AMERICA’S RETREAT FROM VICTORY BY JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY (1951) In this book McCarthy makes well-researched, credible, and damning charges of pro-Soviet activities by George Marshall, Secretary of Defense, and Dean Acheson, Secretary of State. As a result, he was maligned as one who made 'unproven' accusations against 'hundreds' of suspected communists. However, this book remains as a permanent indictment against those corrupt, high placed traitors that knowingly betrayed American allies in Eastern Europe and Asia, and hypocritically vilified all who opposed them. McCarthy died at age 48 several years after being censured by the Senate. BACKGROUND LEADING UP TO THE MARSHALL SPEECH ............................................................. 3 MARSHALL AND THE SECOND FRONT .........................................................................................12 THE STRUGGLE FOR EASTERN EUROPE .....................................................................................18 THE YALTA SELLOUT .................................................................................................................28 MARSHALL AND STILWELL..........................................................................................................39 THE MARSHALL POLICY FOR CHINA ...........................................................................................45 THE MARSHALL MISSION ............................................................................................................58 THE MARSHALL PLAN ................................................................................................................74 THE MARSHALL-ACHESON STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE ............................................................91 PRESS REACTION TO THE MCCARTHY SPEECH...........................................................................97 SOURCE MATERIAL .................................................................................................................. 102 1 Page INTRODUCTORY LETTER Dear Reader: Here is the record of George Catlett Marshall. He provides the key to an understanding of an extremely tragic and disastrous period in American history. The contribution of Marshall himself to this tragedy was tremendous. More sad and significant, however, was the number of other men in high places who were willing to support Marshall, defend him, and help to carry out the plans and policies dreamed up for him and associated with his name. Saddest of all was the cooperation of so large a part of the press, in making a hero of Marshall and scoundrels of his critics. For it was in connection with McCarthy's charges against Owen Lattimore and George Marshall, and Whittaker Chambers' charges against Alger Hiss, that the American press first clearly revealed the depths to which so much of it had fallen. Instead of carefully considering fully documented charges of extreme importance to the security of our country, the press as a whole—despite many honorable exceptions—brushed the accusations under the rug as quickly as possible, and devoted its full attention to vilifying the accusers. We have always felt—and have said before—that the name of George Marshall was attached to the great American foreign-aid fraud as a means of letting the really important Communists and fellow travelers all over the world know the truth: That the whole plan had really been designed and initiated by the Communists themselves for ultimate Communist purposes. This book will certainly go far to explain why such a trademark would have been—and was—so readily understood by those "in the know." 2 Page BACKGROUND LEADING UP TO THE MARSHALL SPEECH On June 14, 1951, I reviewed the public career of George Catlett Marshall from the beginning of World War II before the United States Senate. It was an exhaustive review, running to 72,000 words, drawn from the acknowledged sources of this period. Among the questions raised by that speech were these: What were McCarthy's motives? Why did McCarthy single out the Secretary of Defense and spend so much time preparing such a searching documentation of his history? Those questions recalled the advice given me by some of my friends before I gave the history of George Marshall. "Don't do it, McCarthy," they said. "Marshall has been built into such a great hero in the eyes of the people that you will destroy yourself politically if you lay hands on the laurels of this great man." My answer to those well-meaning friends was that the reason the world is in such a tragic state today is that too many politicians have been doing only that which they consider politically wise—only that which is safe for their own political fortunes. My discussion of General Marshall's career arose naturally and inevitably out of a long and anxious study of the retreat from victory which this Administration has been beating since 1945. In company with so many of my fellow citizens I have become alarmed and dismayed over our moral and material enfeeblement. The fact that 152 million American people are officially asked by the party in power to adopt Marshall's global strategy during a period of time when the life of our civilization hangs in the balance would seem to make it imperative that his complete record be subjected to the searching light of public scrutiny. As a backdrop for the history of Marshall which I gave on June 14, there is the raw, harsh fact that since World War II the free world has been losing 100 million people per year to international Communism. If I had named the men responsible for our tremendous loss, all of the Administration apologists and the camp-following elements of press and radio led by the Daily Worker would have screamed "the Big Lie," "irresponsible," "smear," "Congressional immunity," etc., etc., etc. However, it was the Truman branch of the Democratic Party meeting at Denver, Colorado, which named the men responsible for the disaster which they called a "great victory"—Dean Gooderham Acheson and George Catlett Marshall. By what tortured reasoning they arrived at the conclusion that the loss of 100 million people a year to Communism was a "great victory," was unexplained. The general picture of our steady, constant retreat from victory, with the same men always found at the time and place where disaster strikes America and success comes to Soviet Russia, would inevitably have caused me, or someone else deeply concerned with the history of this time, to document the acts of those molding and shaping the history of the world over the past decade. However, an occurrence during the MacArthur investigation was the immediate cause of my decision to give the Senate and the country the history of Marshall. A deeply disturbed Senator from the Russell Committee came to my office for information. "McCarthy," he said, "I have always considered Marshall as one of our great 3 heroes and I am sure that he would knowingly do no wrong. But, McCarthy," he said, "tell Page me who prejudiced the thinking of this great man? Why, for example, did he keep from Roosevelt the complete and correct intelligence reports at Yalta? Why did he, as Roosevelt's military adviser, approve that Yalta agreement which was drafted by Hiss, Gromyko, and Jebb? Who persuaded him to disregard the intelligence report of 50 of his own officers, all with the rank of colonel or above—an intelligence report which urged a course directly contra to what was done at Yalta and confirmed at Potsdam?" He handed a copy of that report to me and asked: "Why did a man of Marshall's intelligence ignore such a report as this compiled by 50 of his own top intelligence officers?" The report, dated April 12, 1945, read as follows: "The entry of Soviet Russia into the Asiatic war would be a political event of world-shaking importance, the ill effect of which would be felt for decades to come. Its military significance at this stage of the war would be relatively unimportant. The entry of Soviet Russia into the Asiatic war would destroy America's position in Asia quite as effectively as our position is now destroyed in Europe east of the Elbe and beyond the Adriatic. "If Russia enters the Asiatic war, China will certainly lose her independence, to become the Poland of Asia; Korea, the Asiatic Rumania; Manchuria, the Soviet Bulgaria. Whether more than a nominal China will exist after the impact of the Russian armies is felt is very doubtful. Chiang may well have to depart and a Chinese Soviet government may be installed in Nanking which we would have to recognize. "To take a line of action which would save few lives now, and only a little time— at an unpredictable cost in lives, treasure, and honor in the future—and simultaneously destroy our ally China, would be an act of treachery that would make the Atlantic Charter and our hopes for world peace a tragic farce. "Under no circumstances should we pay the Soviet Union to destroy China. This would certainly injure the material and moral position of the United States in Asia." Marshall had ignored this report. The Senator went on. "McCarthy," he said, "who of evil allegiance to the Kremlin sold him on the disastrous Marshall Mission to China, where Marshall described one of his own acts as follows: "As Chief-of-Staff I armed 39 anti-Communist divisions. Now with a stroke of a pen I disarm them"? "When that was done," the Senator asked, "who then persuaded Marshall to open Kalgan Mountain Pass, with the result that the Chinese Communists could make contact with the Russians and receive the necessary arms and ammunition