BULGARIA POLITICAL PARTY '. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ASSESSMENT & PROGRAM DESIGN Preparedfor: U.S. Agency For International Development/Bulgaria Democracy & Local Governance Office Prepared by: Mark Hopkins, M.A. Sarah Birch, Ph.D. & John Mason, Ph.D. (Team Leader) Consultants for: Developmeut Associates, Inc. 1730 N. Lynn Street Arlington, VA 22209-2023 (703) 276-0677 April 29, 2002 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Acronyms 1lI Executive Summary iv Chapter 1: Introduction I A. Purpose I B. Background I C. Methodology and Research Perspective 2 D. Organization ofthe Report 4 Chapter 2: Constraints to Enhanced Party Electoral Competitiveness 5 A. The Setting 5 B. Cultural and Social Attitudes towards Political Parties 5 C. Legal Framework ofParties, Voting Systems and Elections 7 D. Impact ofLocal Elections on Party Behavior 8 E. Party Election Campaign Capacity 9 Chapter 3: Challenges to Formation of Effective Party Structures 12 A. Overall Organizational Status ofParties 12 B. Internal Organizational Development 13 C. Institutionalization ofParty Structure 15 D. Prospects for Party Reform IS E. The Needs ofWomen in Politics 16 F. Youth Needs 18 Chapter 4: Potential for Effective Party Governance 21 A. Outreach Capacity 21 B. Links to Advocacy Groups and the Media 27 C. Coalition-Building Experience 29 D. Role ofthe Opposition 29 Chapter 5: An Overview ofDonor Experience in Assisting Party Development 31 A. u.S. Experience in Direct Support ofParty Development 31 B. Other Donor Experience in Direct Support ofthe Political Party Process 34 C. USAID Experience in Indirect Support ofParty System Development.. 35 • D. Future Plans and Potential Donor Cooperation 38 PoliJical Party Deve1JJpment April 2002 in Bulgaria ....' Development Associates, Inc. Chapter 6: Conclusions and Program Design Recommendations 40 A. Conclusions 40 B. Program Design Recommendations 42 ... ANNEXES 1. Scope ofWork 1-1 2. Persons Interviewed 2-1 3. Interview Schedules 3-1 4. Documents and Resources Consulted 4-1 Political Party Development ii April2002 in Bulgaria ... ACRONYMS BAFECR Bulgarian Association ofFair Elections and Civil Rights BSP Bulgarian Socialist Party BSY Bulgarian Socialist Youth CEGA Creating Effective Grassroots Alternatives CSD Center for the Study ofDemocracy CSO Civil Society Organizations CSP Center for Social Practices DemNet Democracy Network Program EA Eurointegration Association FLGR Foundation for Local Government Reform ICNL International Center for Non-for-Profit Law IRI International Republic Institute ISC Institute for Sustainable Communities LGI Local Government Initiative MP Member ofParliament MRF Movement for Rights and Freedoms NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDI National Democratic Institute NED National Endowment for Democracy NGO Non-Government Organizations NMSII National Movement Simeon the Second OSF Open Society Foundation PBF Partners Bulgaria Foundation • PBW Party ofBulgarian Women SUNY State University ofNew York UDF Union ofDemocratic Forces WFD Westminster Foundation for Democracy YUDF YouthUDF • Political Party Development iii April2002 in Bulgaria EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Carried out during March 16-April 6, 2002, this assessment focuses on selected aspects of political party development in Bulgaria and on a set ofdesign recommendations. The context for the assessment is the plight of Bulgarian parties that face a considerable uphill struggle in convincing a largely demoralized and cynical public oftheir ability to represent their interests. In a society where parties are generally mistrusted and politicians are widely believed to be corrupt, the parties are challenged with building confidence among the public at large. The success of the NMSII in the 200 I parliamentary elections is a reflection of popular protest against the existing parties, and a desire to have political organizations that are more trustworthy and more responsive to popular demands. Findings suggest that many political leaders and analysts see the need to improve the framework in which elections are held. The area most in need of reform is widely believed to be that of party and campaign financing. A second major issue concerns the parties' tendency to ignore public opinion, except at election time. Once the election is over, the parties, once more, tum inwards, all but ignoring the concerns and problems oftheir constituencies. In formal terms, most Bulgarian parties appear to have mastered the basics of electoral . communication. Platforms are written and disseminated, via the internet and printed leaflets, and overall strategies are agreed upon among the leadership. But at the micro-level, campaign communications appear to break down. Many parties attribute their difficulty in communicating their message to distortions by the media. In strategic terms, most parties are relatively centralized. Major policy decisions are taken by the central leadership and fed down to the grass-roots, and there does not appear to be a well­ developed grassroots party responsiveness. Related is the absence of strong membership recruitment practices among the parties. Additionally, there are few explicit fund-raising strategies and practices among the parties, and it is increasingly clear that transparency in party expenditure would go some way toward rebuilding confidence in parties. Organizationally, the characteristic that most distinguishes Bulgarian parties from parties in west-central Europe, is the fact that they are organized largely on the basis of patronage, rather than on policy, and that their programmatic distinctiveness is weak. Their general willingness to form coalitions is also a feature that, though beneficial in some respects, limits the extent to which parties can develop coherent, autonomous internal institutions. There is, undoubtedly, a need for Bulgarian political parties to reform their internal structures, both to improve information flows and to enhance input from the grass-roots. Communication with the public is yet another one of the main areas where Bulgarian parties have shown weakness and have expressed an interest in having assistance. The UDF and the BSP both interpret their failure in the 2001 election, in terms ofweaknesses in their respective communications strategies--And the NMSII has recently become acutely aware of its own lack of success in this domain, as its support in the polls has plummeted. Many party leaders blame the media for their inability to get their message across to the public. They also blame corruption of the media and of research organizations, such as polling agencies. But though tensions between the media and the parties are undoubtedly a factor, many persons interviewed also Political Party Development iv April2002 in Bulgaria DevelopmentAssociates, Inc. admitted that their own communications strategies were inadequate. Observers say that ..., politicians lack the skills to get their message across to the media in clear and comprehensive fashion. Concerning Bulgaria's coalition-building experience, the national party system is unusual in its cohesiveness. Whereas most ofthe post-communist states have experienced high levels ofparty fragmentation and party system instability, the underlying opposition in Bulgaria, between the 'red' Socialists and the 'blue' UDF (together with the orthogonally positioned MRF), generated a relatively stable partisan structure, until 2001. The unexpected success ofthe NMSII disrupted this pattern of alignment, but it is unclear that the basic pattern will not reassert itself. The opposition, on the other hand, has over the past twelve years, been highly polarized. This has limited the extent to which opposition forces have acted "constructively." External assistance to political party development by the U. S. has been provided through the USAID-supported International Republican Institute (00), the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NOI), and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Not all ofthis support has been implemented along partisan lines, some of it having been aimed more broadly at fair elections and reform of the party system generally. 00 aimed at supporting the emergence of a center-right coalition in the mid-1990s. Through most of 2001, it undertook monthly polls, right up to the Parliamentary elections, as well as focus group research, especially' with women voters, youth, and voters outside ofSofia. The NDI has been supporting fair elections and civil society in Bulgaria since 1990. Its role in the country has been somewhat different from 00, in that it has supported a broader spectrum of political activity, rather than focusing on the development of one or two parties' capacity to organize. The NDI in the mid-1990s focused on reversing the monopoly of central parties in selecting local candidates, by stressing grassroots power. In more recent work, during 1998-99, the NDI consulted MPs from BSP, UDF, MRF, and Euroleft parties and their local staffers, in how to manage citizen concerns, daily staffschedules, and public outreach generally. Alongside assistance from the U. S., the British, Germans, and Netherlands have ongoing w programs that support Bulgarian political party development. Other governments, such as Sweden and Greece, have supported short-term efforts, but do not have a presence in Bulgaria. Here, we will review the above Government programs, though with the proviso that several of 'ilol the foreign parties are not physically present in Bulgaria. The British Government provides direct support to political parties