2018/03/01 DISCUSSION PAPERS Applying Speech Act Theory to Regional Integration Joshua Anderson Applying Speech Act Theory to Regional Integration Joshua Anderson Introduction In this paper we will provide a conceptual framework for applying Speech Act Theory analysis of political speech in the context of regional political and economic integration. First we will provide a brief theoretical outline of Speech Act Theory, elucidating its main terminology (Section I). Then we argue why understanding and applying Speech Act Theory is crucial for the process of regional integration (Section II). Lastly, we will turn to analyzing some pertinent case studies to demonstrate the dynamics at play in regional integration (Section III) and end with conclusions and thoughts on further research (Section IV). I. What is Speech Act Theory? It will be beneficial to outline a basic understanding of speech act theory. Of course we cannot give an adequate analysis of all of its deliverances, but a basic summary will be enough for our purposes. Perhaps the central claim of this philosophical theory of language, which was pioneered by J.L. Austin’s work, How to Do Things with Words, is that language does more than simply say things; rather, we do things with words, hence the term “speech acts.”1 Austin called such actions “performative utterances,” including actions such as promising, warning, thanking, inviting, or commanding. This is to go far beyond the prior models of language such as the sender-receiver model, which viewed language primarily as the sending and decoding of messages. Kevin J. Vanhoozer has shown how the old “code model” does not adequately grasp several primary elements of language, including the facts that, “(1) some of the information conveyed is not actually encoded, (2) understanding involves more than decoding linguistic signals, and (3) words do more than convey information.” 2 To be sure, it is true that language is used to convey propositional truths or assertions, but this is only one of the many ways language works in the real world. John Searle has classified at least five different types of utterances, each of which is the accomplishing of some action:3 Name Definition Example(s) 1 J.L Austin, How To Do Things With Words, 2nd Edition, ed. J.O. Urmson and M. Sbisá (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962). 2 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, First Theology: God, Scripture & Hermeneutics (Grand Rapids: IVP Academic, 2002), 166. 3 John R. Searle, “A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts,” in: Günderson, K. (ed.), Language, Mind, and Knowledge, (Minneapolis Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 7, University of Minneapolis Press, 1975) 344-69. 1 2018/03/01 DISCUSSION PAPERS Applying Speech Act Theory to Regional Integration Joshua Anderson and Hikari Ishido 1. Assertives The speaker proposes the Asserting, affirming. truth of an expressed (e.g., “It is now 2:30pm”). proposition. 2. Directives The speaker causes the Requesting, commanding, hearer to adopt a course of advising. (e.g., “Would you action. pass the salt, please”). 3. Commissives The speaker commits him Promising. (e.g., I’ll meet or herself to future action. you at the station at noon”). 4. Expressives The speaker displays an Thanking, praising, hating. emotional stance towards (e.g., “I love this movie!”) the proposition. 5. Declarations The speaker creates a new Firing, hiring, pronouncing reality by means of as husband and wife. expressing a proposition. (e.g., when a judge pronounces “guilty” verdict in a court of law). David Clark has summed up these five different types of speech acts simply as, statements, commands, promises, exclamations, and performatives. 4 The point here is that each of these utterances are actions performed by the speaker when he or she speaks; she doesn’t just say “I’ll be there tomorrow,” she enacts a promise to be there tomorrow. Also central to speech act theory is the distinctions between locutionary acts, illocutionary force, and perlocutionary force—that is, locutions, illocutions, and perlocutions.5 A locution is simply the token use of an utterance in its given medium (whether, text, speech, body language, etc.) and with its particular rules of syntax, grammar, and so on. For instance, a particular sentence printed on a page is a locution. But each locution also comes with an illocutionary force(s), which is the action the speaker hopes to do with this piece of language. And the actual result of this illocutionary force, that is what the speech results in, is its perlocutionary force. A perlocution can either be “felicitous” meaning it accomplished its illocutionary intent, or “infelicitous,” meaning it failed to accomplish its illocutionary intent. So if Marty McFly’s boss faxes over a sentence that says, “YOU’RE FIRED!,” the illocution would be the performative act of firing Mr. McFly, and the perlocutionary effect would be that Mr. McFly actually is fired. In summary, then, the basic insight of speech act theory is the notion that language accomplishes various actions in the world by means of locutions, illocutions, and perlocutions. 4 David Clark, “Beyond Inerrancy: Speech Acts and an Evangelical View of Scripture,” in Faith and Clarity: Philosophical Contributions to Christian Theology (ed. James K. Beilby; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006), 119. 5 See: Clark, Beyond Inerrancy, 121; Vanhoozer, First Theology, 172–73; Green, Mitchell, "Speech Acts", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/speech-acts/>, §3. 2 2018/03/01 DISCUSSION PAPERS Applying Speech Act Theory to Regional Integration Joshua Anderson and Hikari Ishido But we must make one further note of Searle’s distinction between primary and secondary illocutionary acts. Primary speech acts are taken to be indirect; they lie beneath direct, secondary speech acts: “In indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, together with the general powers of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer.”6 An example of this distinction can be seen in the following exchange: Wife: “Are you ready to eat dinner?” Husband: “I’m almost finished with my work.” The husband’s secondary, indirect speech act is about the status of his work completion, which is, strictly speaking, unrelated to his wife’s question. But she knows precisely what he means, because she can perceive what he is really communicating: the indirect illocutionary act of asserting, “No, I’m not ready to eat dinner.” So there are direct (secondary) and there are indirect (primary) illocutionary speech acts. We all know of daily examples of this sort of indirect speech. But why do humans talk in this way? To ease tensions and make relationships smoother, in part because we don’t want to sound harsh or demanding so we “soften” our language. Instead of commanding a coworker to “pour me some coffee,” we ask, “is there any coffee left?”7 II. Why is Understanding Speech Act Theory Important? What is important about this theory of language, firstly, is that it applies beyond interpersonal communication, to political and economic speech. Using a speech act theory framework we are able to analyze and understand political speech with a more precise set of tools. On This view, when a politician makes promises on the campaign trail, their speech is more than mere words— they are literally enacting a promise. Ambassadors and diplomats employ deputized speech on behalf of their countrymen to issue commands, express emotions, enact performatives, and assert truths. Thus we are able to apply Searle’s classification of speech acts towards the following kind of examples: 6 John Searle, “Indirect speech acts,” in Syntax and Semantics, 3: Speech Acts, ed. P. Cole & J. L. Morgan, pp. 59– 82 (New York: Academic Press, 1975). Reprinted in Pragmatics: A Reader, ed. S. Davis, pp. 265–277 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) 178. 7 We can analyze this particular speech act in this way: the locution is the English sentence “Is there any coffee left?” The primary illocutionary intent is the directive-request of asking a co-worker to pour a cup of coffee. This primary meaning is lying beneath the surface of a secondary illocution of a “softer” directive-question, which seeks information about how much coffee is left. The perlocutionary effect is felicitous (i.e. it works) if the coworker pours you a cup, but it is infelicitous if he or she merely tells you that, yes there’s some left—implying you can pour your own cup! 3 2018/03/01 DISCUSSION PAPERS Applying Speech Act Theory to Regional Integration Joshua Anderson and Hikari Ishido Name Political Example 1. Assertives “I did not have sexual relations with that woman” (Bill Clinton). 2. Directives “Mr. Gorbachov, tear down this wall!” (Ronald Regan). 3. Commissives Korean War Armistice Agreement, July 27, 1953. 4. Expressives “December 7, 1941—a date which will live in infamy” (Franklin D. Rosevelt). 5. Declarations Declaration of War. Secondly, if we understand that political language works in this way, we will see that relationship is intrinsic to all communication because speech acts constitute actions between persons (or nations supervening upon a network of persons). This means that in order to better political relations we must better political speech. To move towards regional economic and political integration, there must be focus upon how speech affects relationships. Crucial to this process is to see how the act of “interpretation” fits into this scheme. The “meaning” of an utterance lies in its illocutionary intent. To “interpret” meaning therefore is simply to ascribe illocutionary intent to a speaker. The act of successful interpretation occurs when we accurately ascertain the speaker’s intent; misinterpretation occurs when we wrongly ascribe intent to the speaker, in the form of misunderstanding his or her illocutions.