NO. 39 OCTOBER 2019 Introduction For a Peaceful Transition in Sudan Current Developments and Plausible Scenarios Annette Weber There seems to be no end to the good news coming from the Horn of Africa. First, the Nobel peace prize for Ethiopia’s young reformer Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Octo- ber and then, in April, Sudan’s dictator Omar al-Bashir was overthrown after thirty years of rule. After months of civil and peaceful protests, it was actually the Sudanese military that finally forced the ruler out of office. Then, less than four months later, military leaders and civilians led by Abdalla Hamdok, an economist with decades of experience at the United Nations, managed to form a government. Whether the tran- sition continues to develop positively will depend on the willingness of the security apparatus to transfer power to civilian leaders. However, in stabilising the country and improving its economic performance much will depend on whether and to what extent external actors support Sudan’s transformation process. At the top of the agenda is the economic only must the protesters’ polarising ideol- upturn required to satisfy the population’s ogies and their demands for representation expectations as the tide of positive events be taken into account, but so must those begins to ebb. The new government will of the armed movements. also need to find peace with armed groups in Darfur and the Nuba Mountains. Ques- tions of accountability and justice are From protest movement to equally prevalent. This will be no easy task transitional government for the transition councils and the cabinet since, after thirty years of Islamist military Demonstrations were held in December rule, the population has little confidence in 2018 after subsidies for bread, oil and state structures, the judiciary or the security petrol were cut, resulting in large parts sector. of the population no longer being able to In addition to these tasks, the divergent afford basic living costs. The protesters’ interests of the actors involved are a mas- demands for a better supply of basic com- sive stress test for consolidating the tran- modities quickly transformed into a call sition. As a result, the civilian side faces a for political change. The protests remained security apparatus mainly comprising those peaceful, despite provocation from the in- who benefitted from the old regime. Not telligence service and government-backed militia. During the day, the streets were of the RSF, General Mohammed Hamdan mainly occupied by women, students and Daglo – also known as Hemedti – and representatives of various professional tangible progress on turning the economy associations while, at night, young men around. Nevertheless, sociopolitical issues, picketed the gates of the barracks calling such as giving young people a say in politi- for the military to join them. cal matters and overcoming the discrepan- More than 250 people were killed by the cies between urban and rural areas, are also security forces during the protests, thou- important. sands were wounded and hundreds were imprisoned, tortured and raped. These actions revealed clear rifts within the Suda- Actors nese security apparatus. The military police, who were subordinate to the intelligence Civilian actors. The civilian camp of the service, and in particular the Rapid Support transitional government is made up of Forces (RSF) were responsible for firing tear representatives of professional associations gas and live rounds at protestors. However, and trade unions (the Sudanese Profession- some members of the military sided with als Association, SPA), protesters without the demonstrators and returned fire. no ties to other organisations and the tradi- President Bashir was removed from office tional political parties. In the case of the in a military putsch on 11 April and a Tran- civilian forces, it will be a matter of recon- sitional Military Council (TMC) set up. The ciling the politically and ideologically con- civilian actors who had joined the Forces of tradictory positions of actors such as the Freedom and Change (FFC) began negotia- Communists and the Islamists. It will also tions with the TMC to form a government. be important to represent the rights of the However, progress was sluggish and even- women and young people who risked their tually came to an abrupt halt after a violent lives during the demonstrations, but who attempt on 3 July to clear a protest camp had no seat at the negotiating table and are claimed 120 lives. insufficiently represented in the transition The African Union (AU) sent an envoy government. flanked by the Prime Minister of Ethiopia and a prominent Ethiopian mediator. Military. The grouping within the security Despite the violent attacks on demonstra- apparatus with the most personnel is the tors and repeated breakdowns in the nego- Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Despite their tiations, they were able to establish a tran- participation in the war in South Sudan sitional government in less than eight and in Dafur they still enjoy a level of months with the support of a Sudanese respect among the population because team of mediators. throughout the history of the country they The transitional government consists of have repeatedly overthrown dictators who a Sovereignty Council made up of six civil- came to power in coups d’état. The Suda- ians and five members of the TMC. Lieuten- nese Armed Forces (SAF), directly under the ant-General Burhan will lead the Sovereignty control of President Bashir, are now repre- Council for the first 21 months, after which sented by Lieutenant-General Burhan who a non-military actor will take charge. In will also be in charge of the Sovereignty addition, the cabinet, also composed of Council for the next 21 months. civilians and military, is the executive body The RSF lead by General Daglo (Hemedti) responsible for setting and implementing was also under the direct command of policy. President Bashir. It is the most opaque and Whether the transition is successful, potentially decisive force in the security whether the government holds together camp. Since the RSF soldiers fought in the and whether the country achieves peace, war in Yemen as part of the Saudi-Emirati depend on two crucial factors: the leader Coalition, they are better trained than the SWP Comment 39 October 2019 2 SAF soldiers. They are also financially more coup or controls the country from behind independent because they were paid directly the scenes is of secondary importance. by the Gulf States, unlike the SAF whose Hemedti’s particular strategic skills lie salaries largely come from the state coffers. in communicating with the periphery, by Some of them have now been deployed on acting as a mediator in conflicts between behalf of the Emirates to support General ethnic groups, seeking talks with Sheiks Haftar in Libya, while others have taken on and local rural leaders and reaching out to the role of the army and intelligence service the Darfur rebels. While the Sudanese elites in Khartoum and their presence is most of the Nile Valley underestimate them as visible there. RSF troops are also respon- uneducated and provincial, he has posi- sible for securing the border between Chad tioned himself as a populist and representa- and Darfur and the border with Libya. tive of the marginalised. Hemedti has built General Daglo is suspected of being in- up his own independent empire in a very volved in irregular gold mining operations short space of time and, at the same time, and illegal smuggling networks. Over the is also the deputy president of the TMC. The past few years, he has mainly been recruit- RSF leader can rely on support from the ing fighters from the periphery who, like Emirates. A coup would sour relations with himself, are considered second-class citizens the West. This would, in turn, harm the by the central elite. They are therefore more country’s economic development, but would loyal to General Daglo, than they are to allow Hemedti to consolidate his power. Sudan. The third force in the security apparatus War in the security apparatus is the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), which is also responsible for In this scenario, centrifugal forces would counterinsurgency units and was consid- cause the military council to fragment, pos- ered a close ally to long-time ruler Bashir. sibly leading to a war between the military, The NISS were largely responsible for the the RSF and the intelligence services. The arrests and incidents of torture. Western donor countries would cease their Also deserving of a mention are the announced support, the AU would suspend armed movements on the periphery, such Sudan’s membership and the required eco- as the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), nomic recovery would be blocked. The Gulf which comprises armed movements from States and Egypt, who are committed to Darfur and the region on the border with maintaining a military government, a ‘Sisi- Southern Sudan. The SRF is demanding light’ scenario, would be called upon to to be a part of the transition government. mediate. Otherwise, still being of geopoliti- cal interest, Sudan would become a play- ground for proxy wars. The result would be Scenarios a destabilising of the region, from the Red Sea to the Sahel. After thirty years of authoritarian rule, a radical new beginning is as necessary as it is The civilian government collapses challenging, given the marginalisation of those on the periphery and the mafia-like In the protest camp there is resistance to interdependence between the government the TMC continuing to form part of the apparatus, the Islamist elite and the transition government. Old political parties military. and the SRF claim to be directly represented in the transition councils. The ideological Military coup: Hemedti takes over confrontations between the formerly pow- erful Islamists and secular political forces In this scenario, Hemedti takes power.