RESET OF AMERICA’S NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT Strategy and Policy 2018 RESET OF AMERICA’S NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT Strategy and Policy Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs October 15, 2018 SPONSORED BY: Precourt Institute for Energy Stanford University Freeman Spogli Insitute for International Studies Stanford University John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation CREDITS FOR COVER IMAGE “Radioactive Gordian Knot” by François Diaz-Maurin (Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License). Source: http://www.fdiazmaurin.eu/radioactive_gordian_knot/ Copyright © 2018 All rights reserved. PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RESET OF AMERICA’S NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT Strategy and Policy Table of Contents Acknowledgements i Executive Summary and Recommendations 1 Introduction: Status of the U.S. Program & the Reset Process 13 A New National Radioactive Waste Management Organization with a New Funding Strategy 27 Integration of the Back-end of the U.S. Nuclear Fuel Cycle 43 Public Engagement and Consent-Based Siting 61 Regulations, Risk and Safety 75 APPENDIX A: Reset Steering Committee Members 95 APPENDIX B: Reset Speakers and Affiliations for Each Meeting 101 APPENDIX C: Prospectus and Agenda for Each RESET Meeting 107 RESET OF AMERICA’S NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT Strategy and Policy Acknowledgements During the course of the five, public Reset meetings, we benefitted from the more than 75 invited presentations. We also appreciated the vigorous discussion among experts, scholars, fellows and students who participated. The Steering committee thanks all of the participants for sharing their time and views. Most importantly, we thank all of the participants for their civility and patience as we tried to understand and articulate the fundamental issues that confront the U.S. nuclear waste management program. This project could not have happened without the support of the Freeman-Spogli Institute for International Studies, the Precourt Institute for Energy at Stanford University, and the MacArthur Foundation for the support of the meetings at George Washington University. The grants from these institutions provided the travel support for all speakers and members of the Steering Committee. The meetings were hosted by the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford and the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. Stanford staff and students provided support for each of the meetings. We are especially grateful to Aparna Surendra, Elizabeth Gardner, Kathryn Anne Holleb, Zlator Gogolevse, Chelsea Papa, Katlyn Turner, Sulgiye Park and Paulette Wolak. Without their unfailing support and attention to detail, the meetings would not have been successful. Finally, since the time of the meetings, two important participants have passed away: Russell Jim and Milt Levenson. Russell Jim, an Elder of the Yakama Nation, had a long history of dealing with the issues created by nuclear waste. Russell was a forceful advocate for rigorous environmental standards and the necessity of thorough cleanup at the Hanford site in Washington in order to protect the Columbia River and surrounding lands. Milt Levenson began his career with the Manhattan Project, working at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. He was the Associate Laboratory Director at Argonne National Laboratory, Acknowledgements / i Director of the Nuclear Power Division at Electric Power Research Institute and an executive consultant at Bechtel Power Corporation. He was the president of the American Nuclear Society (1983-1984). Safe to say that Russell and Milt reflected two very different perspectives on nuclear waste issues, but at the Reset meetings the dignity of both set the tone of the discussions. Their knowledge and sense of purpose are a guide for us all. We were honored to know them both. RUSSELL JIM (1935-2018) MILT LEVENSON (1923-2018) ii / RESET OF AMERICA’S NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT Strategy and Policy RESET OF AMERICA’S NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT Strategy and Policy Executive Summary and Recommendations Status of the U.S. Program The U.S. nuclear waste management program has labored for decades at a cost of billions of dollars each year, and yet there is still no active disposal program either for spent nucle- ar fuel from commercial reactors or for the high-level radioactive legacy waste and spent nuclear fuel from defense programs. The program has suffered from a number of factors, including major changes to the original law; a series of amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982; a slowly developed but changing regulatory framework; erratic funding; significant changes in policy with changing administrations; conflicting Congressional and Executive policies; and finally, and most significantly, inadequate public engagement in deci- sions about strategies for the storage and disposal of the nuclear waste. Such disruptions are not unexpected in any extremely large technical megaproject subject to strong debates over value trade-offs extending far into the future. Only the radioactive waste-management program in Finland has been relatively immune to such challenges. The programs in Sweden, France, Switzerland, Germany, Japan, Canada, and the United Kingdom have all faced similar challenges. In some cases, the programs “reset” themselves relatively rapidly; in others, they did so over decades. Currently, Finland is in the process of constructing its repository after receiving a license; Sweden and France have selected sites and are moving through their licensing processes; and Canada and Switzerland are well into a comprehensive siting process. Germany has recently initiated a “reset” of its program with an entirely new, comprehensive siting process. Meanwhile, the U.S. program is an ever-tightening Gordian Knot — the strands of which are technical, scientific, logistical, regulatory, legal, financial, social and political — all subject to a web of agreements with states and communities, regulations, court rulings and the Con- gressional budgetary process. There is no single group, institution or governmental organi- zation that is incentivized to find a solution, nor is any single institution entirely responsi- ble for the failure of the U.S. Program. Executive Summary and Recommendations / 1 Reset Initative The Reset initiative, Reset of America’s Nuclear Waste Management Strategies and Policies, is based on the simple premise that given the scale and importance of the challenges at the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle, there is great value in taking a penetrating look at some of the most critical problems and their possible solutions. Reset is an effort to untangle the technical, administrative and public concerns in such a way that important issues can be identified, understood and addressed. Any new strategy must be informed by a thorough understanding of the history of the U.S. nuclear waste program, as well as the scientific, technical, social and policy challenges required to “reset” the U.S. program. Today, technical and policy issues have been over- whelmed by a partisan political process. A Democratic administration has tried to shut down the Yucca Mountain project as “unworkable”, while some Republicans in Congress view Yucca Mountain as the “law of the land.” As a first step, and in order to inform any new strategy, the “Reset” meetings have provided a forum for discussing the critical issues that must be addressed in order for the U.S. pro- gram to move forward. The meetings were organized by an international Steering Com- mittee, listed in Appendix A. The members of the Steering Committee represent diverse and international perspectives and have considerable experience with issues involving the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle. The members of the Steering Committee do not represent the views of their organizations. They, however, bring considerable technical skills and experience to the discussion. The “Reset” process involved convening five meetings, which consisted of 75 presentations by internationally recognized experts, government officials, legislators, nongovernmental organizations and members of the public (Appendix B). The series of five meetings were held at Stanford University and George Washington University (Appendix C: Prospectus and Agenda for Each Meeting). The meetings were open to the public, interested experts and scholars. This report is a summary of the major issues that were raised during the discussions as understood by the Steering Committee during their subsequent deliberations. As one might expect, there are a range of views, and we have tried to capture the essential elements of these different perspectives. At the same time, the Steering Committee has tried to em- phasize specific ways forward for the U.S. program. This is not a consensus report. Individual members of the Steering Committee may have preferred a different emphasis on certain options, but we have tried to capture the “center of gravity” of our different perspectives. We think that these recommendations will be useful as the U.S. fashions a new strategy and policy for the management and disposal of the Nation’s nuclear waste. 2 / RESET OF AMERICA’S NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT Strategy and Policy A New National Radioactive Waste Management Organization with a New Funding Strategy The lynchpin to the recommendations of the Reset Steering Committee is the recognition of the need for a new, independent, single-purpose national