Evolution’s Eye Susan Oyama Science and Cultural Theory A Series Edited by Barbara Herrnstein Smith and Roy E. Weintraub Evolution’s Eye A Systems View of the Biology-Culture Divide Susan Oyama Durham and London © Duke University Press All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper Designed by C. H. Westmoreland Typeset in Times Roman with DIN Neuzeit display by Tseng Information Systems, Inc. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data appear on the last printed page of this book. Contents Acknowledgments vii Introduction Part I Looking at Development and Evolution 1 Transmission and Construction: Levels and the Problem of Heredity 2 What Does the Phenocopy Copy? 3 Ontogeny and the Central Dogma: Do We Need the Concept of Genetic Programming in Order to Have an Evolutionary Perspective? 4 Stasis, Development, and Heredity: Models of Stability and Change 5 Ontogeny and Phylogeny: A Case of Meta-Recapitulation? 6 The Accidental Chordate: Contingency in Developmental Systems Part II Looking at Ourselves 7 Essentialism, Women, and War: Protesting Too Much, Protesting Too Little 8 The Conceptualization of Nature: Nature as Design 9 Bodies and Minds: Dualism in Evolutionary Theory 10 How Shall I Name Thee? The Construction of Natural Selves 11 Evolutionary and Developmental Formation: Politics of the Boundary Notes References Index of Subjects and Names This page intentionally left blank Acknowledgments The following people were of special help in writing this book. By offer- ing comments on the pieces when they were originally being written, ad- vice and other aid at varying points in the preparation of the book itself, or both, they demonstrated once again the value of critical and gener- ous colleagues. My deep thanks go to Pat Bateson, Ben Bradley, Linnda Caporael, Richard Francis, Eli Gerson, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Russell Gray, Paul Griffiths, Megan Gunnar, Jack Hailman, Mae-Wan Ho, Tim Johnston, Evelyn Fox Keller, William Kessen, Philip Kitcher, Richard Lewontin, Lenny Moss, Katherine Nelson, Jeff Ricker, Barbara Herrn- stein Smith, Elliott Sober, Don Symons, Peter Taylor, Rasmus Winther, and Cor van der Weele. Miriam Angress, Pam Morrison, and Reynolds Smith of Duke University Press were responsive and supportive; what more could any author ask? This page intentionally left blank Introduction This book is about an approach to development and evolution that pro- vides a novel way of analyzing these two biological processes and their interrelationships. It also allows us to bring them together quite differ- ently, by means of the concept of a developmental system: a heteroge- neous and causally complex mix of interacting entities and influences that produces the life cycle of an organism. The system includes the changing organism itself, because an organism contributes to its own future, but it encompasses much else as well. Although the notion of a developmental system alters our understand- ing of development and evolution, it also has significant implications for a multitude of broader issues, scientific and otherwise. This is because con- temporary versions of the age-old distinctions between biology and cul- ture, between nature and nurture, are grounded in largely unquestioned assumptions about how the processes of development and evolution are, or are not, conjoined. Developmental Systems: DST, DSA, DSP? In my earlier writings I have spoken primarily for myself, however much I have drawn on the work of others. My later writings refer to a sometimes shadowy band of ‘‘developmental systems theorists,’’ and some readers have wondered whether these constitute a school of sorts, and if so, what its shape and extent are (not to mention ‘‘how to buy some of it and take it home,’’ as Barbara Herrnstein Smith [:] says in a slightly dif- ferent context). That the question of group identity should arise has its pleasing aspect. It seems that scholars from a variety of disciplines are finding in developmental systems writings a fresh way of addressing a wide range of issues and feel the need for a convenient label. Occasion- Introduction allyIhaveusedthetermdevelopmental systems theory () to describe this approach, and I will continue to use it here.1 It is short and snappy, already in use, and convenient for indicating a rough grouping of alter- native conceptualizations and critiques. I have tended to employ the term with qualifications, however, indicating that if a theory is taken to be only a hypothesis-generating machine, then perhaps perspective or ap- proach would be preferable. What I have in mind is broader: a kind of conceptual background that serves to orient more specific empirical and theoretical endeavors. It can also allow different interpretations of exist- ing work. (See van Gelder and Port for a discussion of this framing or orienting function of approaches to cognition.) The need for a term cannot be ignored, but any act of individuation in- volves the marking of commonalities and dissimilarities in order to pick something out from the background. The drawing of such outlines can be a delicate matter. Reciting a creed or compiling lists of insiders risks essentializing a more or less loose assemblage in inappropriate ways. Nor is this the place for a history or an analysis of related approaches.2 I will, however, sketch a number of key ideas and methods that characterize the work presented in this book. Fuller presentations are found primarily in the chapters of part ; to varying degrees these features also characterize the writings of the colleagues with whom I am most closely associated.3 Although we don’t always agree on technical details or on the precise form and limits of necessary theoretical reworkings, I think we share a commitment to a view of development as interactive emergence over time and to exploring the implications of taking this gradual construction seriously. Following the ideas and methods below is a list of work that was especially important for the development of my thinking, along with some remarks on research and metaphor. Key Ideas and Methodological Strategies . Parity of reasoning. A prime characteristic of my method is an insis- tence on applying certain modes of reasoning consistently and rigorously, even in areas in which they are not customarily used. Parity-of-reasoning arguments (namely, what’s sauce for the goose...)areespecially useful in revealing hidden inequalities and questionable assumptions. In chap- Introduction ters and , for instance, I show how the reasons for calling features of organisms ‘‘genetic’’ or ‘‘environmental’’ tend to be used asymmetrically. These analyses are developed in subsequent chapters (especially ) to demonstrate how genes are frequently given causal priority even when similar reasoning could be used for other causes. In such cases, what is presented as a justification for giving the gene special status is actually a consequence of already having done so. Undoing these conventional asymmetries highlights, among other things, point . The developmental and evolutionary interdependence of organism and environment. I replace conventional wisdom’s ‘‘interaction’’ between separate and independently defined organisms and environments with ‘‘constructivist interaction.’’ This is not to be confused with the ‘‘inter- action term’’ in some statistical analyses; that is why ‘‘constructivist’’ is important. In constructivist interaction organisms and their environ- ments define the relevant aspects of, and can affect, each other. This is called the ‘‘interpenetration’’ of organism and environment by, for ex- ample, Lewontin (; see also Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin ). See- ing life in these terms rather than following the traditional cleavages be- tween nature and culture, body and mind, permits different and fruitful ways of conceiving biology, psychology, and society, as well as different relations among the disciplines (see Ingold ). Such a view suggests point . A shift from ‘‘genes and environment’’ to a multiplicity of entities, influences, and environments. One benefit of thinking in terms of mul- tiple systems, interconnected and measurable on more than one scale of time and magnitude, is that the stunningly oversimplified distinction be- tween genes and environment resolves into a heterogeneous and equally stunning array of processes, entities, and environments—chemical and mechanical, micro- and macroscopic, social and geological—of the sort outlined in chapter . Evolution’s eye widens, and so do ours. Hence my preference in the following chapters for systemic interaction over one- way causal arrows, for mutually influencing levels rather than the col- lapsed levels that often go with unidirectional causation. The shift from genes-and-environment to multilevel systems is coupled with the next point.4 . A shift from single to multiple scales. Looking through developmen- tal systems lenses means, among other things, looking hard and repeat- Introduction edly in a variety of directions and with both near and distant focuses. Movement among scales, both of magnitude and time, is important: from interactions of molecules inside cells to those between persons, from the brief periods involved in the action of a hormone in the nervous sys- tem to changing relations among conspecifics over the life span, from the short-term dynamics of a population of organisms in a habitat to the slow procession of generations through evolutionary time.5 Moving among scales in this way not only enables us to see more, it also gives us a more acute sense of the many relations among these scales. The outcome of an aggressive encounter between animals, for instance, can lead to physiological changes, including changes in gene activity (see Gottlieb , , , on bidirectional influences between structure and function; Lehrman ). Similarly, rapid processes can influence, and be influenced by, much slower ones, as might happen if gradual cli- matic change altered the kind of food available to a creature. The animal’s digestive processes might adapt (with or without accompanying genetic change), and this might eventuate in a different foraging range, which could then lead to other developmental and evolutionary changes (see P.