Review of African Political Economy No. 119:9-21 # ROAPE Publications Ltd., 2009 Public Service Provision in a Failed State: Looking Beyond Predation in the Democratic Republic of Congo Theodore Trefon ‘The state is dying but not yet dead’ and ‘the state is so present, but so useless’ are also commonly heard refrains. These popular sentiments, inexorably expressed in all of the country’s languages by the poor and the well-to-do, have been described by development experts and political scien- tists as state failure. But why is the state still so powerful and omnipresent in the daily lives of these people wronged by colonial oppression, dictatorship, economic underdevelopment and more recently, unresolved political transition? How, concretely, does the state manifest itself? Does the raison d’eˆtre of the Congolese state go beyond the violence of exploitation and predation? The objective of this article is to respond to these questions, contributing to our understanding of the function and dysfunction of the Congolese state, notably during the post-Mobutu transition. Dying But Not Dead In Congo today, the state doesn’t do anything for us. Roads are a mess, teachers can’t live with their pay, health care is reserved for the upper class, public transport is a nightmare ...Things were much better before ... Instead of the state taking care of the people, we cater to civil servants and do the state’s work. (Fieldwork interview) This litany, which combines nostalgia and legitimate complaints, summarises the perception ordinary Congolese have of the state. ‘The state is dying but not yet dead’ and ‘the state is so present, but so useless’ are also commonly heard refrains. These popular sentiments, inexorably expressed in all of the country’s languages by the poor and the well-to-do, have been described by development experts and political scientists as state failure. This ostensibly bleak situation is explained by the collapse of the post-colonial system hastily fabricated by Belgium – a situation not dissimilar to the broader fiasco result- ing from the inappropriate export of nation-state models throughout Africa. It is also attributable to mismanagement and corruption, Cold War politics, and the ‘paradox of plenty’ or ‘resource curse’ paradigms. As the Congolese Government does not respond to the basic needs of its citizens, it has been replaced by international institutions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), private enterprise, and increas- ingly, by the people themselves. Despite this context, however, the state remains an ISSN 0305-6244 Print, 1740-1720 Online/09/010009-13 DOI: 10.1080/03056240902863587 10 Review of African Political Economy unavoidable force on the social, economic, political, cultural and administrative fronts in Congo. But why is the state still so powerful and omnipresent in the daily lives of these people wronged by colonial oppression, dictatorship, economic underdevelopment and more recently, unresolved political transition? How can this paradox be explained? How, concretely, does the state manifest itself? Who are its agents? Does the raison d’eˆtre of the Congolese state go beyond the violence of exploitation and predation? The objective of this article is to respond to these questions. Analysis of Congolese public administration is the approach adopted here. It focuses on the relations between people and public services.1 This is pertinent because throughout Africa’s second largest country, workers, students, the unemployed, people from the formal and informal sectors, housewives and street vendors are all condemned to deal with the hungry representatives of public administrations. Escaping them is impossible. Avoiding a tax, be it official or arbitrarily invented on the spot, is a daunting challenge for some and a daily exercise for others. While most people do whatever they can to outwit the state agent in front of them, the latter rely on a host of tactics and strategies to have the final word. As arbitrariness reigns supreme, state agents try to push up the fine, tax or fee. Meanwhile, people try to pay the smallest amount possible. At the outcome of palabre (the ritual negotiation process), each party usually ends up with something: compromise is generally preferred to a unilateral decision. Beyond monetary loss or gain, saving face is also an important consideration. The presence of state agents and the institutionalisation of negotiation processes and scenarios for all kinds of exchanges remind people of the stubborn persistence of the state. Although the administrative machine is clearly more manifest in towns and cities, rural populations (who comprise approximately half of the Congolese popu- lation) are also within its reach. This analysis consequently rejects the frequently expressed idea of a non-existent state. This work contributes to our understanding of the function and dysfunction of the Congolese state, notably during the post- Mobutu transition.2 State crisis in Congo is characterised by loss of legitimacy, abdication from the devel- opment agenda, incapacity to maintain the monopoly of coercion, shortcomings in the management of political and technical priorities and the inability to mobilise, generate or manage internal and external financial resources. Despite these overwhelming problems, the Congo endures as an administrative space in which state agents and citizens seem to have reached a complex but workable form of accommodation. The Congolese have a love-hate relationship with the state and its administrative machine, notwithstanding its brutality and corrupt practices at all levels. Why the Administration Persists Even though state crisis certainly handicaps the modus operandi of state services, it has hardly made them disappear. They still clearly have a raison d’eˆtre throughout society, for elites and ordinary citizens alike. However, state crisis has significantly transformed the original mandates of these services. The administration is a powerful machine that contributes to the perpetuation and reproduction of the state as a sover- eign political and territorial entity. Although a recent World Bank report on govern- ance in DRC makes reference to ‘the administration’s endurance and a few pockets Public Service Provision in a Failed State 11 of functionality’, it also argues that the administration ‘seems to have abandoned its original objectives’ (World Bank 2005, p. iii). In a study devoted specifically to the endurance of the Congo state and Congolese nationalism, Pierre Englebert (2003, p. 2) highlights the Congo state’s ‘stunning propensity for resilience’ despite all the indicators that seem to indicate total state collapse.3 This pertinent characterisation is borrowed here to account for the resilience of the Congolese administration. Exploitation and predation are the dominant explanations accounting for the persistence of the Congolese state in general, and the administration in particular (Mbaya and Streiffeler 1999, p.11). A considerably more subtle argument that contrasts normative concepts of good governance and real practices of governance is put forward by Giorgio Blundo (for West African states): “Participation, decentralisation and administrative transparency need to be interpreted as being particular govern- mental technologies endowed with their own political rationalities and ‘govern- mentalities’ ” (2002, p. 3). A further useful explanation is expressed by Dominique Darbon: ‘... the relationship between service providers and service users is based on uncertainty and discrimination, resulting in a culture of fear, evasion and periodic predation when the opportunity arises’ (2002, p. 85). Three reasons account for the persistence of the administration in the Democratic Republic of Congo. First, the administration in Congo is instrumentalised by the state’s political elites. They exploit the administration in the same way they exploit mafia-type networks for political survival and personal enrichment.4 Even though they exploit and manipulate these networks, they are at the same time dependent on them. Despite the flagrant contradictions and internecine haggling that characterise the symbiosis between state and administration, one could not exist without the other. Aloko Gbodu Ombeng already observed this situation more than 20 years ago in his study of lower-level Zairian civil servants. He analysed the phenomenon of ‘fusion and confusion’ between state and administrative bodies (1987–88, p. 232). Instrumentalisation is a dynamic and constant process. The state manifests itself in administrative and security institutions. With regard to the latter, the branches involved in the protection of territory and population – but especially protection of the elites themselves – are the army, the police, the intelligence services (Agence Nationale de Renseignements – ANR) and border control (Direction Ge´ne´rale des Migrations – DGM). Although the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior theoretically control these services, important decisions emanate directly from President Joseph Kabila and his advisors. In this context, the administration of security is instrumenta- lised to reinforce and stabilise political elites. This can also be interpreted as being the deliberate production of ‘clever power’ opposed to the production of ‘weak power’ (Diouf 2002, p. 33). This refers to the advantages that political elites derive from see- mingly unmanageable political situations that they in fact help produce and perpetuate. The state also still wields considerable