Censorship and Self-censorship in Turkey: December 2017 December 2018 Censorship and Self-censorship in Turkey December 2017- December 2018 Prepared by Özlem Altunok Pelin Buzluk Figen Albuga Çalıkuşu Murat Şevki Çoban Yasemin Çongar Seçil Epik Özkan Küçük Sibel Oral Melike Polat Onur Yıldırım Censorship-Self-censorship Research Murat Şevki Çoban Design Bülent Erkmen Printing by Tunç Matbaacılık Seyrantepe Mahallesi, Çalışkan Sokak 11 / A Kağıthane / İstanbul T: +90 212 279 91 31 P24 Activity Reports Punto24 Platform for Independent Journalism Meşrutiyet Cad. Yemenici Abdüllatif Sk. No:1-3 Asmalı Mescit Mah. 34430 BEYOĞLU/ISTANBUL [email protected] www.susma24.com www.twitter.com/susma_24 www.facebook.com/susma24 Censorship and Self-censorship in Turkey December 2017 December 2018 CENSORSHIP AND SELF-CENSORSHIP IN TURKEY Table of Contents Foreword 7 Media 8 Social Media 12 Publishing Industry 14 Cinema Industry 17 Theatre 20 Music 23 Visual Arts 26 Regions 29 Cases 37 Censorship and Self-censorship Research 77 What has Susma Platform Done? 83 Legal Expert Interpretation 90 7 Foreword This report covers incidents of censorship and self-censorship from the period December 2017 to December 2018. During the first seven-and-a-half months of this reporting period Turkey was under emergency rule (SoE). The state of emergency lasted for 729 days and was extended seven times in three-month intervals before it was finally lifted on 19 July 2018. However, the powers to censor and control which government assumed under the SoE were made de facto, through Law number 7145 which came onto the statute book on 31 July 2018. This has had the effect of installing emergency rule as the norm. 8 CENSORSHIP AND SELF-CENSORSHIP IN TURKEY Media It is the opinion here that the majority of acts of censorship affecting Turkish media during the reporting period were a result of the practices honed during the SoE and the “normalized SoE” that followed, or they were the result of the environment of intimidation created through these practices. Self-censorship in media, which has now reached a historical peak, is yet another direct outcome of this environment. In assessing the censorship and self-censorship currently affecting media in Turkey, one needs primarily to take into account the journalists and media workers who are deprived of their liberty solely because of their journalistic output. According to a list compiled by P24, as of 31 December 2018, at least 161 journalists and media workers were in prison in Turkey. Practices such as associating journalistic activity with coup and/or terrorism-related charges; arrest, long periods of pre-trial detention without legally adequate evidence to substantiate the charges (hence the reality of journalists and media workers imprisoned for years without a conviction), have become methods of media censorship and the impetus for self-censorship. According to data compiled by Bianet, as of the end of September 2018, a total of 247 journalists faced a combined total of 46 aggravated life sentences, 1 life sentence, 2,855 years and 6 months in prison, as well as TL 30,000 in fines. These totals did not include sentences sought for journalists prosecuted for “insult” and “insulting the president.” Another effective censorship method during the SoE was the closure of media companies and rendering their employees unable to seek reinstatement or compensation for their rights. Statutory decrees (known by the Turkish acronym KHK) issued throughout the two-year SoE took a particularly heavy toll: 15 news agencies, 20 television stations, 25 radio stations, 70 newspapers, 20 magazines and 29 publishers were closed overnight; their assets have been seized; some of their employees have been arrested and jailed; almost all their employees have been condemned to unemployment. The most recent incident in this wave of media closures was the KHK number 701 published on 8 July 2018 in the Official Gazette, which shut down the newspapers Özgürlükçü Demokrasi, Halkın Nabzı and Welat, and the TV station Avantaj TV. This decree was the pinnacle of the increasing pressure and censorship targeting Kurdish media throughout the SoE, and MEDIACENSORSHIP AND SELF-CENSORSHIP IN TURKEY 9 particularly in the period covered by this report. On 28 March 2018, the head office of Özgürlükçü Demokrasi in Istanbul and its printing house, Gün Matbaa, were raided by police; numerous employees of the newspaper and the printing house were taken into custody and later jailed pending trial; both companies were appointed trustees by the government in the next 24 hours; and Welat, which was also printed by Gün Matbaa, could only be distributed as photocopies. Calls by international free expression organizations for the companies to be returned to their owners and for the release of their employees yielded no results. While major Kurdish news agencies DİHA and JİNHA have already been closed down in 2016, access to the website of Mezopotamya news agency was banned numerous times by the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK) through successive court orders. In fact, there was not even a single day when the Internet was not subject to censorship in Turkey throughout the period covered in this report, for the access ban on Wikipedia, in place since 29 April 2017, continued despite numerous appeals filed by Wikipedia and third parties, including Susma, before Turkish courts. VPN servers, a method of bypassing access bans, were also targeted by censorship: in March 2018, access was banned to 20 VPN servers, including Tor Project, Hotspot Shield, Zenmate and TunnelBear. Censorship targeting media (and the self-censorship it triggered) peaked in periods the governing authority regarded as politically critical and in relation to topics it deemed to be “risky.” Turkey’s 24 June 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections came on the heels of what was perhaps the most censored election campaign period in the country’s history. In a report issued immediately prior to the election, experts from the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) stated that the public broadcaster TRT Haber had violated the principles of impartiality and accuracy, set out by the Supreme Electoral Council (YSK). According to the report, TRT gave too little screen time to election campaigns by political parties other than AKP and CHP, while HDP was given no screen time at all. The Turkish Armed Forces’ operation on the Syrian city of Afrin, and the meltdown of Turkish Lira were other topics fuelling a cycle of censorship and self-censorship. The mainstream media’s blatant adoption of the government’s official discourse to report the Afrin operation was itself newsworthy as far as some western media outlets were concerned as was 10 CENSORSHIP AND SELF-CENSORSHIP IN TURKEY more than suggested by the The Economist article “Muzzling the media” and subtitled “No one in Turkey dares report accurately on the war in Syria.” The plummeting Turkish Lira was an equally sensitive topic as numerous news articles, broadcasts and news posts became subject to investigations. As the decline in the Turkish Lira against the US Dollar hit a record low on 12 August 2018, the government issued a warning, after which mainstream TV channels and a large number of websites stopped displaying exchange rates in real-time on the crawler at the bottom of the screen. The expectation of media to be in full compliance with the stance put forward by the political authority and demands fueled by this expectation influenced the Doğan Media Group to change hands. Its principal shareholder, Aydın Doğan, sold the entirety of his media outlets including Hürriyet, CNN Türk and Doğan News Agency to Demirören Holding, whose relationship with the government was much smoother than his own -- thus removing his parent company, Doğan Holding, from the media business. Following the acquisition, announced in March 2018, censorship within these media institutions intensified, and employees who failed to adapt -- managers, journalists, anchors -- were subsequently sacked. The Cumhuriyet daily went through another kind of transformation, from an active opposition paper to one with a much tamer editorial line. The paper was already under pressure with many of its leading columnists, reporters and executives in pre-trial detention. Though 13 persons were convicted they were freed pending appeal. However their return to work was short lived after a court battle forced changes in the administration of the foundation which controlled the paper and they were either dismissed or forced to resign. A different aspect of the political pressure newspapers faced was revealed recently, on 12 November, when the daily Karar, a once pro-government newspaper that recently turned more critical, issued a public statement complaining that not only state-owned enterprises but also private companies were being forbidden from purchasing ad space in the newspaper. We note that an embargo on advertising aimed at punishing media outlets who are not supportive of the government, when combined with the steadily rising printing paper, printing and distribution costs, is at the end of the day a measure forcing the press into eventual bankruptcy/ closure, and is, therefore, a form of censorship. MEDIACENSORSHIP AND SELF-CENSORSHIP IN TURKEY 11 In such an environment, Internet media, despite widespread ban on access to numerous websites, seemingly continues to be a field where independent journalism is still possible. However, after the 19 September enactment of a new bill, we can expect censorship even here to become more structural. Under this new law, RTÜK is now entitled to impose bans on content broadcast on Internet and those seeking to broadcast radio/TV content online are required to obtain a broadcast and transmission license from RTÜK. It is currently impossible to speak of journalism in Turkey without mentioning censorship. The small number of independent newspapers, radio stations, magazines and online news outlets and TV channels striving to run on extremely tight budgets are only able to survive by the judicious application of self-censorship.