An investigation into the irregular military dynamics in Yugoslavia, 1992-1995 Kate Ferguson Ph.D University of East Anglia School of History 97,948 This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with the author and that use of any information derived there from must be in accordance with current UK Copyright Law. In addition, any quotation or extract must include full attribution. None of the material offered here has previously been submitted by the candidate for a degree in this or any other University nor has it formed part of solely or jointly-authored publications. It is a wholly original and independent contribution. 1 Abstract This dissertation makes an original contribution to knowledge of how irregular military actors operate in modern mass atrocity crises, providing an evidence- based multi-perspective analysis of the irregular military dynamics that accom- panied the violent collapse of Yugoslavia (1991-1995). While it is broadly accep- ted that paramilitary or irregular units have been involved in practically every case of genocide in the modern world, detailed analysis of these dynamics is rare. A consequence of paramilitary participation in atrocity crises –which can be seen in academic literature, policy-making, and in popular understanding– has been to mask the continued dominance of the state in a number of violent crises where, instead of a vertically organised hierarchical structure of violence, irregular actors have comprised all or part of the military force. Here, analysis of structures of command and control, and of domestic and international net- works, presents the webs of support that enable and encourage irregular military dynamics. The findings suggest that irregular combatants have participated to such an extent in the perpetration of atrocity crimes because political elites bene- fit by using unconventional forces to fulfil devastating socio-political ambitions, and because international policy responses are hindered by contexts where re- sponsibility for violence is ambiguous. The research also reveals how grassroots armed resistance can be temporarily effective but, without the benefits of cent- ralised capabilities, cannot be easily sustained. While the variety of irregular military activity that took place in former Yugoslavia was significant, it is clear that the irregular dynamics were more substantial and more effective when op- erating within, or in close coordination with, structures where the state retained greater powers of central command and control. Furthermore, the dissertation identifies substantial loopholes in current atrocity prevention architecture and suggests the utilisation by state authorities of irregular combatants as perpetrat- ors in atrocity contexts will continue until these loopholes are addressed. 2 Acknowledgements This project could not have been completed without the support and encour- agement of many wonderful people; I owe a great debt to them all. I must first acknowledge the Arts and Humanities Research Council of England and Wales, who awarded me full studentships for my M.Phil and PhD degree programmes. Without these funds I would never have been able to pursue post-graduate stud- ies and I will always be immensely grateful for the opportunities I have enjoyed as a result. I would like to express my gratitude to the History department at UEA for providing a supportive research environment and, through the Barney Fund, for enabling aspects of this research to be presented at UK and inter- national conferences. Thanks go to Geoff Hicks, Silvia Evangelisti, Ian Farr, Richard Mills, and Matt Willer. I’m grateful to the staff of the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives at King’s College University of London. I am in- debted to Rebecca Jinks for her thoughtful comments on an early draft, and to Chris Woolfry for his suggestions and positivity. Particular thanks go to Mark Vincent, whose enthusiasm and encouragement throughout our years in and out of the library has been a great comfort. For their warm hospitality during early research and writing trips, I extend thanks to the whole family at Guest House Rose in Sarajevo. Thank you Ros and Frank for the loan of beautiful May Cottage, it was a lovely, happy place to write up. Above all, I thank my supervisor and now great friend, Cathie Carmichael, for years of advice, motivation, and belief. Cathie has always been generous with her time and always known the right thing to say. (She has also been a great help in assisting in translating research materials.) Thank you to my many friends who live outside the academic bubble and without whom I would never have made it this far, especially to Katie, Sophie, and Agatha. Huge thanks to my mum and dad for their endless love and support, and to Max for always being there for his geeky sister. Andy, thank you for believing in me, for sacrificing so much, and for making everything that is to come possible. 3 Contents I Introduction 7 0.1 Towards a methodology . 12 0.2 Working with ICTY Sources . 22 0.3 Definitions & terminology . 29 0.4 Setting the Scene on the gathering storm . 33 II The Architecture of Violence 40 1 Serbian Command 51 2 The Croatian model 79 3 Bosnian Government forces 102 4 Building national structures of command & control; some conclusions 122 III Criminal shadows 134 5 Social banditry 136 6 Institutional banditry 147 7 A terrorist diaspora 160 8 Assessing the criminal dynamics 165 IV Bellum omnium contra omnes? Looking at local networks of command & control 170 9 Explaining local irregular participation 174 10 Implementing (and interpreting) the Instructions of the Ser- bian People 183 4 11 Bosniak Localities 190 12 Local Croat Structures 197 13 Paramilitaries of political parties 199 14 Interpreting identity-based violence on the local level 203 V A note on social networks and the wartime (a)moral order213 VI Conclusions 232 VII Bibliography 245 5 Prologue In 1992, Yugoslavia was fracturing along lines of conflict and identity. The former communist state, first created in 1918 and put back together in 1945 in the wake of the Second World War, was a federation of six republics; Bosnia- Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. After 1974 and the adoption of a new constitution, two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, flanked Serbia. It was a religiously and culturally mixed state but not all the republics reflected the same demography; Slovenia was the most homogenous, Bosnia the more mixed. Under Marshal Tito, who had led the multiethnic ‘Partizan’ resistance to Axis occupation, Yugoslavia had embraced communism and forged a unique path of socialist politics. The Yugoslav experi- ence of the Second World War had involved civil war and an attempted genocide of Serbs at the hands of Croatian Ustaše as well the trauma of the Nazi mael- strom. The communist party succeeded in uniting the republics under a banner of “Brotherhood and Unity,” which subverted older identities of religion, culture, republic-patriotism, and perceived ethnic differences, with a collective identity of Yugoslavism. But when Tito died in 1980 it was clear that the communist state needed to reform. Economic and political crisis worsened in Yugoslavia as other communist countries in Europe began to repudiate the regimes that had been forced upon them by Moscow. In the constituent Yugoslav republics, communit- ies rediscovered and reinvented past identities as nationalism filled the political vacuum left by the dead patriarch. In 1990 Slovenia voted to to leave the federation, leading to a ten-day conflict between the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (JNA) and the Slovenian Territorial De- fence. Unlike what was to follow in Croatia and Bosnia, the Slovene government had protected its defence structures from being stripped by the JNA. Croatia and Bosnia both held referendums and also voted for independence but here the re- discovered identities clashed; many Serbs living in Croatia and Bosnia wanted to remain in a Yugoslav federation ruled by Belgrade while Croats and Muslim Bosnians (sometimes referred to as Bosniaks) sought self-determination. What followed was a series of bitter conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia, and later in Kosovo, that broke apart the federation and destroyed all remnants of Tito’s brotherhood and unity. 6 Part I Introduction While it is broadly accepted that what are commonly referred to as non-state armed groups are often present in modern instances of mass atrocity, little is known about the causal processes that have led to the phenomenon.1 Since the end of the Cold War it has been suggested that irregular military combatants have increased in both number and significance in many conflicts around the world.2 This perceived rise of non-state combatants and military formations has been interpreted as being demonstrative of declining state strength.3 States or regions where non-state armed groups are present are therefore considered to be weak or failing.4 As a result these violent actors are frequently assumed to operate independently of state auspices.5 Observations that non-state armed groups have become a significant feature in post-Cold War conflicts have led to linear divisions being drawn between violent situations where non-state forces are present and where they are not, irrespective of the nature of the violence being perpetrated.6 The effect has been to similarly diminish the role of the state in the analysis of non-state, or irregular, armed groups and modern atrocity crimes.7 1Non-state armed groups is used by many international policy-making and monitoring institutions, including the European Union’s External Action Service and the United Nations, in particular the Office of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide (OSAPG); Mass atrocities is a non-legal term for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing.