THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR 9 Chapter One the nigerian Civil War When the British granted nigeria independence in 1960 they left behind a federal structure that helped polarize nigerian politics, by dividing nigeria into three regions that represented the three largest ethnic groupings in the country. this, combined with the inability of the nigerian political elites to compromise, destroyed what little hope remained of effective cooperation between the central and the regional governments.1 as the political system fell apart, nigeria’s military elite took matters into their own hands. in the early hours of January 15, 1966 a group of young nigerian army officers (mostly ibos from the country’s southern region), instigated a bloody coup to end the nigerian politicians’ corrupt ways. the prime Min- ister, Sir abubakar tafawa Balewa, was killed along with Chief akintola the Minister of Finance and the governor of nigeria’s western region (one of three ethnic regions). a number of senior army officer were also killed, but the army commander, an ibo, general ironsi, escaped. ironsi swiftly moved to crush the “Majors Coup” by initiating his own coup within a coup by pressuring the nigerian cabinet to hand over all political powers to the army.2 ironsi then attempted to get rid of nigeria’s federal constitutional structure in favor of a unitary state. the hausas of the north perceived these actions as an attempt by an ibo dominated military government to diminish the hausas’ status. throughout May and June of 1966 there were widespread anti-ibo riots in the north. the January “Majors Coup” had also created a deep sense of loss amongst northern nigerian nCOs and soldiers since most of their northern officers were killed in the coup. Seven senior officers above the rank of colonel were killed during the coup, four were northerners, two were from the west, one from the mid-west, and only one, Colonel Unegbe was an ibo.3 not surprisingly many northerners believed 1 See larry Diamond, Class, Ethnicity, and Democracy in Nigeria (Syracuse: Syracuse University press, 1988). 2 M.J. Dent, “the Military and politics: a Study of the relations between the army and the political process in nigeria,” in African Affairs, St. Anthony Papers, no. 21, ed. Kenneth Kirkwood (london: Oxford University press, 1969), 113-139. 3 robin luckham, The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960-67 (london: Cambridge University press, 1971), 43. 10 chapter one that the January coup was an ibo attempt to seize power. although most northern officers accepted that the January coup was not an ibo conspir- acy, they were disgusted by the way in which it was carried out. the north- ern officers also were under tremendous pressure from northern nCOs and other ranks to act.4 On July 29, 1966 northern soldiers turned upon their ibo officers and fellow soldiers, killing them where they could. the north- erners were successful everywhere, except in the eastern region, where the military governor Colonel Ojukwu managed to survive and prevented the northern soldiers from taking over. On august 1, lieutenant Colonel go- won declared himself the head of the new military government over the radio.5 Colonel Ojukwu also went on the air and responded by saying he would not accept gowon’s authority and stated his desire to split the na- tion and its military into its component regional parts. the stage was set for the secession of the eastern province (named Biafra) on May 30, 1967, and the bloody civil war that followed.6 When the civil war began, the nigerian army numbered approximately 10,000 soldiers and officers. the army was already divided according to ethnicity prior to the May 1967 secession declaration. this occurred when a meeting of regional representatives in lagos on august 9, 1966 recom- mended that army personnel should be redeployed to their respective re- gions of origins. Soldiers of eastern origin were posted to enugu, the eastern region’s capital while non-eastern troops in enugu were sent to the bar- racks in Kaduna and lagos. this split up of the army along ethnic lines essentially made it easier for the eastern province to secede.7 the series of coups and countercoups since January of 1966 had weakened the already small pool of officers in the nigerian army. the internecine violence with- in the army had also greatly diminished the discipline and professionalism of the army’s rank and file. however, both the Biafrans and the Federal army began a crash program of expanding their military forces in 1967. in May the Federal army’s 4 regular battalions were formed into the 1st Brigade and designated 1st area Command. Four additional battalions were also formed and would eventually form the 2nd Brigade. as the war progressed, these brigades would be expanded to divisions. they would be joined by a third force, the lagos garrison Organization (LGO), which 4 luckham, The Nigerian Military, 166-168. 5 gowon, a northern Christian from the middle belt was the only northern colonel to survive the January coup. 6 luckham, The Nigerian Military, 64-67. 7 general Olusegun Obasanjo, My Command: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War 1967- 70 (london: heinemann, 1980), 8..