VOLUME 131 DECEMBER 2017 NUMBER 2 © 2017 by The Harvard Law Review Association ARTICLES MULTIPLE CHANCELLORS: REFORMING THE NATIONAL INJUNCTION Samuel L. Bray CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 418 I. THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL INJUNCTION .......................................................... 424 A. The Absence of the National Injunction from Traditional Equity ............................. 425 B. The Changing Scope of Injunctions Against Federal Defendants .............................. 428 1. No National Injunctions (to the 1960s) .................................................................. 428 2. The Emergence of National Injunctions (from the 1960s) .................................... 437 II. WHY DID THE NATIONAL INJUNCTION EMERGE? .................................................... 445 A. The Structural Precondition: Multiple Chancellors ..................................................... 446 B. Two Ideological Shifts ...................................................................................................... 448 C. Other Changes? .................................................................................................................. 452 III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE NATIONAL INJUNCTION .......................................... 457 A. The Incentive to Forum Shop ......................................................................................... 457 B. The Effect on Judicial Decisionmaking ......................................................................... 461 C. The Risk of Conflicting Injunctions ............................................................................... 462 D. The Doctrinal Inconsistencies ......................................................................................... 464 IV. THE FAILURE OF EXISTING LIMITS ............................................................................... 465 V. W HERE SHOULD WE GO FROM HERE? ......................................................................... 469 A. Injunctions Should Be Plaintiff Protective ................................................................... 469 B. Objections .......................................................................................................................... 473 1. Differential Treatment ................................................................................................. 473 2. Regulatory Disruption ................................................................................................. 476 3. Regulatory Entrenchment ........................................................................................... 476 4. Plaintiff Detection ....................................................................................................... 478 5. A Standard, Not a Rule .............................................................................................. 479 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................. 481 417 MULTIPLE CHANCELLORS: REFORMING THE NATIONAL INJUNCTION Samuel L. Bray In several recent high-profile cases, federal district judges have issued injunctions that apply across the nation, controlling the defendants’ behavior with respect to nonparties. This Article analyzes the scope of injunctions to restrain the enforcement of a federal statute, regulation, or order. This analysis shows the consequences of the national injunction: more forum shopping, worse judicial decisionmaking, a risk of conflicting injunctions, and tension with other doctrines and practices of the federal courts. This Article shows that the national injunction is a recent development in the history of equity. There was a structural shift at the Founding from a single-chancellor model to a multiple-chancellor model, but the vulnerabilities in the latter did not become visible until the mid- to late twentieth century, when there were changes in how judges thought about legal challenges and invalid laws. Only with those changes — only in the second half of the twentieth century — did the national injunction emerge. This Article proposes a single clear rule for the scope of injunctions against federal defendants. A federal court should give what might be called a “plaintiff-protective injunction,” enjoining the defendant’s conduct only with respect to the plaintiff. No matter how important the question and no matter how important the value of uniformity, a federal court should not award a national injunction. This rule is based on equitable principles and on the scope of the “judicial Power” granted by the Constitution of the United States. INTRODUCTION ederal district judges have taken to an odd practice: they are issuing F injunctions that apply across the nation, controlling the defendant’s behavior with respect to nonparties. A prominent example is the pre- liminary injunction in Texas v. United States,1 which shut down the implementation of the Obama Administration’s most important immi- gration program.2 Another is the preliminary injunction in Washington ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– Professor, UCLA School of Law. The writing of this Article was supported by a Harrington Faculty Fellowship at the University of Texas at Austin. For comments and criticisms on earlier drafts, I am grateful to William Baude, Josh Blackman, Bob Bone, Maureen Carroll, Nathan Chapman, Kevin Clermont, Kristen Eichensehr, Richard Fallon, Ranjit Hakim, Andy Hessick, Andrew Kull, Douglas Laycock, Marty Lederman, Michael Morley, Nicholas Parillo, Richard Re, Doug Rendleman, Bertrall Ross, Stephen E. Sachs, Eugene Volokh, Kevin Walsh, Patrick Wooley, Stephen Yeazell, and the participants in law faculty workshops at Notre Dame and the University of Texas at Austin. For helpful conversations and correspondence, I am grateful to Ronen Avraham, Aaron-Andrew Bruhl, Jud Campbell, Perry Dane, John Duffy, Ward Farnsworth, John Golden, Michael McConnell, Susan Morse, John Nagle, Andrew Pincus, Jeffrey Pojanowski, Zachary Price, Larry Sager, David Waddilove, Christopher Walker, and Howard Wasserman. I also thank Lei Zhang for his excellent research support and archival sleuthing. 1 Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex.), aff’d, 809 F. 3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.). 2 Id. 418 2017] MULTIPLE CHANCELLORS 419 v. Trump,3 which halted the implementation of President Trump’s first executive order restricting entry by individuals from seven coun- tries.4 How did this practice of issuing national injunctions begin? Is it defensible? This Article offers a new analysis of the scope of injunctions to re- strain the enforcement of a federal statute, regulation, or order. Without much controversy, federal courts have increasingly been acting as if they have the authority to issue “national injunctions.”5 That is, in non–class actions, federal courts are issuing injunctions that are universal in scope — injunctions that prohibit the enforcement of a federal statute, regulation, or order not only against the plaintiff, but also against any- one. There is a small but growing literature critical of the national in- junction.6 The criticisms expressed in this literature are essentially cor- rect, including that the national injunction encourages forum shopping and that it arrests the development of the law in the federal system. But there is a strange disconnect between the diagnosis and the cure. The solutions proposed in this literature rely heavily on existing principles and appeals to judicial self-restraint. If these solutions would work, they would already have worked. ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 3 Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017) (granting temporary restraining order). 4 See id. The challenged executive order was subsequently replaced. The second order was the subject of national injunctions, which were stayed in part by the Supreme Court, see Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087–89 (2017) (per curiam), and later vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot, Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017) (mem.) (per curiam). The third order was also the subject of national injunctions. See Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17-00050, 2017 WL 4639560, at *14 (D. Haw. Oct. 17, 2017) (granting temporary restraining order), appeal docketed, No. 17-17168 (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, No. 17-0361, 2017 WL 4674314, at *40–41 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2017). The litigation is continuing. 5 No term is perfect. “Nationwide injunction” is especially inapt, because it emphasizes terri- torial breadth, when the real point of distinction is that the injunction protects nonparties. See infra note 19. “Universal injunction” is better, though it does not include the distinctive fact that these injunctions constrain the national government, as opposed to state governments. See infra note 29 and accompanying text. 6 See Michael T. Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23 (B)(2), and the Remedial Powers of the Lower Courts, 97 B.U. L. REV. 615 (2017); Michael T. Morley, De Facto Class Actions? Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in Voting Rights, Election Law, and Other Constitutional Cases, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487 (2016)