IRAQ’S PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS: THE STAKES Middle East Report N°82 – 27 January 2009 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. THE 2005 ELECTION, ITS DISCONTENTS AND ITS LEGACY.............................. 2 A. IMBALANCED COUNCILS ..............................................................................................................2 1. Ninewa (capital: Mosul) ..............................................................................................................2 2. Diyala (capital: Baaquba) ............................................................................................................4 3. Anbar (capital: Ramadi)...............................................................................................................5 4. Baghdad .......................................................................................................................................6 5. Basra ............................................................................................................................................7 B. DYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNANCE AND THE ROLE OF RELIGION......................................................8 C. ELECTORAL LEGISLATION ..........................................................................................................11 D. TO VOTE OR NOT TO VOTE?.......................................................................................................12 III. KEY POLITICAL BATTLES AND THE PARTIES FIGHTING THEM................. 13 A. SHARPENING THE KNIVES ..........................................................................................................14 B. THE RULING PARTIES .................................................................................................................15 1. The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI).............................................................................15 2. The Kurdistan Alliance ..............................................................................................................16 3. The Islamic Call (Daawa) Party of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki .........................................17 4. The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) ......................................................................................................18 C. THE OPPOSITION........................................................................................................................19 1. The Sadrist current.....................................................................................................................20 2. The awakening councils.............................................................................................................21 3. Shiite nationalist/Islamist parties ...............................................................................................21 4. Secular parties............................................................................................................................22 IV. FACTORS SHAPING THE OUTCOME...................................................................... 23 A. CONTROL OF INSTITUTIONS........................................................................................................23 B. INDEPENDENT LISTS AND CANDIDATES ......................................................................................24 C. USING MOSQUES .......................................................................................................................24 D. THE TRIBAL VOTE .....................................................................................................................25 E. FRAUD .......................................................................................................................................27 V. THE BATTLEGROUND STATES ................................................................................ 28 A. NINEWA .....................................................................................................................................28 B. DIYALA......................................................................................................................................29 C. ANBAR.......................................................................................................................................30 D. BAGHDAD..................................................................................................................................31 E. BASRA .......................................................................................................................................31 VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 33 APPENDICES A. MAP OF IRAQ ...................................................................................................................................34 B. MAP OF IRAQ’S GOVERNATES AND DISTRICTS .................................................................................35 C. GLOSSARY OF TERMS.......................................................................................................................36 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP.....................................................................................37 E. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON THE MIDDLE EAST .......................................................38 F. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................39 Middle East Report N°82 27 January 2009 IRAQ’S PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS: THE STAKES EXECUTIVE SUMMARY On 31 January, Iraqis will head to the polls in fourteen ple of elections and fully thrown themselves into elec- of eighteen governorates to elect new provincial coun- toral battle. cils. The stakes are considerable. Whereas the January 2005 elections helped put Iraq on the path to all-out The elections inevitably will have severe shortcom- civil war, these polls could represent another, far more ings. Most significantly perhaps, ruling parties enjoy peaceful turning point. They will serve several impor- built-in advantages that will make it hard to translate tant objectives: refreshing local governance; testing the severe popular disappointment into clear repudiation strength of various parties; and serving as a bellwether at the polls. The electoral law may not be as favourable for nationwide political trends. In several governorates, as they would have liked but is probably good enough new parties or parties that failed to run four years ago to give currently dominant parties an edge. They will may oust, or at least reduce the dominance of, a handful use their superior access to wealth and patronage to of dominant parties whose rule has been marred by per- influence the vote. Their control of crucial institutions, vasive mismanagement and corruption. This in itself from the security apparatus to state-run mosques, is no would be a positive change with far-reaching conse- trivial affair. Fraud is feared, despite domestic moni- quences as the nation braces for parliamentary elections toring and in the absence of international observers. later in 2009. And the opposition is hopelessly divided. In January 2005, key constituencies such as Sunni Yet even an imperfect outcome is bound to begin to Arabs and the Shiite urban-slum underclass largely redress some of the most severe problems associated stayed away and thus were excluded from power in the with the 2005 elections – from corruption and mis- current councils. The result was imbalanced provincial management to the enormous political imbalances bodies often unreflective of popular needs, as well as generated by the boycott of Sunni Arabs and many an accumulation of local grievances. At the time, weak followers of Muqtada al-Sadr. Indeed, even if ruling par- home-grown parties took a back seat to exile-bred ties maintain power, the electoral process would retain Shiite Islamist parties in Baghdad and governorates virtues and value. It already has introduced a degree of south of the capital which capitalised on endorsements accountability: practices of the past four years have been from senior clerics. stigmatised, most council members are not even trying to get re-elected and parties have been forced to change Today, even before the first ballot has been cast, the their discourse, put on new faces and recruit independ- elections mark a remarkable transition. In the past four ents. A new political elite will make its entrance, if only years, politics have evolved from a violent conflict by this influx of (both nominal and real) independents focused largely on the capital to an essentially democ- with a technocratic profile. In constituencies that suf- ratic contest over positions and institutions, including fered most from the 2005 boycott, disenfranchised groups at the local level. Former confessional blocs are fray- will make a comeback, assuring fairer representation of ing, as sectarianism is increasingly challenged by more all segments of the population. Sunni Arabs in particu- nationalist sentiment and promises of better govern- lar can be expected to strengthen their representation ance by political actors seeking to capture the public within the political system. mood. Competition between communities