemalan economy on expensive imports, and, through increased technological innovation, free up the huge number of agricultural workers needed during harvest time, to create an industrial workforce. The plan looked to distribute the land of those latifundios (landowners) with more than 223 acres to as many peasants as possible.5 By 1953, while Guatemala was still underdeveloped, progress was certainly being made, and most notably along lines similar to that of the New Deal and programs the US was supporting in Japan.6 Cold War paranoia, however, meant the situation was viewed somewhat differently in Washington. The reasons for US intervention into Guatemala are often based around two beliefs: the first that Communist infiltration eventually led to direct action from the US,7 through the CIA but under the authorisation of the White House, to protect hemispheric security; and the other that the US acted to protect financial interests, most prominently those of the Boston-based United Fruit Company (UFCO),8 which had large economic interests in Guatemala and lobbying power in Washington. The first of these views, while not leading to firm presidential action until Eisenhower, did start to bloom under Truman. Although most in the State Department were on the whole unconcerned, at first, about Arevalo and the Guatemalan situation, some more persistent anti-Communists 5 Thomas Melville, and Marjorie Melville, Guatemala: The Politics of Land Ownership, (New York: Free Press, 1971) pp. 44-45. 6 By 1953 the government had redistributed an estimated 740,000 acres, which amounted to an average 100,000 families or 500,000 individuals receiving some land, an estimated 10.4 acres per individual. See Karl M. Schmitt and David D. Burks, Evolution or Chaos: Dynamics of Latin American Government and Politics (New York: Praeger, 1963) p. 8. 7 See Richard H. Immerman The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998) and John Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars (Chicago: Elephant, 1996), Cullather (see note 1) and Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike’s Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 1981). 8 See Schlesinger and Kinzer (see note 3). 17 Winter 2010 such as Spruille Braden, were not satisfied; and alongside heightened reforms in Guatemala caused a ‘general uneasiness within the Truman administration,’ 9 leading to increased ‘thin’ intelligence gathering.10 The duck test No matter how thin the evidence was, reports of the possibility of Communism in Guatemala continued. Richard Patterson Jr., Truman’s ambassador to Guatemala, coined the ‘Duck Test’ in which, using the metaphor of a duck, he explains that just because a duck is not wearing a label, if he ‘swims like a duck’ and ‘quacks like a duck’ then you can probably reach ‘the conclusion that the bird is a duck, whether he’s wearing a label or not.’ 11 John Peurifoy, who would be Eisenhower’s Guatemalan ambassador, would later apply this test. After talking to Arbenz he stated that ‘he talked like a Communist, he thought like a Communist, he acted like a Communist and if he is not one, he will do until one comes along’ 12 – a revealing statement about US Cold War policy thinking. Following Arevalo’s 1947 work code, United Fruit, seeing this action as ‘an assault on free enterprise’,13 found powerful voices who could bring their fears to the Oval Office, notably Edward L. Bernays, a master of public relations, and Thomas 9 Richard Immerman, ‘Guatemala as Cold War History’, Political Science Quarterly, 95:4 (Winter, 1980-1981) p. 635. 10 Intelligence gathering in Guatemala at this time was the responsibility of the FBI. 11 Richard Patterson, ‘Draft of Speech to Rotary Club,’ 24 March 1950, Patterson Papers, box five, Truman Library (Missouri) cited in Stephen E. Ambrose (see note 7) p. 222. 12 House of Representatives, ‘Subcommittee on Latin America of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression’, Ninth Interim Report of Hearings: Communist Aggression in Latin America, (1954) p. 12. 13 Nick Cullather (see note 1) p. 15. 18 Winter 2010 G. Cocoran, a major lobbyist.14 When United Fruit land was expropriated under Arbenz’s Decree 900, compensation of $600,000 was offered in agrarian bonds. The sum was in fact UFCO’s own valuation, but, regardless, this caused outrage in the company, which proceeded to launch a huge PR campaign and sponsor junkets to Guatemala in order to highlight their grievances and depict Arbenz as a Communist.15 While these reports and lobbing tactics, along with UFCO’s close contacts in the White House and State Department, did gain recognition, with Schlesinger and Kinzer even arguing that UFCO held ‘the fate of Arbenz and his ambitious social reforms,’16 neither Truman nor Eisenhower would warrant action purely on this basis. Eisenhower even stated that, ‘expropriation in itself does not, of course, prove Communism.’17 However, in the context of the Cold War situation, and the need to protect America’s ‘backyard’, United Fruit was seen as an example of the American way of life, which in turn was being threatened by those who wanted to undermine it – the Communists. So a threat to UFCO was a threat to US national interests and security.18 This link was made by John 14 Jim Handy, ‘The Most Precious Fruit of the Revolution: The Guatemalan Agrarian Reform 1952-54’, Hispanic American Historical Review, 68:4, (November 1988) p. 699. 15 Correspondents from Time, Chicago Tribune, Newsweek and the New York Times were sent to report on Communist activities. The press took the bait, and floods of articles denouncing the Guatemalan government were published, such as Fitzhugh Turner’s five part series on Guatemala in the New York Herald Tribune in February 1950, and Sydney Gruson’s report (The New York Times, 4 June 1954 p. 1) which called UFCO ‘the whipping boy for the Communists, the pawn in the Soviet’s vast conspiratorial design.’ Also see Richard Immerman (see note 7) p. 112. 16 Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer (see note 3) p. 77. 17 Dwight D Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963), pp. 421-22. 18 Martin Needler, The United States and the Latin American Revolution (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972), p. 79. 19 Winter 2010 F. Dulles, who stated that if UFCO did receive the desired payment, ‘the problem would remain just as it is today as far as the presence of Communist infiltration in Guatemala is concerned.