Foreign Policy at BROOKINGS MISSILE DEFENSE IN EUROPE: Cooperation or Contention? Steven Pifer Arms Control Series Paper 8 • May 2012 Acknowledgments I would like to express my deep gratitude to John Beyrle, Linton Brooks, Michael Elleman, Michael O’Hanlon and Greg Thielmann, as well as to officials in the U.S. government, for taking the time to review a draft of this paper and for their very useful reactions and comments. Of course, the contents, conclusions and recommendations are my own. I appreciate Gail Chalef’s assistance in the paper’s editing and production. Finally, I am very grateful to the Ploughshares Fund for its generous sup- port for this paper and for other activities of the Brookings Arms Control Initiative. Brookings recognizes that the value it provides to any supporter is in its absolute commitment to quality, independence and impact. Activities supported by its donors reflect this commitment, and the analysis and recommendations of the Institution’s scholars are not determined by any donation. FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l s e r i es MISSILE DeFENSE IN eUROPe: C o o P e rAt i o n o r C o n t e n t i o n ii Table of Contents Acknowledgments ........................................................... ii 1. Introduction and Executive Summary .........................................1 2. A Brief History of Missile Defense ........................................... 4 3. The European Phased Adaptive Approach ......................................10 4. The Russian View ..........................................................15 5. Models of Cooperation ....................................................19 6. Transparency and Arms Control .............................................22 7. Pursuing Cooperation over Contention ......................................25 Endnotes...................................................................28 About the Brookings Arms Control Initiative ...................................29 About the Author . .30 FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l s e r i es MISSILE DeFENSE IN eUROPe: C o o P e rAt i o n o r C o n t e n t i o n iii 1. Introduction and Executive Summary Missile defense has been an issue on the agenda Initially, the Russians seemed to see the EPAA as less between Washington and Moscow since the 1960s. of a threat than the Bush administration plan that Although the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty it replaced. The Russians agreed at the end of 2010 appeared to resolve the question, it kept coming to explore a cooperative missile defense arrangement back—in the form of U.S. suspicions about the with NATO. In 2011, however, Russian officials at- large, phased array Soviet radar at Krasnoyarsk, So- tached priority to securing from Washington a “legal viet concern about the Strategic Defense Initiative, guarantee” that U.S. missile defenses would not be National Missile Defense programs, U.S. withdraw- directed against Russian strategic ballistic missiles, al from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and plans accompanied by a series of constraints. for deploying missile defenses in Europe. The Obama administration has offered a political as- In 2012, the missile defense issue ranks high on the surance on this but could not agree to a legal guaran- U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia agendas. Policymak- tee. Republican support for missile defense and op- ers in Washington, Moscow and NATO capitals face position to any treaty limits on it would mean that a a challenge: can they manage the question in a co- treaty could not obtain the two-thirds majority nec- operative manner, perhaps by developing a NATO- essary for Senate ratification. Moscow nevertheless Russia missile defense of Europe, or will this be a has held to its insistence. The mix of motives that contentious issue that undermines arms control and underlies the Russian approach to missile defense broader relations? and possible cooperation with NATO is not entirely clear but likely includes: concern that later phases of After a review of the history of missile defense, this the EPAA or subsequent developments will threaten paper describes the Obama administration’s “Euro- Russian strategic ballistic missiles; Ministry of De- pean Phased Adaptive Approach” (EPAA) to missile fense reluctance in principle to engage in a coopera- defense in Europe. The EPAA is based on the Aegis tive effort; opposition to U.S. military infrastructure SPY-1 radar and Standard SM-3 missile interceptor, on the territory of countries that joined NATO in which is to be upgraded over the next decade to de- or after 1999; and a desire to drive wedges within fend NATO Europe, and later to augment defense of NATO. Finally, Moscow may be in a holding pat- the U.S. homeland, against prospective longer-range tern on missile defense, as it is on nuclear arms con- ballistic missiles from Iran (though NATO as a mat- trol issues, until it sees who wins the November U.S. ter of policy does not publicly cite Iran). NATO has presidential election. endorsed this approach, and the first phase began in 2011, with deployment of U.S. Navy warships Should the sides find a way around the legal guar- armed with SM-3 interceptors in the Mediterranean antee obstacle, there appears to be a rich menu of and a supporting radar in Turkey. Later phases envis- ideas as to how a cooperative NATO-Russia mis- age SM-3 interceptors plus SPY-1 radars deployed sile defense arrangement might be structured. In on land in Romania and Poland. 2011, U.S. and Russian officials reportedly found FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l s e r i es MISSILE DeFENSE IN eUROPe: C o o P e rAt i o n o r C o n t e n t i o n 1 convergence on ideas such as transparency; joint For the time being, missile defense falls into the NATO-Russian missile defense exercises; a jointly- category of difficult issues in U.S.-Russia relations. manned “data fusion center” that would share early Achieving a NATO-Russia agreement on missile warning data and develop a “common operational defense cooperation appears all but impossible in picture;” and a “planning and operations center” 2012. The U.S. and NATO objective should be to that would, among other things, implement trans- keep the door open for a NATO-Russia agreement parency measures, exchange updated threat assess- in 2013. Then, the United States and NATO could ments, and discuss possible attack scenarios. Several offer a package to encourage Russia to join in a co- U.S.-Russia Track II dialogues over the past two operative missile defense. Such a package could in- years have developed complementary ideas for NA- clude some or all of the following measures: TO-Russia missile defense cooperation. • A U.S. and NATO political commitment The Russian proposal for a legal guarantee is accom- not to direct their missile defenses against panied by a proposal for “objective criteria,” which Russian strategic ballistic missiles. translates to limits on numbers, velocities and loca- tions of missile defense interceptors—a treaty cover- • Maximum transparency regarding planned ing missile defense. Short of a treaty, however, there U.S. missile defenses. This should include are ways to reassure Moscow about the capabilities an offer of an annual notification laying of U.S. missile defenses and the inherent limits on out the numbers of key missile defense ele- those capabilities. For example, as the head of the ments currently deployed and planned for U.S. Missile Defense Agency has suggested, the Rus- deployment each year over the next decade. sians could observe SM-3 interceptor tests to con- This should be accompanied by a commit- firm that the velocity and range of the missile would ment to provide the Russians notice in ad- not allow it to engage Russian strategic missiles. The vance should there be any changes in those U.S. government might also offer an annual declara- planned deployment numbers. Ideally, this tion regarding the current and planned numbers of would apply on a reciprocal basis. key elements of the U.S. missile defense system—in- terceptor missiles, silos and land-based launchers, as- • Technical briefings as to why the Defense sociated radars and missile-defense capable ships— Department concludes that U.S. missile and commit to provide advance notice of changes in defenses will not threaten Russian strategic the planned numbers. This would allow Moscow to ballistic missiles. gauge whether the sum of U.S. capabilities seriously challenged its strategic deterrent. • Reiteration of the offer to allow Russian experts, using their own sensors, to observe In different political circumstances, given current SM-3 interceptor tests. U.S. plans, it would appear that a ten-year agree- ment limiting each side to no more than 100-125 • Indicating that a cooperative NATO-Rus- interceptors capable of engaging strategic ballistic sia missile defense arrangement could be missiles would (1) assure Moscow that its strategic of a provisional, time-limited nature, with ballistic missile force was not threatened, and (2) per- NATO acknowledging at the outset that mit the United States to do everything that it wants (1) Moscow has strong concerns regard- to do over the next decade to defend against the ing U.S./NATO missile defense capabili- Iranian and North Korean ballistic missile threats. ties and (2) Russia’s decision to agree to a The administration, however, is not exploring such provisional cooperative arrangement does a treaty, as it understands that any such agreement not preclude that Moscow may decide not would have no prospect of Senate ratification. to make the arrangement permanent if it FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l s e r i es MISSILE DeFENSE IN eUROPe: C o o P e rAt i o n o r C o n t e n t i o n 2 believes that U.S./NATO missile defense The United States and NATO should seek, without capabilities will threaten its strategic forces.