THE LIMITS OF FIRE SUPPORT: AMERICAN FINANCES AND FIREPOWER RESTRAINT DURING THE VIETNAM WAR A Dissertation by JOHN MICHAEL HAWKINS Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Chair of Committee, Joseph G. Dawson, III Committee Members, R. J. Q. Adams Terry H. Anderson James C. Bradford Charles Hermann Head of Department, David Vaught August 2013 Major Subject: History Copyright 2013 John Michael Hawkins ABSTRACT Excessive unobserved firepower expenditures by Allied forces during the Vietnam War defied the traditional counterinsurgency principle that population protection should be valued more than destruction of the enemy. Many historians have pointed to this discontinuity in their arguments, but none have examined the available firepower records in detail. This study compiles and analyzes available, artillery-related U.S. and Allied archival records to test historical assertions about the balance between conventional and counterinsurgent military strategy as it changed over time. It finds that, between 1965 and 1970, the commanders of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Generals William Westmoreland and Creighton Abrams, shared significant continuity of strategic and tactical thought. Both commanders tolerated U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Allied unobserved firepower at levels inappropriate for counterinsurgency and both reduced Army harassment and interdiction fire (H&I) as a response to increasing budgetary pressure. Before 1968, the Army expended nearly 40 percent of artillery ammunition as H&I – a form of unobserved fire that sought merely to hinder enemy movement and to lower enemy morale, rather than to inflict any appreciable enemy casualties. To save money, Westmoreland reduced H&I, or “interdiction” after a semantic name change in February 1968, to just over 29 percent of ammunition expended in July 1968, the first full month of Abrams’ command. Abrams likewise pursued dollar savings with his “Five-by-Five Plan” of August 1968 that reduced Army artillery interdiction expenditures to nearly ten percent of ii ammunition by January 1969. Yet Abrams allowed Army interdiction to stabilize near this level until early 1970, when recurring financial pressure prompted him to virtually eliminate the practice. Meanwhile, Marines fired H&I at historically high rates into the final months of 1970 and Australian “Harassing Fire” surpassed Army and Marine Corps totals during the same period. South Vietnamese artillery also fired high rates of H&I, but Filipino and Thai artillery eschewed H&I in quiet areas of operation and Republic of Korea [ROK] forces abandoned H&I in late 1968 as a direct response to MACV’s budgetary pressure. Financial pressure, rather than strategic change, drove MACV’s unobserved firepower reductions during the Vietnam War. iii DEDICATION To Linda, Brandon and Kaitlyn iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my committee chair, Dr. Joseph G. Dawson, III, and my committee members, Dr. R. J. Q. Adams, Dr. Terry H. Anderson, Dr. James C. Bradford, and Dr. Charles Hermann, for their patience, guidance and support throughout this research project that I completed as both a distance student of Texas A&M and an active duty U.S. Army officer. Most significant research projects would prove considerably more difficult without the help of trained archivists and this work is no exception. I am particularly indebted to Dr. Boyd Dastrup and Sheila Duckworth for helping me to navigate the resources available at the Morris Swett Technical Library in Fort Sill, OK. Richard Boylan, Cliff Snyder, and Jeannine Jeffrey of the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD, also helped me tremendously, as did Dr. Richard Sommers, David Keogh, and Randy Rakers at the U.S. Army Military History Institute in Carlisle Barracks, PA, and John Wilson of the LBJ Library in Austin, TX. Finally, I want to thank my parents, Les and Julia Hawkins of Tucson, AZ, but especially my wife, Linda, and my children, Brandon and Kaitlyn, for being so patient and understanding during this project. They know too well how many after-duty hours this consumed over an extended period of time. This project remains my own, as do its flaws or shortcomings. My views do not necessarily reflect those of NATO, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Army. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... ii DEDICATION ................................................................................................................ iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................. v TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................ vi LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................... viii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION: FIREPOWER RESTRAINT DURING THE VIETNAM WAR ............................................................................................................. 1 Notes ............................................................................................................. 18 CHAPTER II AMERICAN ARTILLERY IN SOUTH VIETNAM: INNOVATION AND FIREPOWER DOMINANCE .............................................................................. 21 Notes ............................................................................................................. 44 CHAPTER III INHERITING AN INTER-SERVICE FAITH IN UNOBSERVED FIREPOWER ................................................................................................................. 49 Notes ............................................................................................................. 72 CHAPTER IV THE U.S. ARMY AND UNOBSERVED FIREPOWER, 1965-1967 .. 77 Notes ........................................................................................................... 102 CHAPTER V UNOBSERVED FIREPOWER BY U.S. MARINES AND ALLIED GROUND FORCES, 1965-1967 ................................................................................. 108 Notes ........................................................................................................... 140 CHAPTER VI COST CONTROLS: INFLATION, LIMITED WAR, AND U.S. ARMY CUTBACKS IN UNOBSERVED FIREPOWER DURING 1968 ................. 147 Notes ........................................................................................................... 182 vi CHAPTER VII TO CUT AND TRY: WITHDRAWAL, FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND U.S. ARMY REDUCTIONS IN UNOBSERVED FIREPOWER, 1969-1970 ............................................................................................ 189 Notes ........................................................................................................... 216 CHAPTER VIII UNOBSERVED FIREPOWER BY U.S. MARINES AND ALLIED GROUND FORCES, 1968-1970 ................................................................................. 223 Notes ........................................................................................................... 257 CHAPTER IX USING AND LOSING THE THEATER COMMANDER’S ARTILLERY: AIRPOWER IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 1968-1970 ............................. 265 Notes ........................................................................................................... 290 CHAPTER X CONCLUSION: THE AVAILABILITY AND LIMITATIONS OF FIREPOWER IN SOUTH VIETNAM ........................................................................ 294 Notes ........................................................................................................... 319 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................. 323 APPENDIX A NOMENCLATURE ............................................................................ 339 APPENDIX B U.S. ARMY, FIRST FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM, ARTILLERY AMMUNITION EXPENDED IN II CTZ, FEBRUARY 1968 TO JULY 1970 ......... 341 APPENDIX C U.S. ARMY ARTILLERY AMMUNITION EXPENDED DURING THE VIETNAM WAR, JULY 1968 TO JUNE 1970 ................................................. 343 APPENDIX D U.S. MARINE CORPS ARTILLERY AMMUNITION EXPENDED DURING THE VIETNAM WAR, MARCH 1965 TO MAY 1971 ............................ 388 BIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT ............................................................................... 410 vii LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE Page B-1 U.S. Army, First Field Force, Vietnam, Artillery Rounds Fired by Target Category in II CTZ, February 1968 to July 1970 ........................... 342 C-1 U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARV), Artillery Rounds Fired by Target Category, July 1968 to June 1970 ................................................... 344 D-1 U.S. Marine Corps, Vietnam, Artillery Missions Fired by Target Category, July 1965 to December 1967 .......................................... 389 viii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION: FIREPOWER RESTRAINT DURING THE VIETNAM WAR* In October 1966, out of the darkness blanketing a U.S. Army base camp in South Vietnam, sudden and then sustained concussions of sound and pressure jolted Major General Arthur S. Collins, Jr., who had just lain down to rest within his sandbagged living quarters. The newly arrived commander of the U.S. Army’s 4th Infantry Division, Collins immediately recognized the sounds as outbound artillery fire and thought that his camp