School of Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies • Arizona State University P.O. Box ABCDEF • Tempe, Arizona AIFAB-CDEF hps://sites.google.com/site/dwportmore/ [email protected] Curriculum Vitae Douglas W. Portmore ACADEMIC P OSITIONS FERC– (Full) Professor of Philosophy (tenured) School of Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies Arizona State University FERW–RB Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Faculty Fellow The University Center for Human Values, Princeton University September R, FERW – July , FER FERC–RW Head of Philosophy School of Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies Arizona State University FERI Visiting Fellow, School of Philosophy Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University June FERI – July FERI FEEA–RC Associate Professor of Philosophy (tenured) School of Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies Arizona State University FEEA–E_ Faculty Fellow, Center for Ethics and Public Affairs The Murphy Institute, Tulane University September R, FEEA – April D, FEE_ FEEI–EA Assistant Professor of Philosophy (tenure-track) Department of Philosophy, Arizona State University FEEE–EI Assistant Professor of Philosophy (tenure-track) Department of Philosophy, California State University, Northridge R__A–EE Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy (not tenure-track) Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston EDITORIAL P OSITIONS FERW– Associate Editor Portmore Curriculum Vitae //R_ Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political and Legal Philosophy FERI– Member of the Editorial Panel Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. FEE_– Category Editor for “Varieties of Consequentialism” and “Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics.” PhilPapers (philpapers.org) FERI–RA Associate Editor and Discussion Notes Editor Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy (www.jesp.org) FEEC–RD Co-founding Editor and Contributor PEA Soup, a blog dedicated to philosophy, ethics, and academia. (peasoup.us) AREAS OF S PECIALIZATION ª NORMATIVE ETHICS: teleology, maximalism, consequentialism, consequentializing, supererogation, moral worth, virtuous motivation, special obligations (i.e., associa- tive duties), agent-centered options, agent-centered constraints/restrictions, paradox of deontology, duty of beneficence, moral dilemmas, self-other asymmetry, agent- relative/agent-neutral distinction, actualism versus possibilism, the problem of over- determination, the puzzle of plural obligation, the principle of moral harmony, per- fect and imperfect duties, the distinction between moral and non-moral reasons, making a difference, and the problem of causal impotency. ª REASONS AND RATIONALITY: weighing reasons, paKern-based reasons, reasons- responsiveness, transmission of reasons, reasons to be moral, underdetermination by reasons, what we just plain ought to do (all things considered), different types of strength a reason can have (enticing, requiring, and justifying), reasons and obliga- tions with respect to aitudes and their relationship to reasons and obligations with respect to actions, the self-torturer puzzle, the wrong-kind-of-reasons problem, the basic belief, time and rationality, the rationality and fiKingness of emotions, the rela- tionship between reasons with respect to more and less specific options, and whether ‘reason’ implies ‘can’. ª ACTION, AGENCY, ATTITUDES, AND RESPONSIBILITY: accountability, action theory, mor- al luck, mental agency, reactive aitudes, moral responsibility, guilt and shame, ac- counts of blame, collective action problems, the connection between blame and de- sert, the connection between moral requirements and blameworthiness, the connec- tion between control and moral responsibility, reasons-responsiveness, rational ca- pacities, aitudes and fiKingness, the toxin puzzle, rational control versus volitional control, and obligations and responsibilities with respect to reasons-responsive aKi- tudes (e.g., beliefs, desires, and intentions). ª METAETHICS: moral rationalism, internalism versus externalism, the putative overrid- ingness of morality, ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, the relationship between morality and self- interest, and informal deontic logic (e.g., the inheritance principle, Ross’s paradox, Professor Procrastinate, the paradox of gentle murder, the problem of act versions, etc.). Page 2 of 23 Portmore Curriculum Vitae //R_ ª VALUE THEORY: final value, intrinsic value, value pluralism, the concept of wellbeing, theories of wellbeing, the principle of organic unities, the wrong-kind-of-reasons problem, the value of achievement, the shape-of-a-life phenomenon, and the buck- passing account of value. ª APPLIED ETHICS: problems involving collective harm, effective altruism, collective ac- tion, and causal impotence (e.g., voting, eating meat, and climate change), obligations to distant strangers, obligations to future generations (e.g., total principle, non- identity problem, mere addition paradox, repugnant conclusion), and the ethics of eating meat. ª METAPHYSICS OF DEATH: posthumous harm, the badness of death, and the alleged asymmetry between pre-vital and postmortem nonexistence. AREAS OF C OMPETENCE ª Bioethics, Introductory Symbolic Logic, and the History of Modern Philosophy. EDUCATION R__I–_A Ph.D. in Philosophy, June R__A University of California, Santa Barbara The Structure of Common Sense Morality CommiKee: Ma Hanser (Chair), Chris McMahon, and Burleigh Wilkins Post-Graduate (Exchange) Student Centre for Human Bioethics & Department of Philosophy Monash University, Australia Studied under Peter Singer and Michael Smith. R__R–_D M.A. and C.Phil. in Philosophy, January R__D University of California, Santa Barbara Thesis: “The Compatibility of Internalism and Moral Objectivism” R_AB–_R B.A. in Philosophy and Political Science, March R__R University of California, San Diego PUBLICATIONS AUTHORED BOOKS ) Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options (New York: Oxford University Press, FER_). ISBN: _BA-ER_E_CIDIE ) Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality (New York: Ox- ford University Press, FERR). ISBN: _BA-ER__B_CID_ Page 3 of 23 Portmore Curriculum Vitae //R_ ª Oxford Scholarship Online. Oxford University Press. January FERF. hKp://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/.RE/acprof:oso/_BAER__B_CI .EER.EE/acprof-_BAER__B_CID_. ª Paperback edition. (New York: Oxford University Press, F). ISBN-R: _BA-ER__D_WCIE EDITED BOOKS ) Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism (forthcoming with Oxford University Press, USA). PEER-REVIEWED JOURNAL ARTICLES ) “Desert, Control, and Moral Responsibility,” forthcoming in a special issue of Ac- ta Analytica. ) “Control, Aitudes, and Accountability,” forthcoming in the sixth volume of Ox- ford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. ) “Maximalism and Moral Harmony,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research _W (): DRA–DCR. ) “Maximalism versus Omnism about Permissibility,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (FE): CFB–CIF. ) “Maximalism versus Omnism about Reasons,” Philosophical Studies RBC (FER): ,_ID–,_. ) “Transitivity, Moral Latitude, and Supererogation,” Utilitas F_ (FER): FAW–F_A. ) “Uncertainty, Indeterminacy, and Agent-Centered Constraints,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy _I (): FAC–F_A. ) “Perform Your Best Option,” The Journal of Philosophy R (FE): CDW–CI_. ) “Imperfect Reasons and Rational Options,” Noûs CW (FE): FC–WE. ) “The Teleological Conception of Practical Reasons,” Mind RFE (FERR): RRB–RID. ) “Consequentialism and Moral Rationalism,” Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics (): RFE–RCF. ) “Rule-Consequentialism and Irrelevant Others,” Utilitas (): DWA–DBW. ) “Consequentializing,” Philosophy Compass C (FE): DF_–. ) “Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding?” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice R (): DW_–DAA. ) “Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism,” Philosophical Studies RDA (FEEA): CE_–CFB. ) “Welfare, Achievement, and Self-Sacrifice,” Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, www.jesp.org, (), vol. F, no. (F pp.) Page 4 of 23 Portmore Curriculum Vitae //R_ ) “Desire Fulfillment and Posthumous Harm,” American Philosophical Quarterly C (): FB–DA. ) “Consequentializing Moral Theories,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly A (F): D_– . ) “Combining Teleological Ethics with Evaluator Relativism: A Promising Result,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly AW (FEEI): _I–RRD. ) “Position-Relative Consequentialism, Agent-Centered Options, and Supereroga- tion,” Ethics (): DED–D. ) “Can an Act-Consequentialist Theory Be Agent-Relative?” American Philosophical Quarterly DA (): DWD–B. ) “McNaughton and Rawling on the Agent-Relative/Agent-Neutral Distinction,” Utilitas RD (FE): DIE–. ) “Commonsense Morality and Not Being Required to Maximize the Overall Good,” Philosophical Studies REE (FE): R_D–FRD. ) “Does the Total Principle Have Any Repugnant Implications?” Ratio (): AE–. ) “Can Consequentialism Be Reconciled with Our Common-Sense Moral Intui- tions?” Philosophical Studies _ (R): R–. INVITED CHAPTERS AND ARTICLES ) “Introduction,” forthcoming in Douglas W. Portmore (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism (Oxford University Press, USA) ) “Consequentialism and Coordination: How Consequentialism Has an AKitude Problem.” In Christian Seidel (ed.), Consequentialism: New Directions, New Prob- lems? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, FERA), pp. BR–A. ) “Teleological Reasons.” In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, FERA), pp. BWC–BAD. ) “Parfit on Reasons and Rule Consequentialism.” In Simon Kirchin (ed.), Reading Parfit: On What MaVers (London: Routledge, FERB), pp. RDI–RIF. ) “Précis: Commonsense