The limits of the notion of criminal responsibility regarding Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems Sarah Leeman ANR: 229357 SNR: 2041723 First Supervisor: Dr. Merel Noorman Second Reader: Prof.Dr. Kees Stuurman Law and Technology August 2020 II Acknowledgements ________________________________________________________________ This academic year will be one to remember. It started out like any other year where academic challenges and social moments with new friends alternated each other. This master’s program allowed me to deepen my knowledge and meet amazing people from all over the world with whom I hope to be lifelong friends. In March the normal academic dynamic drastically changed when a surreal scenario was put upon all of us. It was unknown territory both for the University and the students. I am profoundly grateful to my first supervisor, dr. Noorman, who took the time necessary to guide me on this academic journey and point me in the right direction at challenging crossroads I further wish to thank Colonel Chris De Cock, Legal Advisor of the European External Action Service - Director EU Military Staff and Colonel Stein Westlye Johannessen, Defence Attaché of Norway to the Netherlands and former legal advisor of the NATO Special Operations Command, SHAPE for their profound insights during exploratory interviews. Lastly, I would like to thank my parents. They have stood by me through every high and low. Completing this master would have been impossible without their support. III Table of content ___________________________________________________________________________ Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1 1.1. Background of LAWS ........................................................................................................................... 2 1.2. Objective and research questions .......................................................................................................... 5 1.3. Significance of this thesis ..................................................................................................................... 6 1.4. Preliminary remarks and limitations ..................................................................................................... 7 1.5. Methodology ......................................................................................................................................... 8 1.6. Chapter overview .................................................................................................................................. 9 Chapter 2: Defensive Autonomous Weapon Systems ................................................................................... 11 2.1. The significance of increasing levels of autonomy in weapon systems ................................................ 11 2.2. Is a definition necessary? .................................................................................................................... 11 2.3. Characteristics and usage modalities Phalanx CIWS.......................................................................... 15 2.3.1. Lethal character ......................................................................................................................... 16 2.3.2. Autonomous character ............................................................................................................... 16 2.3.3. Defensive character .................................................................................................................... 17 2.3.4. Human-machine interaction ...................................................................................................... 18 2.4. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 19 Chapter 3: Criminal Responsibility .............................................................................................................. 21 3.1. Criminal Responsibility in IHL ........................................................................................................... 22 3.2. The principles underlying the targeting process .................................................................................. 26 3.3. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 30 Chapter 4: Analysis of criminal responsibility for defensive LAWS ........................................................... 31 4.1. Impact of the characteristics and usage modalities of the Phalanx CIWS on the principle of distinction .................................................................................................................................................................. 31 4.2. Consequences for the notions of criminal individual and command responsibility ............................. 35 4.3. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 38 Chapter 5: Future prospects ......................................................................................................................... 39 5.1. A possible function creep .................................................................................................................... 39 5.2. Legal safeguards against a function creep .......................................................................................... 42 5.3. Impact of offensive LAWSs on the principle of distinction .................................................................. 47 5.4. Consequences for the notions of criminal individual and command responsibility and possible solutions .................................................................................................................................................... 49 5.5. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 52 Chapter 6: Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 54 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................................. 57 Appendix ....................................................................................................................................................... 66 IV V Chapter 1: Introduction The Blitzkrieg of the German Armed Forces in World War II (WWII) confronted their opponents with an innovative doctrinal approach. An important aspect of this military doctrine was a renewed perspective on Auftragstaktik also known as mission command. This is “a form of military tactics where the emphasis is on the outcome of a mission rather than the specific means of achieving it”.1 The commander does not tell the subordinate exactly what to do and how, instead he informs the subordinate of his intent. In fact, he describes the end state of what needs to be achieved. The reasoning behind this was that the subordinate’s actions largely depend on the situation where he finds himself in. In such an approach, which formed a radical rupture with WWI doctrine, more emphasis was put on individual responsibility. From a legal perspective the notion of criminal command responsibility became more important as the subordinate received more freedom of action thus increasing the level of legal responsibility of the commander for the behaviour of his soldiers. More autonomous lethal weapon systems might lead to a new yet to determine balance between command and individual criminal responsibility depending on the type of weapon system and the precise circumstances of employment. In this thesis I will argue that for the deployment of defensive Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS), due to their increasing autonomy, the current legal framework is not fully suited anymore resulting in a creeping regulatory gap. This calls for a re-evaluation or adaptation of these notions.2 I use the term autonomy here to refer to “systems capable of operating in the real-world environment without any form of external control for extended periods of time”.3 In this chapter I will introduce the focus of the thesis. First, I will give a brief background of the technology that will be explored and explain the challenges associated with this technology by referring to existing literature. I will then present the main research question and 1 R. Wagner, ‘Agility and Self-Organisation – Success Factors for the Prussian Army in the 19th Century’ International Project Management Association <https://www.ipma.world/agility-and-self-organisation-success- factors-for-the-prussian-army-in-19th-century/> accessed 3 January 2020 2 P. Margulies, ‘Making Autonomous Weapon Accountable: command responsibility for Computer-Guided Lethal Force in Armed Conflicts’ (2016) No. 166 Roger Williams University Legal Studies Paper, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2734900> accessed 20 March 2020, p. 25 3 M. Noorman, D. G. Johnson, ‘Negotiating autonomy and responsibility in military robots’ Vol. 16 (2014) Ethics and Information Technology, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10676-013-9335-0?shared-article- renderer> accessed 21 February 2020, p. 61; G. A. Bekey,