Mouseion, Series III, Vol. 6 (2006) 407–423 ©2006 Mouseion INITIATION INTO THE MYSTERIES: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE IRRATIONAL IN PLATO VISHWA ADLURI INTRODUCTION Plato is generally interpreted as if he were a purely rational philoso- pher. Except for the category of erotic madness, Platonic texts are usu- ally evaluated according to the quality of the arguments contained therein.1 Rather than define irrationality in terms of flawed arguments, it is possible to see the dialogues operating according to a different sys- tem of meaning, a different “logic.” Such a different sense of logic oper- ates in myth and other narratives, where the argument is neither com- pletely illogical nor rational in the positivist sense.2 Much has been written about Plato’s use of myth and the narrative logic of his dialogues.3 However, very little has been written on the Pla- tonic dialogue as following a different methodology: the ritual structure in archaic experiences of personal transformation and salvation.4 In 1 For example, see Annas 1981. 2 In the Phaedrus, Socrates asserts that he has no time for the clever and rough ingenuity of rationalists who seek to explain myths and the creatures therein in positivistic terms (229e–230a). This is significant, since it anticipates Socrates' critique of Lysias' erotic sobriety, his defense of divine madness, and the divine vision of the Forms later in the dialogue. Notice that such frontal at- tacks on rationalism do not preclude the sober argumentation on rhetoric. 3 See, for example, Morgan 2000. I agree with her conclusion (289): “My- thologia must therefore take its place as an intimate and essential part of the Platonic philosophical project. It is no accident that Plato invented the word and gave it conceptual shape. It seems likely that he performed a similar role with the other words that define his enterprise, both positively and negatively: rhetorike (rhetoric) and philosophia (philosophy). Mythology, rhetoric, phi- losophy: all are formed in and through language, all interpenetrate and influ- ence each other.” Conspicuously missing in this account, but crucial to this pa- per, is the transformation of self which is a part of the Platonic project. This transformation is not a mere study into whether these tools operate successfully on Socrates' interlocutors in the dialogue. On the contrary, a transformation of the reader must be viewed as an essential aspect of these dialogues. I will argue throughout that the use of the dynamics of initiation is a technique distinct from mythology, philosophy, and rhetoric—a technique par excellence—in implicat- ing the reader. 4 Hadot 2002 is a notable exception; see also Levenson 1999. Peter Kingsley (1995, 1999, 2003) brilliantly demonstrates this ritualistic aspect of philosophy 407 408 VISHWA ADLURI some dialogues, at least, narrative structure closely mirrors ritual structure. In demonstrating these parallels, we may reach the following conclusions: (1) Platonic philosophy is indeed closer to what we con- sider theology than to what we consider rational positivism.5 (2) Pla- tonic philosophy is meant to transform the reader in the manner of an initiation ritual. This may involve a ritual disorientation from the pro- fane or a symbolic “death” and rebirth. (3) Beyond the formalities and fallacies of arguments, something much more profound is at stake: the salvation of the philosophical initiate through Platonic dialogue. The ultimate aim of such salvation is a philosophical viewing of that which is immortal, and an experience of eudaimonia or happiness. Perhaps our own religious prejudices allow us to see only a “polis religion” in Greek religion, and perhaps our modern philosophical openness and emphasis on reason induce us naturally to rehabilitate Platonic philosophy by what we consider the highest standard of knowledge: proper argumen- tation. Only if we allow ourselves to see the Platonic dialogues as more than rational may we recognize their eschatological dimension. In this non-derogatory sense, at least, the term “irrational” can be applied to Platonic philosophy. FRAMING THE PROBLEM In Plato’s Gorgias, the great sophist impels Callicles to answer Socrates’ questions. Socrates begins his questioning with the following words (497c): eÈda!mvn e‰, Œ Kall!klei!, ˜ti tå megãla memÊh!ai pr‹n tå !mikrã: §g" d' oÈk ’mhn yemitÚn e‰nai. ˜yen oÔn ép°lipe! épokr!nou, efi oÈx ëma paÊetai dic«n ßka!to! ≤m«n ka‹ ≤dÒmeno!. You’re a happy man, Callicles, in that you’ve been initiated into the greater [mysteries] before the lesser. I didn’t think it was permitted. So answer where you left off, and tell me whether each of us stops feeling among the Presocratic thinkers (1995, 1999, 2003). Christoph Riedweg's impor- tant philological analysis (1987) informs the philosophical conclusions of this essay. 5 For an alternative view, see McPherran 1996. McPherran denies any mysti- cal aspect to Socrates and portrays him as endowed with Apollonian modesty (293): “He is concerned very little with epistemology and metaphysics, but is passionately interested in obtaining some measure of adequate response to his various and relentless ‘What is x?’ questions.” Socrates is also credited with raising the stakes of Greek religion away from votives to elenctic practice. McPherran goes further and allows some bolder theological tampering on Plato's part. Despite the evidence, expecially from Xenophon, I am not con- vinced of this particular solution (or any other) to the Socratic problem of dis- tinguishing Plato and Socrates. INITIATION INTO THE MYSTERIES 409 pleasure at the same time as he stops being thirsty.6 We could explain the reference to “Great and Lesser Mysteries” as a mere metaphor. Socrates, it seems, is mocking Callicles for wanting to speak of great matters without first questioning the preliminary minor issues. Indeed, Callicles complains about Socrates’ “finicky little ques- tions” in just the preceding line. However, this explanation is incom- plete. As Riedweg has recently shown (1987), Plato’s use of the language of initiation into the mysteries is not merely accidental. Rather, Plato’s extensive use of mystery-initiation terminology in his dialogues is pro- grammatic and philosophically significant. Further, the research of Pe- ter Kingsley on the Presocratics shows the deep resonances between philosophic literature and the journey of the initiate undergoing katãba!i! (katabasis, ritual descent).7 These studies allow us to see that in the Gorgias passage above, Plato indicates both stylistically and lexi- cally that Socrates is evoking a different form of knowing altogether. This other philosophical project begins with the vocabulary of initiation and concludes in the myth of an afterlife. The language of initiation is not a linguistic archaism carried over by Plato. Rather, this language comprises an essential aspect of Plato’s conception of philosophy, as illustrated in several of the other dialogues below. When taken seri- ously, we are forced to admit (paraphrasing Whitehead’s famous com- ment) that Western Philosophy is a series of footnotes to a radically de- theologized Plato, an alleged rational philosopher. RATIONAL ENLIGHTENMENT OR INITIATION? We may contrast two scholarly interpretations of the language of initia- tion in the Gorgias. Richard Janko (1998: 26) champions the first view. He writes: “Thus the [Derveni] papyrus reveals how, under threat of persecution, spiritually inclined freethinkers like Socrates exchanged the traditional polytheistic religion, with its shocking myths and pecu- liar rites, not for atheism or even agnosticism (for which Protagoras had been condemned), but for a new pantheism. Even this seemed so dangerous that the Athenians unleashed a veritable Inquisition against it.” This view, popular amongst many including Burnet and numerous other Anglo-American scholars,8 shows Socrates as chiefly participating 6 Unless otherwise specified, translations of Plato’s works in this essay shall be taken from Plato: Complete Works (Cooper 1997). In this passage, the word “mysteries” does not occur in the Greek; memÊh!ai, “you have been initiated,” is used instead. 7 Kingsley 1995 and 1999. 8 See, again, McPherran 1996. 410 VISHWA ADLURI in the “Enlightenment” of the period. Socrates is, in this view, a critic of the “old religion,” and while not atheistic, nevertheless constitutes a break in traditional “theology.”9 This interpretation of Socrates’ genius as a radical break with old religion as the Greeks understood it is not the only possible view. Per- haps philosophers of this era did not see themselves as merely icono- clastic, scientific truth seekers. Socrates himself, in his intellectual biog- raphy in the Phaedo, speaks about his “second sailing,” where he abandons the intellectual enterprise of natural philosophy for a new beginning, a “techne of logos.” However, this new methodology also proves insufficient to demonstrate the immortality of the soul or to give an account of life.10 Could the various references in the Phaedo to death, to a heroic journey to the labyrinth, to the Bacchic cults, as well as the clearly described eschatalogical myth and the detailed geography of the underworld, hold the key to a solution? Could the immortality of the soul be one of those philosophical matters which are attainable through the practice of initiatory rituals rather than through the logical argu- mentation of the elenchus? The recent work of Peter Kingsley (1995), who follows the research of Walter Burkert (1969), supports this inter- pretation: The philosopher was also a prophet, a skilled knower and leader of initiates into the mysteries. In light of this research (to be dis- cussed in the next section), it is evident that the true meaning of Socratic teaching continues to operate on the basis of an ancient philosophical experience, one closer to a katabasis, a ritual descent, than to an elenchus, or argument.11 In the Gorgias, the language of initiation should be interpreted as a clue that Socrates is leading Callicles on a very different philosophical path, one that culminates in the vision of a great myth.