SUBJKOT; A critical analysis of the operations of the X Corps in the first- yhe.no of the Heuge-Argonne offensive* SUb/n.Uted by; Capt t W< L. 01c* anr.on, Inf., DOL. INDSX Historical narrative 8tratogioal and tnotioal ^nsl^vratlons - paces 2-3 The terrain - pegee 4-5 Sneruy defemsivfl dispositions - pages 6-8 The raeans - pabc3 8-9 Analysis of the First Army scheme of maneuver; The tactical plan - pages 9*14 Plan of operation of the French Fourth Amy - pages 14-17 iv-asone advanced for attaoking the Argonne Forest irontnUy - pages 17-19 The I Corps; Divisionaltaaks - pages 19-21 The artillery with the I Corpe - pages 2i-25 Antiairoraft - page 26 Auxiliary means; 1st Gas Regiment -page 26 1st American TunK Brigade - page 27 The Air Service - pages 27-30 The French Fifth Cavalry Division - page 31 The &ttaok 26 September - pegee 31-32 27 Se^teaber - pages 35-38 ?.o September - pages 38-40 29 8optetn'oer - pages 40-45 30 September * pages 45-50 Conditions-in the valley of the Aisne - pages 50-5l Subsequent events - pages 51-52 bonbat Strength and replacements - pages 52-53 Supply and evacuation - pages 53-55 High lights of oomment and oriticisni on the operation as a whole, and, in particular, ao to limited objectives: Fooh's reaction; regroupaent proposed - pages Ocnor-al Liggett'a statement re limited objeotives page 57 ConOIUBions - pages 57-62 Lea ions: Divieior - pages 62-63 Corps - pagos 63-65 Bibliography - pages 66-68 Fert L«avenwerth, Ktneao, 29 Karon, 193? 16 USUORAKDUU IOKJ The Dlreoter, seoend Year 91A*S, fl CtiUDand and General Staff school, port Leavenwertb, KAr.eas» BDBJHCT: A orltioai analysis of the operations of the X Oorps in the first phase of the Jleuee«Argonne offensive* X. PAPJRS ACCOMPANYING; Bibliography. XX. JJAP8 ACCOMPANYINO: 1* Franoe. Roims and Verdun sheets, 1:80,000. 2. Operation top No. IS, Verdun^Wezieres, 1:80,000, 1st Army, A.E.y. 3. Compilation of maps, The Afterioan Battle Monuments OoBUDiosion, showing dlrieional boundaries and lines held ty diTlstone of the X Corps as of midnight eaoh nieht, period 26 Beptember-Ootober 10, 191$, revised to include 5 February, 1930; scale: 1:20,000. XXX. THB 8TUDY PRE8EHTSD: An attempt to answer the following questions: 1. What was the First Arroy soheme of maneuver? 2. Xs terrain a vital consideration in prior planning, both for the immediate and for the future operations? 3- How did the First Army propose to take advantage of unexpected eucceeoee? Did the First Army provide for contingencies that might arise? 4. How did the First Army define the respective tasks alXotted to the oorps? !?• Was the I Corps allowed to exsroi&e initiative? Did i t have sufficient means with whioh promptly to maneuver, once a zone defense had been penetrated and open warfare oondit* i on« reao'aed, even i f only temporaril^? 6, fhat conclusions Wy be reached as to the effect of leadership on a given action? -1­ IV* HISTORICAL NARRATIVE, It Strategical and taotioal considerations* Before considering the taotioal role assigned to th# I Corps in the Mouee-Argonne offensive, it will be well to sketch the strateglo conoept that dictated suoh taotioal employment* The end of August found the Gorman forces definitely on the defensive along the entire western front* (X) Prodigal expenditures of nan*power in the three major offensives of the first part of the year 1918 had reduoed German reserves to the danger point, while morale had appreciably lowered. (2) (3) (4) The Allied High Corneand deoided to reap the harvest by launching two major offensives late in September, these attaoke to be praotically simultaneous and to be combined with continuous pressure along the entire front and with a further attack east of Ypres. (£) The newly formed American First Army and the Frenoh Fourth Army, one to the east and the other to the west of the Aisne, were to strike in a northerly direction, while a day lat*r the British First and Third Armies were to attack on the front] St. Quentln-Cambrai in a drive to the east* These attacks were designed to oonverge to out the great lateral rail* way system: Oarignan-Sedan-£c»ieres-Ham lee Koines and to trap the German forces southwest of the Ardennes* (6) (7) (8) Marshal Fooh, Commander-in-chief of the Allied forcee, celled together General perehing and General Petain, who command­ ed the Frenoh foroes, in order to settle the major details of the proposed operation* (9) Zt was deoided to have General Petain coordinate the effort of the American First Army with that of General Gouraud'e French Fourth Army, and to adjust any supply difficulties that might arise. (10) initially the American effort was to be directed against the heights of Romagne, while the Preach were to strive to reach tht* heights north of Somme-py, (n) (1) YL P 9 (2) H p 28 (3) VL P 14 (4) vO pp 36,49 (5) P Bx ' , ' • ' • , ' ' ' ' ,• . ' • ' p 280 (6) P Ex p 28l (7) W pp 120-121 (8) 70 p 48 (9) F p 468 (10) How p 381 (11) vG p 55 • 2 ­ Separated by SOD© 40 kilometers, these cain blows were even more widely sundered by a terrain feature, the Argon no Foreut, lying between the Aiene and the Air*. Tactically, in the first phaeoe of the operation, the progress of the one was to have little direct bearing on tho other. (12) And north of tho Argonne Forest lay stil l another forest area, east of the Aisne and beyond the bend of the Air©, which was to oontinue to separate the efforts of the American and French Armies, just AS the Argonne Forebt did initially. Consequently Marshal Foch's Oeneral Instruction of 3 September specifically directed that the American offensive be "at powerful and violent as poeBible, covered on thi east by the Ueuce and supported on the left by the attaok of the French Fourth ArnyN» (13) Th^t the American effort east of the Argonne Forest was Intended to be a main blow in itnelf and was to be pushed hard and with the greatest speed in the direction of Bus&anoy, irrespective of the progress of the French on its left, was again emphasized in Marshal Foch'o rote of 2$ September, (14) It was fui?.y realized that the American effort night fall far short of the desired result, requiring, as it lid, a penetra­ tion by an inexporiencedand hastily assembled army of some two miles through the organised German position, a drive of some three to eight Biles to the Army Objective, and then a further advance of sons eight to ten miles to the heighto north of Buzancy and Barricourt* In fact, Oeneral Petain was so dubious about the proposed operation as to state to General Psrshlng that the capture of idontfaucon was all that covid be expeoted before winter* (lj>) Yet the tactical objective, attainable or not, had now been assigned, and i t remained to Oeneral Perefcing to gather his means, perfect his diopositlons, and Btrive for surprise in hlo drive to the north. Oeneral Pershing must turn from the limited objective attack that was to reduce the Bt» tiihiei ealient, secretly concentrate three oorps and army troops between the fceuse and (12) H p 31 (13) p pP 469-470 (1*) F pp 47S-476 (15) p EX p 2?3 3 the Argonne Forest, and then launoh the drive to the north •• and aU in a period of some ten days* (l6) (17) This he aooompliehed, and through surprise incured at least Initial suoooss in the operation that was to follow, even though it was to fall far short of the goal* 2> The terrain. Before deoiding upon the Kians to be employed in the operation to oome, oenoral pershing must first ooneider the terrain in estimating just how the enemy was to dispose his limited resouroee in attempting to block the projeoted offensive* In the rone of aotion west of the Jteuee, and during the four years of German occupation, the natural defensive strength of position had been intensified by skillful organisation of the ground, particularly south of Ualanoourt, at Vauquois, and in the Argonne Fores t. The wooded area 0* the Bole do itel an court and the Bole de Oheppy served to bulwark Kontfauooti* (18) Rising 80*30 35>O feet, the heights of Montfauoon dominated the valleys of the Mouse to the east and the Aire to the west, as did the heights of Romagne and Cunel farther to the north* The Cotes de lieuee met of that river and the eastern spurs and hill s of the Argonne Forest enabled the defender to perfect a coordinated system of oroae-firee, oontrolled and directed by observation from the oentral hill-mass* (19) The German defensive organisation consisted of three lines in depth and a fourth partially organized line still farther to the north. From weBt to east, these were in general; First position - the Unej B. Carre-Bolante-Boureuilies­ Vauquois«*Bols de Jtalanoourt-Bethinocurt-yorges. Seoond (intermediate) position « generally 1 to 3 kilometers north of the first position and along the lint*; Foe aux Oharmse-Champ Aiahaut-Varennee-Cheppy-Boie de Montfauoon- Ousy-Bois de Forges* (16) p Xx p 263 (17) W p 126 (18) vO pp ?0, 55 (19) W p 123 position • tho lino: lea 4 Ohenoe-font & l'Aune- Fourth position - the line: Or and p re-Land re e ot St.