REMOTE WARFARE AND THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY Scott Hickie, Chris Abbott and Matthew Clarke Open Briefing is a groundbreaking human rights and capacity-building organisation. It provides security risk management, safety and security training, cyber security and open source intelligence services to those working in or on fragile and conflict-affected states or under repressive regimes. It supports organisations and activists striving for social and environmental justice or protecting vulnerable communities globally. www.openbriefing.org This report has been commissioned by the Remote Warfare Programme of the Oxford Research Group. The programme examines changes in military engagement, with a focus on remote warfare. This form of intervention takes place behind the scenes or at a distance rather than on a traditional battlefield, often through drone strikes and air strikes from above, with special forces, intelligence operatives, private contractors, and military training teams on the ground. Chris Abbott is the founder and executive director of Open Briefing. Chris was previously the deputy director of the Oxford Research Group. He has been an honorary visiting research fellow in the Centre for Governance and International Affairs at the University of Bristol and in the School of Social and International Studies at the University of Bradford. Chris is the author of two popular books and numerous influential reports and articles on security, politics and history. Matthew Clarke is a researcher at Open Briefing. Following a master’s degree from the University of Birmingham, with a dissertation on the development of counter-insurgency strategies in Iraq, Matthew has worked in business, politics and the European NGO community. He is currently a freelance data scientist, working on the development of artificial intelligence and new data management technologies. Scott Hickie is a senior analyst at Open Briefing. He is a lawyer, urban planner and former political adviser with a background in environmental law, natural resource governance and climate change. He has also worked in the Australian NGO sector on international trade and corporate social responsibility and in the government sector on energy security and climate change adaptation. His research focus is on urban conflict and natural resource management. Published by the Remote Warfare Programme, January 2018 Cover image credit: AFRICOM/Zayid Ballesteros The Remote Warfare Programme Oxford Research Group Development House 56-64 Leonard Street London EC2A 4LT United Kingdom +44 (0)207 549 0298 [email protected] http://remotecontrolproject.org This report is made available under a Creative Commons license. All citations must be credited to the Remote Warfare Programme and Open Briefing. The information in this report does not necessarily reflect the views of the Remote Warfare Programme. Contents 1. Introduction 1 2. The evolution of Boko Haram 3 3. Defence and security actors 5 a. Nigerian forces 5 b. Regional partners 7 c. International partners 9 4. Analysis of attacks by defence and security actors 14 a. Primary actors 15 b. Lethality 16 c. Outcomes 17 d. Location 18 5. Analysis of attacks by Boko Haram 23 a. Frequency 24 b. Targets 25 c. Tactics 26 d. Location 28 6. Discussion 32 Appendix 1. Datasets 34 Endnotes 35 The answers have significance outside 1. Introduction Nigeria, as ISIS has now entered a similar The United States has been using stage in the wake of the destruction of its special operations forces, covert agents, ‘caliphate’ in Iraq and Syria. mercenaries and proxy armies to fight wars While Boko Haram’s focus remains on the out of the public eye since the Cold War. three strategic attack nodes of Maiduguri, By the time of the ‘war on terror’, these Lake Chad and the Borno (Nigeria)/Extreme unconventional forces were being used Nord (Cameroon) border, it has increased alongside regular coalition military units in its attacks on civilians relative to attacks on counter-insurgency (COIN) operations in military and law enforcement targets. It has Afghanistan and Iraq. also increasingly relied on suicide attacks, However, the recent and rapid development including using children as bombers. The of new technologies and capabilities, as same mix of conventional military operations well as a lack of political appetite for large- and remote warfare that Nigeria and its scale military interventions, has led Western partners used to reclaim territory and prevent governments to embrace a ‘remote warfare’ larger-scale swarm attacks may not now strategy in today’s multiple and dispersed achieve the same successes in this new operations against jihadist networks. The conflict dynamic. recent shift away from ‘boots on the ground’ Open Briefing and the Remote Warfare deployments towards light-footprint Western Programme have been closely monitoring military interventions means Western forces these developments over 2017. Open often now work with and through local and Briefing has produced five intelligence regional forces, who undertake the bulk of briefings since April summarising the frontline fighting. and analysing the main international With the rise of Boko Haram, international developments, the actions of US and support to Nigeria and its neighbours European partners, the actions of local has increased, with the US, the UK, governments and coalitions, and the various France, Russia and China providing Boko Haram attacks over the previous training, equipment, intelligence and month. We have tracked Boko Haram’s shift military aid.1 The evolution of the Boko from high-profile attacks on government Haram insurgency over 2017 presents an forces and infrastructure to high-frequency opportunity for reflection and evaluation. attacks on soft targets, such as camps for Analysis for this report shows that while internally displaced people (IDPs). We have the operations carried out by the Nigerian also noted the need for the forces arrayed military, alongside its regional and against Boko Haram to evolve their tactics international partners, have degraded away from bombing raids and ground Boko Haram, they have also encouraged clearance operations, as this approach is the factional forces to metastasise, build unlikely to counter the new Boko Haram resilience and craft new tactics to sustain threat. ongoing political violence. Nigeria’s government currently appears to be These developments raise important wider in a tactical halfway house. It is expending questions: significant effort on killing or capturing Boko Haram’s leaders. This is often through air • What happens when territory is strikes by armed manned and unmanned reclaimed from insurgencies through aerial platforms followed up by ground forces high-tempo counter-terrorism raids, sometimes with special operations operations and remote warfare yet forces (SOF) support. These operations militants retain the capacity to exploit are designed to restore confidence in the human insecurity and destabilise efforts government’s ability to protect its citizens, at normalisation? but when the leaders remain at large it undermines that confidence. At the same • Does remote warfare provide sufficient time, it is deploying the newly-developed flexibility to span broader timelines and special mobile strike forces from military the different stages of a conflict? and law enforcement agencies in order to 1 | Remote Warfare and the Boko Haram Insurgency try and counter Boko Haram’s attacks on soft targets.2 However, the ability of mobile teams to reduce these attacks and deny Boko Haram access to their strategic attack nodes is uncertain. While local and regional defence and security actors have the tactical upper hand in the conflict, the potential need for further external support cannot be ruled out. Any US, European or Russian military participation in or support for Nigeria’s mobile strike forces carries reputational and operational risks. Limited air platforms to move troops, a higher likelihood of civilian casualties and friendly fire incidents and the potential for human rights abuses are all risks for external foreign forces. Foreign involvement becomes riskier where counter- terrorism (CT) operations are shared across multiple Nigerian agencies and are reactively shaped by opportunistic Boko Haram attacks. The geopolitical objectives of foreign powers may not sufficiently justify such risks. For some foreign powers, containing Boko Haram within north-eastern Nigeria may be enough to meet their national security interests. Remote Warfare Programme | 2 2. The evolution of Boko long lull in the violence. However, Boko Haram re-emerged with Shekau as its leader Haram in mid-2010. The group targeted churches, government compounds and security forces In 2002, Muslim cleric Mohammed Yusuf in a wave of violence over the next year.11 created a school and mosque in northern Under Shekau’s leadership, Boko Haram Nigeria that was the beginnings of Boko 3 launched a military campaign to build an Haram. Yusuf had been using the Islamic state in Nigeria. It is at this point that infrastructure of other peaceful religious Boko Haram became an active insurgency, groups to teach Boko Haram’s philosophy for with the group using asymmetric warfare, the the previous two years. He was a proponent taking and controlling of territory, raids on of sharia law, and desired the creation of an 4 law enforcement and military facilities and Islamic state in Nigeria. Boko Haram loosely infrastructure, and attacks on neighbouring translates