Journal of Strategic Security Volume 4 Number 3 Volume 4, No. 3: Fall 2011 Article 3 Extraordinary Rendition and U.S. Counterterrorism Policy Mark J. Murray The George Washington University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, National Security Law Commons, and the Portfolio and Security Analysis Commons pp. 15-28 Recommended Citation Murray, Mark J.. "Extraordinary Rendition and U.S. Counterterrorism Policy." Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 3 (2011) : 15-28. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.3.2 Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss3/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic Security by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Extraordinary Rendition and U.S. Counterterrorism Policy Abstract This article examines the United States Government policy of extraordinary rendition as a response to terrorism. The paper provides a working definition of the term, outlines why it has become controversial, and uses case studies to examine success and failures of extraordinary rendition in practice. The paper concludes with lessons learned—more specifically, policy amendments—that are necessary to keep extraordinary rendition as a viable tool for the Obama Administration and mitigate political fallout against the United States from both its allies and enemies. This paper argues that extraordinary rendition provides flexibility to policymakers to detain terrorists in cases where an attack may be forthcoming and when other approved legal processes are slow to react. Therefore, instead of ending extraordinary renditions altogether, the United States should reevaluate how it implements the policy on a tactical, operational, and strategic level and amend it based on the recommendations put forward in this article. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss3/ 3 Murray: Extraordinary Rendition and U.S. Counterterrorism Policy Journal of Strategic Security Volume 4 Issue 3 2011, pp. 15-28 DOI: 10.5038/1944-0472.4.3.2 Extraordinary Rendition and U.S. Counterterrorism Policy Mark J. Murray1 [email protected] Abstract This article examines the United States Government policy of extraordi- nary rendition as a response to terrorism. The paper provides a working definition of the term, outlines why it has become controversial, and uses case studies to examine success and failures of extraordinary rendition in practice. The paper concludes with lessons learned—more specifically, policy amendments—that are necessary to keep extraordinary rendition as a viable tool for the Obama Administration and mitigate political fall- out against the United States from both its allies and enemies. This paper argues that extraordinary rendition provides flexibility to policymakers to detain terrorists in cases where an attack may be forthcoming and when other approved legal processes are slow to react. Therefore, instead of ending extraordinary renditions altogether, the United States should reevaluate how it implements the policy on a tactical, operational, and strategic level and amend it based on the recommendations put forward in this article. Introduction Few policies of the Bush Administration's Global War on Terror have inspired more rebuke by U.S. allies and been seized upon by U.S. adver- saries more than that of extraordinary rendition. Simple in its basic con- cept, yet bungled in execution, the U.S. Government has used extraordinary rendition with zeal since September 11, 2001 (9/11). The primary intent of extraordinary rendition is to remove terrorists from the streets and inhibit their ability to plan and execute terrorist operations. Journal of Strategic Security (c) 2011 ISSN: 1944-0464 eISSN: 1944-0472 15 Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011 Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 4, No. 3 Journal of Strategic Security Proponents of the policy argue that it effectively removes terrorists from the streets and makes America and the world safer. Detractors often retort by saying the policy completely undermines greater U.S. foreign policy goals, is not in the spirit of U.S. and international law, and is linked directly with the torture of detainees. A full accounting of the policy's effects has yet to be undertaken—or pro- vided—by the United States Government, but lessons can be learned from its use over the past decade. It is imperative to learn these lessons now because the U.S. will continue to be judged and closely scrutinized on how it implements controversial counterterrorism policies in the future. How- ever, U.S. officials should be careful not to dismiss the policy out of hand because unpredictable failures do not conclusively undermine its overall efficacy. With several adjustments to current policy, extraordinary rendi- tion can continue to be a useful tool in the fight against terrorism. The purpose of this paper is to define the controversy surrounding extraordi- nary rendition policy, use several case studies to assess its overall efficacy as a counterterrorism tool for the United States Government, and put for- ward several recommendations to strengthen the policy for use in the future. Extraordinary Rendition: A Working Definition Rendition is defined simply as any time a fugitive is surrendered by one country and given to another.2 It should not to be confused with extradition, which is a subset of rendition characterized by a legal process and considered to be the official vehicle to transfer suspects in custody between foreign governments.3 Extraordinary rendition, or irregular rendition, is a policy where individuals known to be members or affiliates of terrorist organizations are seized and covertly transferred to a third- country detention facility for debriefing.4 The process is extrajudicial, done in secret, and typically not carried out exclusively by U.S. personnel.5 Targeted individuals are often seized by local authorities in a particular country at the behest of—or based on the intelligence from—personnel from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion (FBI) or the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS). The suspects are then transported using U.S. assets to one of many destinations, including Egypt, Syria, Romania, Jordan, Poland, or Afghanistan. Some individuals are destined for known prisons operated by host governments, but others are held in "black sites" which are operated by the U.S. Government in foreign territories.6 The primary intent of extraordinary rendition is to 16 https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss3/3 DOI: <p>http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.3.2</p> Murray: Extraordinary Rendition and U.S. Counterterrorism Policy Extraordinary Rendition and U.S. Counterterrorism Policy pull terrorists off the streets. In this way it differs from simple covert ren- dition because the individuals are usually not destined for a courtroom of any kind, but rather they are to be detained and interrogated indefinitely, often without official charges filed against them.7 What Makes It So Extraordinary? Extraordinary rendition is not extraordinary because it is a new or novel concept. It is extraordinary because, as a counterterrorism tool, it circum- vents official legal structures and processes to detain known or suspected terrorists. The extraordinary rendition program in its current incarnation began in 1995 during the Clinton Administration and was designed by CIA officials heading the Usama bin Ladin Issue Station (originally code- named Alec Station).8 Its primary goals were to take individuals off the streets that were known to be planning or have planned terrorist opera- tions and to seize evidence in their possession at the time of capture.9 At this time, Presidential approval was required for an extraordinary ren- dition to occur; and, according to officials involved, interrogation of ren- dered individuals by U.S. Government personnel was not part of the program.10 Also, captives were only to be transferred to countries where they were wanted for a criminal offense. After 9/11, the policy was amended by lifting the above restrictions and allowed for a U.S. role dur- ing interrogations.11 Both the Clinton and George W. Bush Administra- tions sought assurances that foreign governments would not torture detained individuals, but the veracity of these claims, and the expectation that host governments would actually comply, is questionable.12 Over time, the program shifted from using an interagency approach to a largely CIA-managed program based on a classified Presidential Directive issued by President Bush.13 What Has Made It Controversial? In theory, extraordinary rendition is not overly controversial, but U.S. management and execution of the policy has created strong opposition from human rights groups. For example, Ramzi Yousef was a target of U.S. rendition who was openly tried and convicted in a U.S. court of law for the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993. Yousef's rendition and conviction faced little opposition because the moral imperative of a free society to protect its people from terrorism is widely accepted. Extraordinary renditions—where individuals simply disappear on "ghost planes," are never charged with crimes, and are detained indefinitely—are what troubles most observers.14 17 Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011 Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 4, No. 3 Journal of Strategic Security During the early years of the program, very few people even knew extraor- dinary renditions were taking place. As of 1998, thirteen suspected inter- national terrorists had been detained and delivered to the United States to stand trial.15 However, the program was expanded significantly after 9/11 because the political landscape had changed and the Bush administration was obliged to take increasingly aggressive actions to combat terrorism.