Item D Number osseo D NotScannBfl Author Fox' R°9er p- Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, Was RBpOrt/ArtlClB Title IV- The Target Air Bases JOUmal/BOOk TltlB Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam, 1961 -197 Year 1979 Month/Day Color D Number of Images ° DeecrlptOlI NotOS ^'so included are two maps. One shows provinces and major cities of South Vietnam, and the other is a 1974 National Academy of Sciences Computer Printout of all defoliation missions in South Vietnam, 1965-1971. Tuesday, March 19, 2002 Page 5560 of 5611 AIR BASE DEFENSE ^ IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 1961 -1973 Roger P. Fox OFFICE OF AIR FORCE HISTORY UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WASHINGTON, D.C., 1979 on maximum alert with particular at- tention to the defense of headquarters complexes, logistical installations, air- Sabotage fields, population centers, and bil- lets." •* Of the four threats posed by the VC/NVA to the local security of U.S. The enemy unleashed his main air bases, sabotage was the least sig- attack between 0300 and 0400 local nificant. Despite unlimited opportuni- time on 31 January with about 84,000 ties for sabotage afforded by the thou- troops. In addition to Saigon they as- sands of Vietnamese civilians working saulted 36 of the 44 provincial capi- on these installations, this classic tals, 5 of the 6 autonomous cities, 64 weapon of insurgency warfare was a IV. THE TARGET AIR BASES of the 242 district capitals, and 50 curiosity rather than a commonplace. 115 hamlets. Responding to USMACV Records reveal but one notable case of The majority of bases do not have a positive approach or alerting orders, the Seventh Air Force sabotage at an American base during active planning program for the protection of their opera- Commander directed all bases to adopt the entire war. On 8 February 1967 tional assets. There are no criteria established for the Security Condition Red (Option 1), at Bien Hoa, Soviet-made explosive construction of air bases in a combat environment. New a readiness posture in which all base devices, secretly planted, destroyed construction and redesigning is [sic] based on peacetime about 2,600 napalm bombs valued at criteria. defense forces were mobilized and ST deployed to repel an impending at- $342,000. During 1968, a year of Seventh Air Force Base Defense Study Group, 1967. tack. Hence at both Bien Hoa and intense enemy activity, not a single Tan Son Nhut, the VC/NVA forces instance of actual or attempted sabo- Major targets for Viet Cong/ found themselves opposed at once by tage was reported at any Seventh Air Florida, the country extends more 88 North Vietnamese Army attacks em- U.S. defenders.6* It was generally Force base. Why the VC/NVA all braced the 10 primary bases that sup- than 1,300 kilometers from north agreed that this fact alone accounted but ignored this simple and potentially ported USAF operations in Southeast to south, while its width from east to for the successful defense of the two highly rewarding tactic cannot be ex- Asia. Da Nang, Phu Cat, Tuy Hoa, west varies from 50 to 200 kilometers. bases. plained by available evidence. Nha Trang, Cam Ranh Bay, and Phan Saigon, usually considered an east Rang are located in the narrow coast city, lies less than 60 kilometers The VC/NVA showed they could from the Cambodian frontier to the coastal zone bordering the South west. Security check do serious damage to air bases, nota- China Sea. (See page 56.) Pleiku is bly by standoff attacks and sapper situated in the Central Highlands less raids. Much of their capability de- than 70 kilometers from Cambodia. The Republic of Vietnam is a rived from a high degree of military Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa are in classic example of exposed territory. expertise that reflected sound doc- the environs of Saigon. Binh Thuy, So lengthy are its boundaries in rela- trine, meticulous planning and prepa- the southernmost base, lies on the out- tion to its size, that points for in- ration, deeply instilled discipline, and skirts of Can Tho in the middle of the filtration by land and sea are almost an aptitude for fusing available man- Mekong Delta. unlimited—a circumstance fully ex- power and weapons with proper tac- ploited by the VC/NVA. The Ho Chi tics to produce a mission-effective Minh Trail, stretching the whole force. Such ingenuity and skill helped The Geographic Impact length of the western boundary with surmount many of the inherent ad- branches extending into most interior vantages of the defense and to retain Geography had a vital bearing areas, was their main route for in- a broad initiative to strike at ground- on all facets of the war. Its impact on filtration of men and materiel through- local ground defense of these bases deployed U.S. air power at times and out the war. Secondary but much more places of their choice. Accordingly, came chiefly from the conformation, it is perplexing that the VC/NVA topography, climate, and vegetation of limited infiltration occurred along the never sought to redress more vigor- the Republic of Vietnam. 1,300-kilometer sea frontier. Hence, ously the air power imbalance by due in part to the physical conforma- fully exploiting their notable counter- A geopolitical principle holds that tion of RVN, logistic support for VC/ air base capabilities to the extent per- a compact country is much easier to NVA operations against USAF bases mitted by the vulnerability of Allied defend than a large sprawling one. was available along well-established defense measures. Clearly, the Republic of Vietnam fits lines of communication reaching from the latter category. Slightly larger than North Vietnam to within tactical M striking distance of the target installa- from China forming the border be- tions. tween RVN and Laos and, further south, between RVN and Cambodia. Topography also favored the in- They terminate at a point in the surgency forces. Nearly 60 percent of Mekong Delta about 80 kilometers NORTH VIETNAM RVN consists of relatively high moun- north of Saigon. Numerous spurs ex- tains and plateaus rising to 2,500 tending to the east insure broken and meters. These mountains, the Anna- rugged terrain in close proximity to all \ INFILTRATION ROUTES mite Chain, extend southeastward USAF bases but Binh Thuy. Low- 1968 DEMARCATION LINE 102 1 ' Primary USAF Operating Bases NORTH VIETNAM DMZ TUYHOA AB NHA TRANG AB CAM RANH BAY AB . SIHANOUKVILLE LEGEND PERSONNEL ROUTES. LOGISTICAL ROUTES. BASE AREAS SEA INFILTRATION AREAS BY PRIORITY NOTE: CORPS TACTICAL ZONES WERE REDESIGNATED MILITARY REGIONS IN 1970. 56 57 lands with little or no relief comprise area the wettest period lasts from the remaining 40 percent of the coun- December through January. This try and are located chiefly in the Me- heavy rainy season crippled Allied and kong Delta where the land is seldom VC/NVA operations alike and more than 4 to 5 meters above sea marked the yearly low point in attack level and is intersected by numerous on U.S. air bases.* waterways. Consequently, almost the whole countryside offered cover and Abundant rainfall joins the year- concealment to the VC/NVA while round high temperatures to give much presenting obstacles to observation, of RVN a 12-month growing season penetration, and movement by RVN that results in luxuriant vegetation. and Allied ground forces. Each of the More than 80 percent of the country 10 USAF primary bases was accessi- has a natural cover of rain forests, ble by land and/or water to insur- monsoon forests, and savanna lands, gency forces. which provide extensive concealment for insurgents. Except in the mountains and pla- teaus of the Annamite Chain—for ex- Around and within the U.S. air Vietnamese fishing village engulfed by dense tropical vegetation ample the Pleiku AB area—high tem- bases, plant life flourished in over- peratures prevail throughout the year, whelming and unwanted profusion. the average annual range varying only Several varieties of grasses and weeds from 77°F in the north to 81 °F in the created a critical problem for base Effective vegetation control was level. The base was ringed by excep- south. There high temperatures ac- defense. Especially widespread is tranh made vastly more urgent and onerous tionally dense tropical vegetation 3-4 companied by high humidity create a grass which reaches a height of 1 to by the year-long growing season and meters high. This growth engulfed the climate that saps human energy and 2 meters, easily tall enough to hide a the exceptional growth rate. The lat- perimeter fences constructed on the enormously increases maintenance re- man or even to imperil a helicopter ter was a truly incredible phenomenon outer face of the levee that enclosed quirements for all equipment. As in and one on which information is sur- landing. Yen-bach, another common 2 the installation. Likewise concealed other countries with similar climates, weed and a serious countrywide pest, prisingly incomplete. Security Police were navigable canals, used occasion- the afternoon siesta is an institution grows from 1.25 to 1.60 meters. Lau, at Tan Son Nhut recorded that vege- ally by the VC/NVA to float muni- observed, except for U.S. forces, by tation grew 1V4 to 2V2 inches per day tions and weapons to the base perim- cane of frequent occurrence grows 3 friend and foe alike. It appeared that in clumps 2 to 3 meters tall. Also during the rainy season, an observa- eter. In the interior of Binh Thuy the by tacit agreement mutual hostilities widespread are the bamboos, the most tion consistent with the findings of same vegetation flourished.