Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons dated 6 July 2016 for The Report of the Iraq Inquiry Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors Volume VIII Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 6 July 2016 HC 265-VIII 46561_29b Viking_Volume VIII Title Page.indd 1 17/06/2016 13:20 © Crown copyright 2016 This publication is licensed under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 except where otherwise stated. To view this licence, visit nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/ version/3 or write to the Information Policy Team, The National Archives, Kew, London TW9 4DU, or email: [email protected]. Where we have identifi ed any third party copyright information you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. This publication is available at www.gov.uk/government/publications Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to us at [email protected] Print ISBN 9781474110136 Web ISBN 9781474110143 ID 23051601 46561 07/16 Printed on paper containing 75% recycled fi bre content minimum Printed in the UK by the Williams Lea Group on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Offi ce 46561_29b Viking_Volume VIII Title Page.indd 2 17/06/2016 13:20 Volume VIII CONTENTS 9.5 June 2006 to 27 June 2007 1 9.6 27 June 2007 to April 2008 181 9.7 May 2008 to October 2009 381 9.8 Conclusions: The post-conflict period 469 46561_29b Viking_Volume VIII Title Page.indd 3 17/06/2016 13:20 46561_29b Viking_Volume VIII Title Page.indd 4 17/06/2016 13:20 SECTION 9.5 JUNE 2006 TO 27 JUNE 2007 Contents Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 2 June 2006 ........................................................................................................................ 2 July 2006 ........................................................................................................................ 11 August 2006 ................................................................................................................... 24 September 2006 ............................................................................................................ 30 October 2006 ................................................................................................................. 41 November 2006 ............................................................................................................. 49 December 2006 ............................................................................................................. 60 January 2007 ................................................................................................................. 69 February 2007 ................................................................................................................ 99 March 2007 .................................................................................................................. 120 April 2007 ..................................................................................................................... 134 May 2007 ..................................................................................................................... 144 June 2007 .................................................................................................................... 165 1 46561_29c Viking_Section 9.5.indd 1 17/06/2016 13:20 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry Introduction 1. This Section covers the year leading up to Mr Blair’s departure from No.10 in June 2007, and addresses: • the development of the Basra Security Plan (including Operation SINBAD) and the Better Basra Plan; • UK planning for withdrawal from Iraq and reinforcement in Afghanistan, and the beginning of transition to Provincial Iraqi Control in the South; • UK responses to the new US strategy of surging forces into Baghdad and their impact on US/UK relations; and • the genesis of negotiations with Jaysh al‑Mahdi in Basra. 2. This Section does not address: • the UK contribution to the reconstruction of Iraq and reform of its security sector, covered in Sections 10 and 12 respectively. 3. The Inquiry’s conclusions in relation to the events described in this Section can be read in Section 9.8. June 2006 4. On 1 June, Major General John Cooper, General Officer Commanding Multi‑National Division (South‑East) (GOC MND(SE)) presented his proposals for the Basra Security Plan to General George Casey, Commander Multi‑National Force – Iraq (MNF‑I).1 5. Maj Gen Cooper wrote that the plan: “… will bring together a number of programmes and include a diplomatic focus from Baghdad .. a MOI [Ministry of the Interior] judicial review/inquiry and support for … search and arrest operations”.2 6. On 2 June, a Cabinet Office official sent Mr Blair an update following his visit to Iraq on 22 May (described in Section 9.4).3 7. In relation to Gen Casey’s plan to address security in Baghdad, it said: “Our initial assessment of the proposals is positive, with the necessary political and military elements woven in.” 8. On Basra, the update said: “The Consul General, Military, DFID … in Basra have made joint proposals on delivering a step‑change in engagement across all lines of operation. We need 1 Minute Cooper, 8 June 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 8 June 2006’. 2 Minute Cooper, 1 June 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 1 June 2006’. 3 Minute Cabinet Office [junior official] to Prime Minister, 2 June 2006, ‘Iraq: Follow‑up to Your Visit’. 2 46561_29c Viking_Section 9.5.indd 2 17/06/2016 13:20 9.5 | June 2006 to 27 June 2007 to clarify some of Maliki’s proposals during his visit earlier this week (the exact role of the five man committee he has appointed, and what the Basra Security plan Casey will offer to Maliki will look like), but the overall impact was very positive and gives us the central government buy‑in that we need. It also gives us the basis for a more confident approach on political outreach to Sadr, combined with a harder line on the Mahdi Army.” 9. In a video conference with President Bush on 6 June, Mr Blair said that he thought that the new government had about three months to show that it could make a difference.4 He suggested that the lack of experience of delivering plans within the government meant that the US and UK should “shepherd” implementation very closely. 10. On 6 June, Mr Blair had a private meeting with Mr Des Browne, the Defence Secretary, on Iraq and Afghanistan.5 11. Sir Nigel Sheinwald, Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy Adviser, reported after the meeting that Mr Blair had asked Mr Browne to focus on the situation in Basra in order to: “… make sure that the political and military strategies were aligned and proceeding together. This required micro‑management. We had been slow to grip the situation there, but now needed: to get on top of the gaps in equipment and training for the Iraqi forces; a plan for getting Iraqi forces on to the streets; and a new political dispensation given the interest now being shown by Iraqi national figures.” 12. Mr Browne agreed to take on that role, and also to continue to co‑ordinate media activity on Iraq, which Mr Blair said needed to be reinvigorated. Mr Blair said that he intended to use the next meeting of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee’s Sub‑Committee on Iraq (DOP(I)) to “divvy up Ministerial responsibility for different parts of the Iraq strategy”. The death of Abu Musab al‑Zarqawi On 7 June, the leader of Al‑Qaida in Iraq (AQ‑I), Abu Musab al‑Zarqawi, was killed by US forces in an airstrike on a house 8km north of Baquba.6 Mr Blair relayed reports of his death at the Cabinet meeting the following day.7 Briefing supplied to Mr Blair’s Private Secretary suggested that the UK “played a leading part in highlighting significant contacts around Zarqawi”.8 4 Letter Banner to Hayes, 6 June 2006, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with President Bush, 16 May[sic]: Middle East issues’. 5 Minute Sheinwald to Banner, 8 June 2006, ‘Iraq and Afghanistan’. 6 BBC News, 8 June 2006, Zarqawi killed in Iraq air raid. 7 Cabinet Conclusions, 8 June 2006. 8 Letter to Banner, 8 June 2006, ‘Death of Zarqawi: […]’. 3 46561_29c Viking_Section 9.5.indd 3 17/06/2016 13:20 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry An initial assessment of the impact of al‑Zarqawi’s death made shortly after he was killed said that it would bolster the image of the Iraqi Government and have a short term disruptive effect on AQ‑I.9 But his death was also likely to enhance his iconic status and inspire other extremists. In a telephone conversation with Prime Minister Maliki on 8 June, Mr Blair described the operation as “a very important moment for Iraq”.10 Over the weeks that followed, AQ‑I suffered further losses with the capture of several other senior leaders.11 Documents and IT equipment found after the 7 June airstrike provided key information about AQ‑I.12 Mr Mowaffak al‑Rubaie, Iraq’s National Security Adviser, was reported to have told a news conference in Baghdad “now we have the upper hand”. General Stanley McChrystal, the US officer who led the operation against al‑Zarqawi, wrote in his memoir: “His death was more than symbolically important. It was a trite reaction among some to point out that there were thousands of men ready to replace Zarqawi – or any leader we removed. It was of course true that the organisation regained a leader … And yet there were not, in fact, thousands of ‘Zarqawis’. He was a peculiar leader. His mix of charisma,