CHINESE MESSAGING ACROSS THE STRAIT China-friendly Narratives and the 2020 Taiwan Presidential Election CHINESE MESSAGING ACROSS THE STRAIT The Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is a start-up incubated at the Atlantic Council and leading hub of digital forensic analysts whose mission is to identify, expose, and explain disinformation where and when it occurs. The DFRLab promotes the idea of objective truth as a foundation of governance to protect democratic institutions and norms from those who would undermine them. The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world. The Center honors General Brent Scowcroft’s legacy of service and embodies his ethos of nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders. The Scowcroft Center’s Asia Security Initiative promotes forward-looking strategies and con-structive solutions for the most pressing issues affecting the Indo- Pacific region, particularly the rise of China, in order to enhance cooperation between the United States and its regional allies and partners. COVER PHOTO (BACKGROUND): “Taipei 101” by Remi Yuan (@remiyuan), Unsplash. Published on February 21, 2018. https://unsplash.com/photos/JMB3Efb8yoQ This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this issue brief’s conclusions. Atlantic Council 1030 15th Street NW, 12th Floor Washington, DC 20005 For more information, please visit www.AtlanticCouncil.org. December 2020 2 CHINESE MESSAGING ACROSS THE STRAIT Chinese Messaging Across the Strait China-Friendly Narratives and the 2020 Taiwan Presidential Election 3 CHINESE MESSAGING ACROSS THE STRAIT Table of Contents Introduction 5 “One China” Policy and China’s Approach to Taiwan 6 The 2020 Taiwan Presidential Election 8 Taiwan’s Social Media Landscape 10 Chinese Interference in Taiwan’s Information Environment 11 Social Media Findings 12 Conclusion 24 4 CHINESE MESSAGING ACROSS THE STRAIT Introduction aiwan has grappled with foreign interference at a administration.3 Moreover, as awareness of Chinese scale that dwarfs the challenges faced by many information operations has grown, some social media users other democracies. The island nation remains a in Taiwan have exacerbated the partisanship by labeling Tflashpoint for Chinese projections of power and any China-friendly narratives – and anyone advancing them sovereignty that date back to the Chinese civil war in the – as Chinese in origin. This has further increased the climate late 1940s when the Kuomintang Party (KMT) was driven of paranoia and distrust. out of the mainland by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Since that time, the CCP has contended that Taiwan is a Despite growing Western attention on China’s interference part of broader China yet to be united with the mainland, in the democratic institutions of Taiwan, there has been while the government of Taiwan has been caught up in a limited academic research that accounts for the full scope debate as to whether it represents the legitimate “China” and impact of such information operations during the (i.e., democratic and free) or whether it is “Taiwan” (i.e., no 2020 Taiwan election and their effects upon Taiwan’s longer connected to China at all).1 broader political landscape. This report identifies instances of Chinese political messaging from both official Chinese Chinese information operations targeting Taiwan have government accounts as well as unattributable accounts intensified alongside China’s more aggressive foreign that promote consistently pro-China narratives that align policy. These operations have been conducted, in part, with CCP propaganda. The DFRLab found that, while through the targeting and denigration of pro-independence China sought to apply influence on the election through or less China-friendly politicians within Taiwan. The 2018 coordinated information operations on social media local elections in Taiwan saw a range of pro-mainland, platforms, such operations achieved far less impact and anti-independence patriotic trolling campaigns and fake pro-CCP sentiment than the party likely anticipated, likely personas that aligned with CCP interests and that spiked thanks in part to general awareness of Chinese efforts particularly during periods of geopolitical tension. The following the 2018 legislative elections. Despite low levels situation only exacerbated as Taiwan approached the 2020 of digital engagement, however, this pro-China material presidential election, when social media, both Western offers a window into the next iteration of Chinese narrative platforms like Facebook and YouTube, as well as platforms propagation. originated from Chinese mainland like Weibo, were entangled with conspiracy theories and disinformation. Although not all of them can be attributed back to the CCP government, they align with China’s “discourse power” projection that favors China’s vision of the cross-strait relationship and criticizes politicians who challenge its authority in the region, including the presidential candidate Tsai Ing-Wen. Echoing the experiences of other democracies, social media has made this challenge more difficult. As communities have grown more insular and opinions more entrenched, fact-based information has become harder to come by, replaced by political polarization and mutual recrimination.2 For example, pan-Blue (pro-KMT) constituents are more likely to believe and disseminate negative disinformation about the current Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 1 For more on the understanding of Chinese government’s approach toward Taiwan, see , “ ” (“On the Evolution of the Chinese Communist Party’s Policy on Taiwan”), 6 (2006): 32-40, accessed on November孙代尧 20, 2020,中国共产党对台政策演变论析 http://www.cqvip.com/qk/81413x/200606/23230795. html; Eleanor Albert, “China Taiwan Relations,”中共党史研究 Council on Foreign Relations, December 7, 2016, https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/ gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/CFR-China-Taiwan%20Relations.pdf. 2 Taiwan Election: Disinformation as a Partisan Issue, Stanford Internet Observatory, January 21, 2020, https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/taiwan-disin- formation-partisan-issue. 3 , “ Pan-Blue or Pan-Green Rumors? The Relationships Between Political Preferences and Dissemination杜兆倫 謠言分藍綠？政治傾向與社群媒體謠言傳播之關聯性研究 of Political Rumors in Social Media,” Degree Thesis of National Taiwan University Journalism Research Institute, January 1, 2018, accessed on November 20, 2020, https://www.airitilibrary.com/Publication/alDetailedMesh?docid=U0001-0902201814560900. 5 CHINESE MESSAGING ACROSS THE STRAIT “One China” Policy and China’s Approach to Taiwan he Chinese Civil War began in 1945 between the Meanwhile, the KMT has – contrary to its origin – deepened KMT and the CCP, splitting the military alliance its cooperation with the CCP based on the 1992 Consensus they maintained throughout World War II, as the that initiated the “One China” policy. Both parties agree Ttwo parties sought to maintain control of the levers that there is only one China, but the definition is left open of government for the entire Chinese territory. Although for interpretation. The People’s Republic of China’s “One the KMT gained military ascendancy at first with the help China” policy, which sees Taiwan as an integral part of of the US military, the Communists later secured military China, is a fundamental part of its foreign policy. A goal victories in 1948, culminating in the KMT’s forced retreated of reunification by 2049 was included in the Communist from the mainland to Taiwan, where it retained a strategic Party of China’s 2049 “National rejuvenation” centenary position and industrial capacity in part because of its goals. China’s use of media and public diplomacy to further geographic isolation from the mainland.4 In Taiwan, the the “One China” policy targets three key audiences: local KMT remained the only political party on the island for an Taiwanese, as a means of building support for unification; extended period. Initially, the KMT declared martial rule a foreign audience, intending to isolate pro-independence with an intent to prevent infiltration from CCP spies and Taiwan political powers; and a domestic Chinese audience, prepare the society for a war to conquer the mainland, an to reassure the legitimacy and ascendency of the CCP aspiration that was never acted upon or realized. Several government.7 While the CCP sees this as a way of temporary dissidents from the KMT secretly founded DPP in 1986, compromise, it has adhered to the agenda of persuading with the hope of creating a more democratic society that Taiwan to reunite with the CCP government as opposed honors basic human rights and freedom for its citizens. to more aggressive military action. On the other hand, Since the early 1990s, when Taiwan shifted to true a multi- while the KMT government in Taiwan signed onto the 1992 party democratic system, the DPP has promoted a separate Consensus with the CCP government, the DPP leadership identity of Taiwan from mainland China, an accelerating has been an adamant opponent