The Evolution of British Airborne Warfare: A Technological Perspective By Timothy Neil Jenkins A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of History and Cultures University of Birmingham July 2013 i University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. Abstract The evolution of British airborne warfare cannot be fully appreciated without reference to the technological development required to convert the detail contained in the doctrine and concept into operational reality. My original contribution to knowledge is the detailed investigation of the British technological investment in an airborne capability in order to determine whether the development of new technology was justifiable, or indeed, entirely achievable. The thesis combines the detail contained in the original policy for airborne warfare and the subsequent technological investigations to determine whether sufficient strategic requirement had been demonstrated and how policy impacted upon the research programme. Without clear research parameters technological investment could not achieve maximum efficiency and consequent military effectiveness. The allocation of resources was a crucial factor in the technological development and the fact that aircraft suitability and availability remained unresolved throughout the duration of the war would suggest that the development of airborne forces was much less of a strategic priority for the British than has previously been suggested. Ultimately, despite the creation of a dedicated research institution in 1942 (Airborne Forces Experimental Establishment), and the development of specialist hardware such as the assault glider, the British did not possess the material resources required for the large- scale deployment of airborne troops. Analysis of the technology has revealed that the development of airborne warfare was as much for the purpose of psychological warfare and British morale as it was for offensive operations. ii Contents Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………………..ii Glossary................................................................................................................................ vi Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1 Methodology & Synopsis ................................................................................................ 5 Historiography & Sources ............................................................................................... 8 The Origins of Airborne Warfare ................................................................................... 16 Chapter One: Science, Technology, Economics, & War ...................................................... 16 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 28 Mechanics of the War-time Economy ........................................................................... 30 Churchill and Lord Beaverbrook ................................................................................... 38 Ministry of Aircraft Production....................................................................................... 42 Scientific Influences ..................................................................................................... 47 Origins of the Scientific & Technological Debate .......................................................... 50 Lindemann and the War-Time Government .................................................................. 54 Operational Research & Combined Operations ............................................................ 59 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 63 Chapter Two: Central Landing School / Central Landing Establishment .............................. 63 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 66 Early Development ....................................................................................................... 67 The Assault Glider ........................................................................................................ 79 M.A.P. and the Treasury .............................................................................................. 82 Central Landing Establishment ..................................................................................... 85 Development Unit ......................................................................................................... 87 Operation Colossus ...................................................................................................... 95 Glider Procurement & Development ........................................................................... 100 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 116 iii Chapter Three: Experimental Flight &Technical Development Section .............................. 119 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 119 Clarification of Roles and Responsibilities .................................................................. 120 Scope of Technological Development and Investigation ............................................. 125 Experimental Flight & Technical Development Section .............................................. 131 Technical Report 1/41 ................................................................................................ 132 Gliders: ...................................................................................................................... 132 Glider Equipment: ...................................................................................................... 135 Tugs: .......................................................................................................................... 135 Paratroop Aircraft: ...................................................................................................... 136 Paratroop Equipment: ................................................................................................ 137 Statichutes: ................................................................................................................ 137 Statichute Equipment: ................................................................................................ 138 Rotary Wing Aircraft: .................................................................................................. 138 Monthly Reports – September 1941 – January 1942 .................................................. 139 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 163 Chapter Four: Airborne Forces Experimental Establishment ............................................. 165 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 165 A.F.E.E. Organisation ................................................................................................ 166 Bruneval Raid (Operation Biting) ................................................................................ 169 Further Development ................................................................................................. 175 Ministry Bureaucracy .................................................................................................. 177 Attack on A.F.E.E. by Major-General Browning .......................................................... 183 Response to Major-General Browning’s Criticism ....................................................... 188 Technical Points ......................................................................................................... 190 Acquisition of Aircraft and the Competition for Resources .......................................... 196 Operation Freshman .................................................................................................. 211 Further Delays ........................................................................................................... 217 Manufacturing Techniques: The Horsa Glider ............................................................ 219 Glider Manufacture, Assembly and Distribution .......................................................... 230 A.F.E.E. March 1943 – December 1945 ..................................................................... 245 M.A.P. & Treasury Correspondence (August 1944 – June 1945) ............................... 256 Future Technical Policy: 1945 .................................................................................... 262 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………….262 iv Conclusion