ICasapcMC. '4., ~eo or · ~· . Poli. -·Vol. XXXI. (1995}, No. s. pp 173-lli& 173 Essays Segmented or "Entrenched" ElectoraJ Systems1 MliUAl A KASAPOVTC Faculty or Political Science. University ur Zagreb Summary 'I he au thus· rl iSC'IJS.~e.~ the problem of segmt'.utuc.l os "entrenched" electOral s}'lltems, which arc nol \\ic.lcly known or applied in the electoral psoctiCI' of democ1 atie <>tate.'\. However, in the pv:.~~·uollllullist !'.IJ\te<> of Eastern Europe they have come tu the forefmnL Their main purpose i:. to combine the princi­ ple.'> of the majority and the propostion:tl elccmral systems as weU ~ tu both highhl!ht the advantage'> and mitiptc the sboru:uming> of both The main find­ ing or the studv is that there isn't a universal model of relat.iu~ bcl\\cen !>egment(d electofal S)~tcms and parliamcnlllt) party S}""lem'- ~ted S)'$te~~?S ba\1: in 1.ome wuntrio pmduced the effcas of me m.aJunt} S)-"Stem and m othe"' of the proportional s\-:stems. l~titut iana l factor!. causing those dtffc:rcnce cannot be p(~Slt~ly esL1btislled. - Th e concept and structure of segllJentcd electoral models Segmented electoral systems are not widely known ami have so far ht:eo relatively rarely applied in the history of democratic election '. In th!! Anglo-Saxon tradition they are usuaUy referred Lo as "mixed electoral sys­ tems'', whereas in lhe German tradition they are known as "die Grabensysteme ·•. They were most extensively discussed in Gt!nnany in the fifties and SL'! ties, when the existing clcctoraJ system was about to undergo a reform. and Lui form of elections emerged IL'- a reform option. The name re­ sulted from the conviction that this electoral model cumbi·nes two pofitical principles separated by a huge gap, a "tTench" ("der Grahcn"). The majCJTity and the proportional systems rcprt:sent "two entirely different concepts of the stale as a whole, particularly of lhe nature and the purpose of the parliament, of the kind of people's participation which have been juxtaposed" (Sternberger, 1964, 139). In this context, I Thi:> paper was wriuen during the author's vi:,it to the Institute for Political Science. Uoivcr:,ity of Heidelberg, h~ed on lhc resenrch grant of the Gcnnun foundation Alexander von HumbolL Kasaoow:, 'A.. Segmented ot · ~· ~ Pulol. ...-o, VOl. XXXII. (19:9!>), '4o 5, po. 1n-166 174 1epresentation principles of the majority and pluraury systems are amhitetical, and therefore no compromise betwet!n them is possible. (Meyer, 1973, 181). The segme nted model is an e lectoral pattern allcnlpting to combine two goals: the repre ·cntaLinn of all political tendencies, which should be guaranteed by propot1ional e lections, ami the creation of parliamentary majority c<~pablc of forming the government, which shoulu be guaranteed by the majority elections. Such an nption resulted from its very stmeture which incorporates the main structural elements of the majority and the proportional e lectoral sy:-> tcm that affect the politica l results of elect ion:-: single-mandate and multi-mandate con'\tilucne-ics, cu111petition of individual candidates and party lists, decisio n-making based on both the majority and the proportional prmciple. In atx:ordance Wtlh such a structure. the segmented electoral model IS supposed to highlight the adva ntag~ and avoid or mitigate tbe .;hortt:um­ ings of both basic types of electoral \)"tern . This " as the main mtention uf it~ advocate.. This model was supposed to encourag\! partlt!.\·movements and honorary parties to develop into modem political parties, which will play dominant parts in the elccliun-. at the same time avoiding a com­ plt::te tlepersonnlizntion of elections by introducing single-mandate constitu­ encies2 it was as well supposed to allow sma U parties to take part in 1h e electio ns and enter the parliament, but al ·o to encourage concentratio n of political parlit::s and parliamentary party systems; furthermore to cn11ble the voters to expres · their prim my anti secondary political preference by means of the two-vote voting mechanism, but also provide them with a clear choice ht!Lwccn the leading party and the opposition; fi nally to ''JUStly" distribute parliamentary eat-. among political parties according to the number of votes gained from voters, b ur also "reward", in term!. nf mandates, 1he party gaining tJu: mo 1 votes. PoliticalJy speaking, the segmented mode~ j, generally viewed as a L'nmpromist! between the party in power and the opposition. However. thi!. is not always the ct'\e. Tn the muntri~ of 'Eastern Europe it bas often reflected insecurity expressed by the leading politic<tl furccs a.'\ tn which 2 11. Meyer showed thar the pcr.-;onnl l'limension of c lecLiuns vani:>hctl !>imulta­ neouc;ly with their local dimension, i.t:. with the cbaoged significance of locnl con­ slilueucies. The local character of mAjority elections a.~ well as Lbcir pclliOnttl di­ me nsion is suppressed in favour of Lhc imporlnuce of lhe ele.clion procedure for tht: coustitution of the parliame nt ns well as for e lccuon odds of Lhc purlics. Majority elections gradually cc.asctl to pcrfot m their primary function of represeot­ iug local units, as political parties got more nnd better cfevelopcd and suprurc­ gionally organized. us ideological w1t.l ~ uprurcgio ua l inLeresrs prevailed over local. ~ functions of the centralist parliament muiLiplied and a.; more attention wa.o, paid 10 its party structure. Political parties "mediated" lhc important.-c of the constituency as well as the importance of lhc local and personal dimensions ot majority e lcctiorn; (Mcycr, 1973, 162). 175 electoral system would be bt:~l suited to their interests and would provide them with a new electoral victory. As H result of such doubts segmented electoral systems ~.: m e rged , which provided the political forces in power with a lot of maneuvering space, primarily in terms of reducing t·hc op­ position's electic.m chances. For example, in Crmtlia t11e segmented elec­ toral model seemed to be, furmally . peaking, an expression uf the com­ promise between the party in power and the uppo iLion: the leading party came into power through majority elections. which, since it was the <;trongc)>t political party, remained heM suited to its potitical int crc!.ts. while :~II npp<1sition parties advocated the prup<lrlional electoral system. The choice of the segmented electoral model was based on the political estimate of the party in power thllt its electoral victory might be threat­ ened if faced with a uni ted opposition in majority elections. ThEs was o;upported by the fact that the electoral system of relative majority, which was upp<1sed to be used for the S&'Ond parliament bouse, was replaced by the proportional electoral system in small (three-mandate) coostiruencies only ten days before the election. TI1e change was motivated by the an­ nouncement madt: by the opposition that they would form a unified elec­ toral bloc against the party iu power in the elections for Lhat parliameo­ Lary body. Segmented electoral models ol East European countries Segmented electural model came into the fo refront in clcctioru held in p<l t-communist countries of Elt..-tem Europe. 1\mong eighteen state ' it \\'aS applied in a. many as in seven: Albania, Rulgaria, Croatia, Yugosla­ via, Lithuania, Hungary aml Russia. ln two countries it was applied only in the first free elections: BulgariH ( 1990) aod Yugoslavia (May 1992), only to he ahundnned in the following pretermed clect.inns in both being replaced by the proportional electoral system. Jn Albania, on the other hand, Ule segmented electoral model was introduced in the second eJec­ tions (1992) after t11e system of absolute majority wa." abandoned, which was used in the fir t organized elections (1991) (Sz:ijakowski, 1991; Hoppe, 1992). Segmented electoral model was also applied in Croatia in the sec­ ond ( 1992) and the third elections (1995) after the S}"'tcm of absolute majority was abandoned, which was u ed in the first organized free eJec­ tions in 1990 when Croatia had not yet hccome an independent state. 1 Bosuia and Hcrcegovinn w n~ not includct.l in tlu.: aualysis, because since its proclnimec1 independence elections could not be held clue r.o the war. The anuly­ si!. indut.lc~ only elections in indepenc1ent tales. i.e. election~ ou tbe oatio01al and not subnational level. The fin.t free elections in Bosnia aoc1 ller7egovina were held in ~o,cmbcr of 1990. when iJ wa" <;till formally a part of the Yugosla" federation. The elections were organizct.l uccordiug to Lbe proport«lnal electoral ~tern for the lower bouse of parliament WJd for t.he upper bou e of parlhuncot t.hey were held according to tltc absolute majoriry 1\y<;tem. l(atlll)OYit. l.f.. Solgm!ried 01 ·~ ~ F'Ok - · Vol XXXII. (1995), No. S. pp. 1 13-18G 176 The first and t h~; . econd free elections in Ru!-..,ia ( 1993, 1995) were organized in accordance with the s~:gmented electoral model (Schneider, 1993; Mikhailovl>kaia and Kuzminsk~ 1994; Wyman et al., 1994), and so were those in Lithuania ( 1992) when it became an independent state (Lucky, 1994). This model was u ed in both the fi rst (1990) and the sec­ ond (1994) election. only in Hungary (K6r6senyi, 1990; Arato, J994) (Table 1). TtJb/e 1: Distribu tion of elt!ctoral model type in Gastern European countries 1990 1994 (*) ··.···. ·,._ ~ El®tontl Mot.lds ~ ;;c :States Majority ·'·:Pr.o~rlional .,;;,Segmented Albania .. • Belorussia • Bulgaria . ~ Chech Republic • Estonia • Croatia ... Yugoslavia "' * Latvia • Lithuania • Hungary • Macedonia • Moldavia . • Poland • Romania • Russia • Slovakia • Slovenia ..