RASMAG/15−WP/16 01-05/08/2011 International Civil Aviation Organization The Fifteenth Meeting of the Regional Airspace Safety Monitoring Advisory Group (RASMAG/15) Bangkok, Thailand, 1 – 5 August 2011 Agenda Item 3: Reports from Asia/Pacific RMAs SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF RVSM WITHIN THE FLIGHT INFORMATION REGIONS MONITORED BY THE AAMA (Presented by Australia) SUMMARY This paper presents the results of three safety assessments undertaken by the Australian Airspace Monitoring Agency (AAMA) for the twelve month period ending 30 April 2011. The assessments cover the Brisbane, Honiara, Jakarta, Melbourne, Nauru and Ujung Pandang FIRs. An assessment for the Papua New Guinea airspace has not been finalised as at 30 April 2011. 1. Introduction 1.1. This paper provides details of the two airspace safety oversight assessments undertaken by the AAMA for the RVSM implementations in the Australian, Indonesian, Nauru and Solomon Islands RVSM airspace. The reports are detailed in Attachments 1 to 2. 2. Discussion 2.1 Since the completion of the April 2011 assessments provided with this paper, the AAMA has completed further assessments for the months of May and June 2011 for both the Australian and Indonesian airspace. These assessments show that in the Australian airspace, the number of Category A type LHDs has decreased by about 50% over the last few months however the total duration of these incidents has only reduced by approximately 20%. The assessed risk for the period to end of June 2011 approximates 3.49E-9. 2.2 For the Indonesian airspace, the number of Category E LHDs has remained unchanged in the two months following the April 2011 assessment however the total duration of these incidents has decreased by approximately 25%. The total risk has reduced marginally since April to be 6.18E-9 in the period to end of June 2011. 2.3 The AAMA is pleased to report that the on-going assistance it receives from the Indonesian DGCA and the two air navigation service providers is commendable and has enabled the AAMA to complete its monthly assessments in a timely manner. The AAMA undertakes visits to Indonesia twice a year with the sole purpose of reviewing the assessments with the DGCA and ANSP staff and to identify potential risk areas, assist with traffic sample data compilation, and aircraft approval and monitoring issues. The AAMA continues to work closely with these authorities to improve reporting of operational error and the accuracy of traffic sample data. RASMAG/15−WP/16 2 2.4 While the AAMA was able to provide a risk assessment for the Papua New Guinea airspace last year for the period ending April 2010, it has been unable to finalise an assessment for April 2011 at this point in time. Work will continue to make the assessment available prior to the next APANPIRG meeting so that the Secretariat can consider including the outcomes in the RASMAG report. 3. Actions by the Meeting 3.1 The meeting is invited to note and discuss the results of the airspace safety oversight presented in this working paper and the attached documentation. The AAMA requests RASMAG endorsement for it to circulate the subsequently completed risk assessment for Papua New Guinea airspace out of session and for the Secretary to nominate a date by which the material should be available for inclusion in the RASMAG report to APANPIRG. …………………………. AUSTRALIAN AIRSPACE MONITORING AGENCY (AAMA) SAFETY & ASSURANCE GROUP SAFETY SYSTEMS, RISK & ANALYSIS Operational Analysis Unit Airspace Safety Review of the RVSM Implementation in Australian, Nauru and Solomon Islands Airspace May 2010 to April 2011 Australian Airspace Monitoring Agency – RVSM Safety Assessment Report Brisbane, Honiara, Melbourne and Nauru FIRs May 2010 to April 2011 Executive Summary For the period 1 May 2010 to 30 April 2011, the technical risk satisfies the agreed TLS value of no more than 2.5 x 10-9 fatal accidents per flight hour due to the loss of a correctly established vertical separation standard of 1,000 ft and to all causes. As depicted in the graph below, the operational and weighted total risk of 4.27 x 10-9 meets the specified TLS value for these components of 5.0 x 10-9. Vertical Collision Risk by Type RVSM Implementation in the Brisbane, Honiara, Melbourne and Nauru FIRs 7.0E-9 6.0E-9 5.0E-9 4.0E-9 3.0E-9 2.0E-9 1.0E-9 000.0E+0 Jul-10 Jan-11 Jun-10 Sep-10 Oct-10 Feb-11 Dec-10 Aug-10 Apr-11 Nov-10 Mar-11 May-10 Technical Risk Opera tio nal Ris k Total Risk TLS for Technical Ris k TLS for Total Ris k The risk this month remains below the TLS. Two Category B reports (ESIRs 2011 1471 filed by WEST RADAR, and 2011 1688 filed by BASS) were reported this month. One resulted from a pilot of an Australian registered aircraft descending before being cleared to do so and was assessed as 0.5 minutes duration. The other report resulted from a crew accepting a descent clearance intended for another aircraft. This report was assessed on the basis of number of levels crossed (2) rather than time duration. Australian Airspace Monitoring Agency – RVSM Safety Assessment Report Brisbane, Honiara, Melbourne and Nauru FIRs - 3 - May 2010 to April 2011 AIRSPACE SAFETY REVIEW OF THE RVSM IMPLEMENTATION IN AUSTRALIAN, NAURU AND SOLOMON ISLANDS AIRSPACE MAY 2010 TO APRIL 2011 Prepared by Australian Airspace Monitoring Agency (AAMA) – May 2011 (An ICAO APANPIRG approved Regional Monitoring Agency) ______________________________________________________________________ 1. Introduction 1.1 This report provides the summary of airspace safety oversight for the post RVSM implementation in the Australian, Nauru and Solomon Islands airspace, i.e. the total areas of the Brisbane, Honiara, Melbourne and Nauru FIRs. The RVSM safety oversight is conducted on a twelve month rolling assessment period. 2. Data Submission 2.1 Traffic Sample Data (TSD). A TSD covering four weeks of the month of December 2010 of aircraft operating in the Australian, Nauru and Solomon Islands airspace was used to assess the safety of RVSM airspace, as required by an ICAO Regional agreement between monitoring agencies. 2.2 Large Height Deviation (LHD). A series of cumulative 12-months of LHD reports were used in this safety assessment, covering May 2010 to April 2011. 3. Summary of LHD Occurrences 3.1 Table 1 and Figure 1 summarise the number of LHD occurrences assessed and associated LHD duration (in minutes) by month from 1 May 2010 inclusive. No. of Non-NIL LHD Duration Month-Year LHD (Min) 2010 May 9 9.0 June 10 15.5 July 5 3.5 August 5 53 September 8 9.5 October 6 52.0 November 3 6.5 December 6 7.5 2011 January 5 6.0 February 10 36.5 March 5 7.5 April 3 2.5 Total 75 209.0 Table 1: Summary of Non-NIL LHD Occurrences and Duration Australian Airspace Monitoring Agency – RVSM Safety Assessment Report Brisbane, Honiara, Melbourne and Nauru FIRs - 4 - May 2010 to April 2011 Summary of LHD Occurrences in Australian, Nauru and Solomon Islands RVSM Airspace May10-Apr11 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr No of Non-NIL LHDs Duration of LHDs (Min) Figure 1: Summary of LHD Occurrences (by Month) 3.2 This month saw the number of LHDs reported decrease by nearly 50% from the last month while the total assessed duration decreased by nearly 70% (see Table 1 and Figure 1). 3.3 Table 2 and Figure 2 summarise the number of LHD occurrences, the associated LHD duration (in minutes) and number of flight levels crossed without clearance, by LHD category from 1 May 2010 inclusive. No. levels LHD LHD No. of LHD crossed Category LHD Category Description Duration Occurrences without Code (Min) clearance Flight crew failing to climb/descend A the aircraft as cleared 21 71 7 Flight crew climbing/descending B without ATC Clearance 12 8.5 5 Incorrect operation or interpretation of airborne equipment (e.g. incorrect operation of fully functional FMS, incorrect transcription of ATC C clearance or re-clearance, flight plan 1 5 0 followed rather than ATC clearance, original clearance followed instead of re-clearance etc) Australian Airspace Monitoring Agency – RVSM Safety Assessment Report Brisbane, Honiara, Melbourne and Nauru FIRs - 5 - May 2010 to April 2011 ATC system loop error; (e.g. ATC issues incorrect clearance or flight D 5 41 2 crew misunderstands clearance message) Coordination errors in the ATC to ATC transfer or control responsibility as a result of human factors issues (e.g. late or non-existent E 22 70 0 coordination, incorrect time estimate/actual, flight level, ATS route etc not in accordance with agreed parameters) Coordination errors in the ATC to ATC transfer or control responsibility F as a result of equipment outage or 0 0 0 technical issues Deviation due to aircraft contingency event leading to sudden inability to G maintain assigned flight level (e.g. 0 0 0 pressurization failure, engine failure) Deviation due to airborne equipment H failure leading to unintentional or 0 0 0 undetected change of flight level Deviation due to turbulence or other I weather related cause 10 8 1 Deviation due to TCAS resolution J advisory, flight crew correctly 0 0 0 following the resolution advisory Deviation due to TCAS resolution K advisory, flight crew incorrectly 0 0 0 following the resolution advisory An aircraft being provided with RVSM separation is not RVSM approved (e.g. flight plan indicating L RVSM approval but aircraft not 0 0 0 approved, ATC misinterpretation of flight plan) Other – this includes situations of flights operating (including climbing/descending) in airspace M where flight crews are unable to 4 5.5 0 establish normal air-ground communications with the responsible ATS unit.