ANTI-TERRORIST RESPONSES IN CRISIS SITUATIONS By William R. Matchett, MSSc (Dist) Detective of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) Associate Lecturer at the European Police College at Bramshill (CEPOL), United Kingdom (The research does not represent the views of the PSNI) CONTENTS PAGE NUMBER 1.0 PREAMBLE ............................................................................................. 2 2.0 CRISIS – Emerging Threat & Overreaction .......................................... 3 2.01 Causes of Conflict: .............................................................................. 3 2.02 A complex Problem - Terrorism: .......................................................... 4 3.0 CRISIS - Elite PIRA Units & Tough Law ................................................ 5 3.01Divided Support: ................................................................................... 5 3.02 Identified Solution - Hybrid Model: ...................................................... 7 3.03 Tip of the Spear: .................................................................................. 7 3.04 Misconceptions: .................................................................................. 9 3.05 Tough Law – Loughgall: .................................................................... 11 3.06 Lynagh & Al-Zarqawi: ........................................................................ 13 3.07 Tough Cop: ....................................................................................... 15 4.0 DELAYED CRISIS – Lack of Guidelines .............................................. 16 4.01 Guidelines: ........................................................................................ 16 4.02Human Rights .................................................................................... 16 4.03 Police Doctrine ................................................................................. 16 5.0 SUMMARY ............................................................................................. 18 REFERENCES ............................................................................................. 19 ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................ 20 1 Palacio de la Aljafería – Calle de los Diputados, s/n– 50004 ZARAGOZA Teléfono 976 28 97 15 - Fax 976 28 96 65 [email protected] 1.0 PREAMBLE This narrative examines the Royal Ulster Constabulary‟s (RUC)1 Anti-Terrorism (AT) efforts in combating a violent Republican insurgency by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)2 in Northern Ireland (1969-1998). Of particular interest is the area of Intelligence-led policing. To a lesser extent, the Sunni insurgency by Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) (2004 – present) and the US-led response is employed as a means of providing contrast and context. Isolated references to other conflicts are also included. The aim is to reflect on State response in a crisis situation [for the purpose of the narrative, crisis situation has been loosely interpreted as a terrorist initiated situation]. Of note, the equally abhorrent aberration of Loyalist terrorism is only fleetingly referred to as a consequence of having narrowed the focus towards PIRA. The work does not seek to study the typology, methodology or ideology of terrorism. However, as many definitions exist of what terrorism is, to add clarity, the author is drawn to his first introduction to the word as a teenage Constable, „the use of violence for political ends‟. The terms – terrorist, guerrilla and insurgent - regularly interleave in the following pages, all three relate to terrorist violence, albeit in different settings and to varying extents. For most Western nations terrorist incidents are an infrequent occurrence, whereas countries enduring insurgency suffer a regularity of hostilities. The work gravitates heavily towards insurgency-inspired conflict in nations such as NI, Iraq or Afghanistan, as opposed to the normalcy of somewhere like England, Germany or the USA. Consequently, in defining Anti-Terrorism, one is minded of it being a catch-all label that can cover a range of measures resistant to terrorism in all nations. Counter-Terrorism (CT) and Counter-Insurgency (COIN) are therefore used under the generic Anti-Terrorism rubric. To clarify the AT descriptor, in the context of this draft, Anti-Terrorism is defined as Law Enforcement’s opposition to unlawful violence used for political ends. It is also useful to briefly define several models later referred to: Criminal Justice Model – Civil Policing; War Model – military primacy; and Hybrid Model – paramilitary policing. 1 The RUC was a locally recruited volunteer force of approximately 13,000 Officers, Patten (1999, 75). 2 Hereafter, the author refers to PIRA and not the PIRA, in keeping with practitioner language. 2 Palacio de la Aljafería – Calle de los Diputados, s/n– 50004 ZARAGOZA Teléfono 976 28 97 15 - Fax 976 28 96 65 [email protected] The author offers five sections in the narrative. Section One: Preamble; precedes a collection of separate phases identifying several crises in the evolution of the RUC‟s Anti-Terrorism Organisation – Section Two: Crisis – Emerging Threat & Overreaction; Section Three: Crisis – Elite PIRA Units & Tough Law; and Section Four: Delayed Crisis – Police Doctrine. A closing section (Section Five) summarises the work. 2.0 CRISIS – Emerging threat & Overreaction ‘While nothing is easier than to denounce the evil doer, nothing is more difficult than to understand him’. Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky3 2.01 CAUSES OF CONFLICT Terrorist conflict, particularly a terrorist insurgency, is the most complex of problems. It is unlikely for anyone to tell the story of the Northern Ireland (NI) insurgency, or indeed any terrorist conflict, in a way that will command general agreement. Such discourse, and so much of the gulf in understanding that plagues AT efforts has to do with the wilful disregard for the others point of view. As an example, what Israelis call the war of Independence, Palestinians call the Nak ba or catastrophe. Israel labelled the attacks on Jewish neighbourhoods in Jerusalem and Jaffa in 1920 as riots; Palestinians view it as popular uprisings! The difficulty is not in the nature of events but in the way we perceive them. Taleb (2008, 59) outlines that „this confirmation problem pervades our modern life, since most conflicts at their root have the following mental bias: when Arabs and Israelis watch news reports they see different stories in the same succession of events...Once your mind is inhabited with a certain view of the world, you will tend to only see instances proving you to be right. Paradoxically, the more information you have, the more justified you will feel in your views‟. A study of both PIRA and AQI reveals a timeline of historic grievances dating back centuries that feed into their latest phase of the struggle. Alonso (2007, 59) highlights this in his research, that for Republicans, the Northern Ireland 3 Hudson (1999), Preface. 3 Palacio de la Aljafería – Calle de los Diputados, s/n– 50004 ZARAGOZA Teléfono 976 28 97 15 - Fax 976 28 96 65 [email protected] conflict was „merely a continuation of the 1919 war of Independence‟4. Indeed, Cromwell (1640s) and the famine (1840s) are other archived incidents that incite Irish Republican hatred towards the British. Similarly, AQI recount the Crusades of the Holy lands in the 11th Century and the more modern Palestinian/Israeli dimension. It is critical to identify that the hearts and minds element is core to any nascent AT plan - looking at it from the other guy‟s point of view as opposed to your own. This can only be achieved by studying one‟s opponent and their support base. 2.02 A COMPLEX PROBLEM - TERRORISM It is much easier and faster to destroy than to build. In 1969 Policing in Northern Ireland had no answer to an illegal terrorist insurgency conducted by the Provisional IRA that threatened to overthrow democratic rule. PIRA violence served to purposely distort religious differences and provoked a sectarian conflict, a point amplified by the new term ethnic cleansing being introduced to the world following PIRA attacks on Protestant families along the Irish border. The destructive impact of the internecine violence that emerged produced a general public need to contain it. PIRA‟s aim was to control the population and create fear and a corollary of silence, dual conditions, which prevented the wider population from helping the police. The criminal justice system was identified as a weakness to be exploited. They legitimised law enforcement as targets for murder, effectively distancing them from the community by forcing them into fortified bases and patrolling in the constant expectation of being attacked. AQI were later to follow the same template so effectively mapped out for them by PIRA. Terrorism, particularly insurgency, is the ultimate complex problem. There are no simple or perfect solutions. It is intransparent and dynamic. Your opponent is mostly unseen, even when he strikes. To unlock it, thereby requires an opaque and highly mobile key, both features of Intelligence-led policing. This may seem an obvious observation, matching like with like, however; following the fatal shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes (22nd July 2005) by the London 4 Abbott (2000, 12-13) documents that 700 RIC [RUC succeeded the RIC] officers were killed and over 1000 wounded by the IRA during the Irish War of Independence