ISRAEL’S RETURN TO SECURITY-BASED DIPLOMACY Senior Foreign Policy Analyst, Jerusalem Dan Diker Center for Public Affairs; Adjunct Fellow, Hudson Institute Diplomacy-Based Security vs. Israel’s previous policy of making concessions first and trying to enforce its vital security Security-Based Diplomacy rights and requirements second has raised international expectations that For most of the past 17 years of Israeli peace Israel will continue to offer an intransigent diplomacy, since the 1993 Oslo Declaration Palestinian leadership greater concessions as of Principles signed with Yasser Arafat’s “sweeteners” to coax them into negotiations. Palestine Liberation Organization, Israel’s vital The Palestinians, in contrast, have been security requirements have been relegated sensitizing the international community to to a position of secondary importance in the what the PA leadership calls “Palestinian service of reaching a final peace agreement. rights” underpinning their statehood quest.2 Israel’s traditional “security-based diplomacy” The public silence of Israeli governments on approach to foreign relations that had anchored Israel’s own rights-based case for a viable, the Jewish state’s defense doctrine since the secure Jewish state with defensible borders Six-Day War in 1967 had been reversed. Instead, has encouraged confusion among allies and a doctrine of “diplomacy-based security” had exacerbated the antagonism of adversaries. come to dominate Israeli diplomatic thinking, as peace agreements were thought to be the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s foreign guarantor of Israel’s safety. policy speech at Bar-Ilan University on June 14, 2009 – the first one of his administration In service to this new doctrine, Israeli efforts – represented a fundamental restoration of to end the Arab-Israeli conflict, including Israel’s security- and rights-based approach the Annapolis process in 2008, the Gaza to the conflict. Netanyahu’s sharp break from disengagement in 2005, the Lebanon past policy was his insistence, up front, that withdrawal in 2000, and the Camp David reciprocity govern relations between the sides: Summit in 2000, were marked by far-reaching that Israel be recognized as the nation-state and often unilateral Israeli concessions. At of the Jewish people,3 that a future Palestinian the same time, the Israel Defense Forces were state be demilitarized, and that Israel’s critical called upon to retrofit Israel’s security needs security needs be honored. into a political model instead of establishing security “red lines” prior to or in the initial stages of diplomatic initiatives.1 90 Security-Based Diplomacy Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivers a major policy speech at Bar-Ilan University, June 14, 2009. Netanyahu called for the Palestinian leadership to recognize Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, called for the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state, and stated that Jerusalem would remain Israel’s united capital city. Dore Gold 91 Netanyahu was indeed articulating a new Netanyahu’s Bar-Ilan Speech Israeli political consensus about the peace process, and at the same time restoring When Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu Israel’s traditional, “security-first” approach stood before a packed auditorium at the to diplomacy that had been reflected in Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Israeli policy by every Israeli government Israel’s Bar-Ilan University, it was a defining from 1967 until the first years of the Oslo moment. Several months earlier, he had peace process. established a strong center-right coalition that reflected a 30 percent rise in public Israel’s return to security-based support for right-of-center parties.4 The Israeli public was looking to move away diplomacy and insistence on from the policies of former Prime Minister Palestinian demilitarization Ehud Olmert, whose unsuccessful bid to negotiate a peace accord and establish a and defensible borders are vital Palestinian state had brought him to offer guarantors of Israel’s security unprecedented concessions to Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas.5 Despite Abbas’ in the face of the profound public admission of Olmert’s far-reaching uncertainties surrounding both concessions, the Palestinian leader noted that there remained “wide gaps between the Palestinians and the rise of the sides” that had led to the collapse of peace talks.6 Newly-elected President Iranian power in the region. Barack Obama had placed exceptional pressure on the Netanyahu government When it came to the West Bank, the for additional concessions, including a full security-first approach was guarded by freeze on Jewish building in the West Bank Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Benjamin and parts of Jerusalem that contradicted Netanyahu. Ariel Sharon would also protect firm understandings reached with the Bush Israel’s rights and security interests there, administration and even collided with the despite his unilateral withdrawal from Oslo Accords and the policies of the Clinton Gaza. Netanyahu’s revival of this approach administration.7 since his 2009 election seems particularly relevant in the context of Iranian- and Netanyahu accepted the notion of a future Al-Qaeda-backed campaigns to threaten Palestinian state,8 but insisted that the Arab regimes amenable to the West, such Palestinians would need to make reciprocal as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, gestures and accept two principles: and the Gulf States. At the same time as recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Iranian regime leads a campaign to the Jewish people; and demilitarization of destabilize the Sunni regimes that have a future Palestinian state and accession to either made formal or de facto peace with additional security guarantees, including Israel, the Iranian regime funds, trains, and defensible borders for Israel.9 He also stated arms terror groups on Israel’s northern and that Jerusalem would remain a united city southern borders, and even in the West under Israeli sovereignty. Bank. Netanyahu placed Israel’s national rights In this context, Israel’s return to security- and vital security needs first, and only then based diplomacy and insistence on accepted Palestinian demands. This was a Palestinian demilitarization and defensible major shift away from the Olmert approach borders are vital guarantors of Israel’s at Annapolis, where many of the fundamental security in the face of the profound security requirements that Israel had insisted uncertainties surrounding both the upon in the past were dropped in the context Palestinians and the rise of Iranian power in of far-reaching concessions he had offered to the region. Mahmoud Abbas.10 92 Security-Based Diplomacy Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at the Knesset debate on the Oslo peace accords signed with the Palestine Liberation Organization, September 21, 1993. Rabin foresaw Israeli control of the Jordan Valley and a united Jerusalem in any final status agreement with the Palestinian Authority. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s commitment from southern Lebanon in 2000 led to an to a security-first paradigm has been well- emboldened Hizbullah firing more than received by Israelis because nearly two 4,000 rockets at Israeli cities in the 2006 decades of concession-driven diplomacy Second Lebanon War. Furthermore, Israel’s not only failed to yield security or earn withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 multiplied international goodwill, but led to broad the rocket and mortar attacks from there on public understanding that Israel’s security southern Israel – more than 12,000 since 2001 situation had become perilous. – and resulted in Israel’s defensive operation in Gaza in December 2008 and January 2009 During the first three years of the Oslo that was condemned around the world.13 process, more Israelis were killed by The failure of Oslo, Annapolis, and territorial Palestinian terror attacks than during the withdrawals to improve the prospects for fifteen years prior to the signing of the Oslo peace did not deter Israelis from yearning for accords in 1993.11 The collapse of the Camp peace. But they did offer a sobering lesson David Summit in 2000 and the ensuing to the Israeli public about the dangers of suicide bombing war claimed the lives of indulging in wishful thinking. The public more than 1,100 Israelis.12 Israel’s withdrawal today is in no mood for unrealistic plans that Dan Diker 93 are long on hope and short on credibility. peacemaking on which he insisted then and They want security first, and a united still embraces today: Israel’s formal diplomatic Jerusalem. Netanyahu’s Bar-Ilan speech was positions on the peace process must be so well received in Israel because it articulated derived by first establishing its security needs, this broad public consensus.14 rather than the reverse. Netanyahu’s approach won the support of more than 70 percent of the Israeli public, Restoring Israel’s Security-First according to a poll conducted by Ha’aretz the day after the speech.15 Ha’aretz columnist Approach Ari Shavit called the speech “Netanyahu’s Netanyahu’s insistence on a demilitarized Revolution,” compared the prime minister Palestinian state and defensible borders to Theodor Herzl – the founder of modern did not represent a new strategy. Prime Zionism, and noted: “With the seven-word Minister Yitzhak Rabin had presented his formula – a demilitarized Palestinian state vision for defensible borders at the height of alongside a Jewish Israeli state – he changed the Oslo peace process, on October 5, 1995, the discourse on