NOVEMBER 6, 2009 | No. 697 U.S. NRC SLAMS WESTINGHOUSE AP1000’S FLAWED DESIGN Two new reactor designs were forecast (at least in Europe and North-America) make the nuclear renaissance happen: the Westinghouse AP1000 and Areva’s EPR. The EPR-design, is as we U.S. NRC SLAMS all know, under heavy fire, and now also from the French nuclear WESTINGHOUSE AP1000’S regulator (see next article). But in the U.S., the AP1000-design is FLAWED DESIGN 1 also running into all kind of problems with the Nuclear Regulatory REGULATORS HIGHLY Commission. CRITICAL ON EPR CONTROL AND COMMAND SYSTEM 2 (697.5987) NIRS Southeast - In a highly unusual move, on 15 October 2009, the The “Safety Shield Building” which NGO'S FORCE RWE OUT OF U.S. nuclear regulator sent a key surrounds the containment has several BELENE PROJECT 3 component of the Westinghouse AP1000 functions, among these to hold a large (not-yet-licensed) “standardized design” tank of water over containment so that in CRACK IN FLORIDA REACTOR CONTAINMENT SIGNALS back to the drawing board. The NRC staff the event of an accident the water is HIDDEN DANGER IN PWR'S 4 is quoted in a press release stating that dribbled over the surface of the steel the AP1000 “Safety Shield Building,” the containment dome (the so-called gravity- U.S.A.: SOUTHWEST outer structure surrounding the AP1000 fed cooling). The AP1000 containment is INDIGENOUS URANIUM containment, does not meet “fundamental a separate, inner structure made of 1 FORUM engineering standards” with respect to inch (2.54 cm) thick steel. This “passive” 5 design basis loads, as well as several convection cooling of the containment SUIT TO AIR INTERNAL EPA other concerns not disclosed to the surface is projected to lower pressure PROTESTS ON RADIATION public. inside containment, in the event of a EXPOSURE PLAN 7 major core disaster. Given the weight of The press release indicates, and a water, in two storage tanks of 70 cubic GLOBAL FISSILE MATERIAL review of NRC documents confirms, that meters each, design basis loading is a REPORT 2009 8 NRC had been raising issues with serious concern. IN BRIEF 8 Westinghouse for more than a year. This move impacts 14 out of 26 currently The Safety Shield Building is three feet proposed new reactor licenses in the US (91.4 cm) thick reinforced concrete, and and throws the review schedule for is intended to protect the reactor from reactor into the air. severe weather including tornado- hurled The NRC October 15, press release projectiles, hurricanes, earthquakes and states that NRC have been talking to air crashes. A somewhat more eerie Westinghouse regularly about the shield function is to add shielding in the event of building since October 2008, and "we’ve a severe accident; the new 1 inch steel consistently laid out our questions to the containment does not provide sufficient company,” according to Michael Johnson, mass to absorb gamma ray emissions director of the NRC’s Office of New after a major accident. In effect, the Reactors. “This is a situation where Safety Shield Building is a pre-installed fundamental engineering standards will “sarcophagus” (like at Chernobyl) which have to be met before we can begin would provide some protection for determining whether the shield building emergency workers called to the site in meets the agency’s requirements.” the event of a meltdown. The structure, 1 far from containment, also functions as that a new review schedule for the considers which reactor applications a cooling tower for the melting core, “design certification amendment” had garner a loan guarantee subsidy. sporting an air-circulation hole at the yet to be established. top. That the LGP has been considering Westinghouse, which is owned by issuing loan guarantees to reactors that Given how the US NRC embraced its Toshiba, has four AP1000s planned for do not have final certification and also mandate from industry and Congress to China. Two nuclear utilities in the U.S. do not have construction and operating streamline the new reactor licensing which are pursuing AP1000s are on the licenses is now clearly revealed to be process, rejection of a major component U.S. Department of Energy’s short list an extremely risky approach. As we of a reactor that was previously certified to receive federal loan guarantees to now see that it is far from certain if as “standard” is a substantial departure back private loans for construction. reactors or combined licenses will win from this regime. In an apparent attempt Given the news from the NRC about the regulatory approval, any move to now at cost-cutting, the new AP1000 version design flaws in the AP1000 design, a issue conditional loan guarantees is features modular construction – bringing number of U.S. public interest groups premature and opens DOE to justified prefab components to the site, rather wrote to the DOE on 19 October, calling criticism." than construction of the Safety Shield on a halt to the imminent issuance of Building on-site from the ground-up. “conditional” loan guarantees for the Given the serious issued now raised by The difference in integrity between projects. They stated: "Given that the the reactor regulatory agency itself, the pouring concrete on the site and action by the NRC is so serious in public interest groups call on DOE to erecting “building blocks” is apparently nature, it is imperative that the "immediately halt issuance of substantial. Department of Energy immediately halt conditional loan guarantees and take the issuance of any conditional loan action to publicly assure the public that The NRC notified Westinghouse on 15 guarantees to any utilities which are this is the case." October in a letter, linked in the NRC basing their plans on the AP1000 news release, that ‘either a confirmation reactor design. Issuance of DOE loan Source: Tom Clements (FOE U.S.A.) test or a validated (or benchmarked) guarantees at this time to companies and Mary Olson (NIRS Southeast) analysis method” must be used to which are considering a reactor which Contact: Mary Olson, Nuclear demonstrate that the “shield building” may well have serious design problems Information and Resource Service can survive design basis events. The would not only heighten public concern (NIRS), Southeast Office. PO Box 7586, letters state that the “NRC considers its about DOE’s regard of oversight of Asheville, North Carolina 28802, USA. review of the shield building, as nuclear reactor safety but would also Tel: +1 828-252-8409 proposed, to be complete” but affirms further call into question the Email: [email protected] that a review of other parts of review, methodology applied by the DOE’s Web: www.nirs.org now in Revision 17, will continue and Loan Guarantee Program (LPG) as it REGULATORS HIGHLY CRITICAL ON EPR CONTROL AND COMMAND SYSTEM Not only the AP1000 is under fire, also the EPR becomes more and more subject of doubts regarding safety questions by the official safety authorities in countries where the reactor is built (Finland, France) or should be built (U.K.) Now the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) has just published a letter to EDF, which questions in the most serious way the ability of the control and command system of the EPR being built in Flamanville to meet safety requirements. Like British and Finnish authorities did before, ASN makes appropriate answers to these doubts a condition to the future operational license of the reactor. (697.5988) WISE Amsterdam - In June, interconnectivity of what were meant to allows lower safety class systems to the U.K. Nuclear Installations be independent systems designed to have write access [the ability to Inspectorate (NII) wrote to EDF and operate the plant and ensure its safety. override] to higher safety class Areva, to express their concerns about systems,” it continued. the control and instrumentation (C&I) of The Health and Safety Executive, which The letter also highlighted concerns Areva’s European Pressurised Reactor oversees the NII, said that the EPR about the absence of safety display (EPR). C&I governs the computers and design could be rejected for use in systems or manual controls that would systems that monitor and control the Britain if its concerns could not be allow the reactor to be shut down, either station’s performance, including satisfactorily addressed. “It is our in the station’s control room or at an temperature, pressure and power output regulatory judgment that the C&I emergency remote shutdown station. levels. The NII, said the EPR architecture appears overly complex,” The NII said that it would grant a technology was significantly the NII letter said. “We have serious license for the EPR reactor only if it was compromised because of the concerns about your proposal which satisfied that the reactor design could 2 NUCLEAR MONITOR 697 be built and operated safely and "the complexity of the architecture no acquired certainty to build an securely. proposed by EDF makes it difficult to acceptable demonstration of safety on That was late June, a few days later, on provide a satisfying demonstration of the basis of the current architecture". July 2, the Finnish safety authority the safety" and states that its Therefore ASN asks EDF, in parallel to raised similar concerns, but the French acceptability is subject to changes in trying to provide this justification, to safety authority ASN remained very the design and complementary "examine as from now arrangements for silent. It would not comment and said it justifications. Furthermore, "the analysis different options of conception" [again, was on the process of assessing this of these elements [to be provided by rough translation from French].