U.S. Naval War College U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons Newport Papers Special Collections 2004 The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy John B. Hattendorf Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-newport-papers Recommended Citation Hattendorf, John B., "The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy" (2004). Newport Papers. 20. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-newport-papers/20 This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Special Collections at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Newport Papers by an authorized administrator of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NEWPORT PAPERS 19 N A The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s V AL Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986 W AR COLLEGE NE WPOR T P AP ERS N ES AV T A A L T W S A D R E C T I O N L L U E E G H E T R I VI IBU OR A S CT MARI VI 1 9 John B. Hattendorf, D. Phil. Cover This perspective aerial view of Newport, Rhode Island, drawn and published by Galt & Hoy of New York, circa 1878, is found in the American Memory Online Map Collections: 1500–2003, of the Library of Congress Geography and Map Division, Washington, D.C. The map may be viewed at http://hdl.loc.gov/ loc.gmd/g3774n.pm008790 The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986 John B. Hattendorf, D. Phil. Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History Naval War College NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207 Naval War College The Newport Papers are extended research projects that the Newport, Rhode Island Naval War College Press Editor, the Dean of Naval Warfare Center for Naval Warfare Studies Studies, and the President of the Naval War College Newport Paper Number Nineteen consider of particular interest to policy makers, scholars, 2004 and analysts. President, Naval War College The views expressed here are those of the author(s) and do Rear Admiral Ronald A. Route, U.S. Navy not necessarily reflect those of the Naval War College, the Provost, Naval War College Department of the Navy, or the Department of Defense. Professor James F. Giblin, Jr. Correspondence concerning The Newport Papers may be Dean of Naval Warfare Studies addressed to the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies. To request Professor Alberto R. Coll additional copies or subscription consideration, please direct Naval War College Press inquiries to the President, Code 32A, Naval War College, Editor: Professor Catherine McArdle Kelleher 686 Cushing Road, Newport, RI 02841-1207. Managing Editor: Pelham G. Boyer Patricia A. Goodrich, Associate Editor, Naval War College Associate Editor: Patricia A. Goodrich Press, edits and prepares The Newport Papers. Telephone: 401.841.2236 Fax: 401.841.3579 DSN exchange: 948 E-mail: [email protected] Web: http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press ISSN 1544-6824 Printed in the United States of America ISBN 1-884733-32-8 Contents Foreword v General Preface vii THE EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. NAVY’S MARITIME STRATEGY, 1977–1986 xi Preface to the First Edition xiii Introduction 1 CHAPTER ONE The Evolution of Naval Thinking in the 1970s 3 CHAPTER TWO Thinking About the Soviet Navy, 1967–1981 23 CHAPTER THREE From the CNO’s Strategic Concepts to the Work of the SSG, 1978–1986 37 CHAPTER FOUR The Work of the Strategic Concepts Branch, (OP-603) 1982–1986 65 CHAPTER FIVE Further Developments, 1984–1986 83 Notes 93 APPENDIX I: SOVIET NAVAL STRATEGY AND PROGRAMS THROUGH THE 1990s Central Intelligence Agency National Intelligence Estimate 11-15-82/D. March 1983 101 Notes 183 APPENDIX II: THE MARITIME STRATEGY DEBATES A Bibliographic Guide to the Renaissance of U.S. Naval Strategic Thinking in the 1980s Peter M. Swartz 185 Notes 188 APPENDIX III: TIME LINE The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy in the Context of Major Political and Military Events of the Cold War, 1964–1991 Yuri M. Zhukov 279 Index 305 About the Authors 331 Titles in the Series 333 Foreword Our pleasure in publishing John Hattendorf’s Newport Paper on maritime strategy arises from several sources. The Naval War College Press is pleased to republish and make more broadly available an essay that had become a standard reference work for those few fortunate enough to be both cleared for and fascinated by the evolution of postwar American strategy. This edition reproduces the Hattendorf analysis as it was first presented and published in 1989. The new elements—the now declassified NIE, the comprehensive updating by Peter Swartz of his earlier bibliographies, and the selec- tive time line created by Yuri Zhukov under Hattendorf’s direction—only enhance Hattendorf’s original analytic core. Even more important are the links between this essay and the Press’s broader commit- ment to publishing and supporting the best work in maritime history. We have devel- oped a notable series of naval biographies, most recently a splendid volume of Admiral H. Kent Hewitt’s memoirs, edited by Evelyn Cherpak. We look forward to working with the materials developed by the project on the Cold War at Sea, a comprehensive effort led by John Hattendorf and Lyle Goldstein, with collaboration between the Naval War College, the Watson Institute of Brown University, and the Saratoga Foundation. We also hope for further historical efforts mounted by the new NWC Maritime History Department. We appreciate the support we have received in declassifying the Hattendorf essay and obtaining the NIE from Peter Swartz and David Rosenberg, as well as the expert assis- tance of Ms. Jo-Ann Parks (JIL Information Systems) in the finalization of the manu- script. We express special appreciation also to Ms. Patricia Goodrich, guiding editor of the Newport Papers throughout much of the last decade, for this, her last hurrah. Perhaps most important for the Press itself and for our readers, this essay sharpens our own sense of history. It recounts a fascinating story and also reflects the significant role that the Naval War College, the Strategic Studies Group, and individual leaders, past and present, played in this critical period of strategy making. It is rare to have as au- thoritative an account of the difficult, complex process of strategy making as that which Hattendorf produced within a very short time after the events themselves. Much has changed in the international context since then; but the fundamental tasks of conceptualization, assessment of ends and means, and focused implementation of strategy remain the challenges for all those who wish to secure their nation’s safety and security. This essay provides a valuable guide to this critical enterprise. CATHERINE MC ARDLE KELLEHER Editor, Naval War College Press April 2004 General Preface To understand a series of events in the past, one needs to do more than just know a set of detailed and isolated facts. Historical understanding is a process to work out the best way to generalize accurately about something that has happened. It is an ongoing and never-ending discussion about what events mean, why they took place the way they did, and how and to what extent that past experience affects our present or provides a useful example for our general appreciation of our development over time. Historical understanding is an examination that involves attaching specifics to wide trends and broad ideas. In this, individual actors in history can be surprised to find that their ac- tions involve trends and issues that they were not thinking about at the time they were involved in a past action as well as those that they do recognize and were thinking about at the time. It is the historian’s job to look beyond specifics to see context and to make connections with trends that are not otherwise obvious. The process of moving from recorded facts to a general understanding can be a long one. For events that take place within a government agency, such as the U.S. Navy, the process can not even begin until the information and key documents become public knowledge and can be disseminated widely enough to bring different viewpoints and wider perspectives to bear upon them. This volume is published to help begin that process of wider historical understanding and generalization for the subject of strategic thinking in the U.S. Navy during the last phases of the Cold War. To facilitate this beginning, we offer here the now-declassified, full and original version of the official study that I undertook in 1986–1989, supplemented by three appendices. The study attempted to record the trends and ideas that we could see at the time, written on the basis of interviews with a range of the key individuals involved and on the working documents that were then still located in their original office locations, some of which have not survived or were not permanently retained in archival files. We publish it here as a document, as it was written, without attempting to bring it up to date. To supplement this original study, we have appended the declassified version of the Central Intelligence Agency’s National Intelligence Estimate of March 1982, which was a key analysis in understanding the Soviet Navy, provided a generally accepted consen- sus of American understanding at the time, and provided a basis around which to de- velop the U.S Navy’s maritime strategy in this period. A second appendix is by Captain Peter Swartz, U.S.