A EUROPEAN DEFENCE UNION? THE EU’S NEW INSTRUMENTS IN THE AREA OF SECURITY AND DEFENCE Justyna Gotkowska WARSAW NOVEMBER 2019 A EUROPEAN DEFENCE UNION? THE EU’S NEW INSTRUMENTS IN THE AREA OF SECURITY AND DEFENCE Justyna Gotkowska © Copyright by Centre for Eastern Studies CONTENT EDITOR Wojciech Stanisławski EDITOR Szymon Sztyk, Tomasz Strzelczyk CO-OPERATION Katarzyna Kazimierska TRANSLATION Jim Todd MAPS AND CHARTS Urszula Gumińska-Kurek GRAPHIC DESIGN PARA -BUCH DTP IMAGINI PHOTOGRAPH ON COVER branislavpudar / Shutterstock.com Centre for Eastern Studies ul. Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw, Poland tel.: (+48) 22 525 80 00, [email protected] www.osw.waw.pl ISBN: 978-83-65827-45-6 Table of contents INTRODUCTION | 5 THESES | 6 I. CONCEPTS | 9 1. A European Security and Defence Union? | 9 2. Plans – reality – outlook | 11 II. ACTORS | 15 1. The member states | 15 2. The EU institutions | 18 III. INSTRUMENTS | 23 1. Military instruments | 23 2. Industrial instruments | 32 3. Civilian instruments | 38 4. Military mobility | 42 5. New financial instruments | 45 6. EU-NATO cooperation | 47 ANNEXES | 50 1. Glossary of abbreviations | 50 2. EU Capability Development Priorities for 2018–2025 | 51 3. PESCO projects (as of November 2019) | 53 4. Financial resources for security and defence in the European Commission’s proposal | 58 INTRODUCTION This report aims to present the evolution of the EU’s security and defence policy since 2016. Public debate on this issue often comes down to slogans about a ‘European army’, which in reality no ‑one intends to create, or ‘Euro‑ pean strategic autonomy’, a concept which has no clear definition. Discussions on the EU’s security and defence policy are much less often based on actual knowledge of the activities the EU is undertaking in this area, or the interests of individual actors. This is understandable: the development of new instruments in the EU is a highly bureaucratic process, in which many actors are involved: both the participating member states and the EU institutions. The aim of this report is to provide information about the security and defence instruments which have been developed so far in the EU; to present their assessment and their possible further development; and to show the opportunities and challenges they generate for the countries on NATO’s eastern flank. At the same time, this text gives the broad political background to the whole process, and pre‑ sents the interests of the participating actors. 11/ 2019 T REPOR W OS 5 THESES • Since 2016, efforts to increase cooperation in the EU’s security and defence policy have accelerated. New initiatives have been undertaken, not only in the military and civilian dimension of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), but also in the related areas of the EU’s industrial policy, transport policy and research & development. This development could not have happened without the coincidence of several factors. First, the largest member states wished to strengthen the EU’s political, military and indus‑ trial standing in the face of the Trump administration. Second, Brexit trig‑ gered a political need to show that more European integration is possible. Third, the European Commission under Jean ‑Claude Juncker has treated closer security and defence cooperation not only as a vehicle for further integration but also as an instrument to increase public support for the EU. As a consequence, the creation of a European Security and Defence Union has become a flagship project for the European Commission. • The original concept promoted by Paris for developing the EU’s security and defence policy was to develop a framework of interlinked military and in‑ dustrial instruments supported by the EU funds. Military ‑industrial coop‑ eration would take place within an exclusive group of member states, which would also be interested in the strengthening of the EU’s political, military and industrial autonomy vis-à-vis the US and in greater involvement in the crisis management in the EU’s southern neighbourhood. However, such a concept would support the security interests of only some of the mem‑ ber states, and would provide financial support for armament cooperation among the biggest countries in the name of European defence industry integration. • This concept has been significantly modified. This has happened mainly thanks to Germany, which has opted for a broad, inclusive and integrative approach to security and defence cooperation in the EU, and has been scep‑ tical of Paris’s interventionist attitude. Also the eastern flank countries, including Poland, have adopted a cautious stance. At present, crisis manage‑ ment remains the formal reference of the EU’s security and defence policy. 11/ 2019 However, as a result of negotiations, most of the new instruments allow also T support for capabilities needed for collective defence, as has been advocated by the eastern flank countries. REPOR W OS 6 • Greater military integration in the EU will not necessarily mean compe‑ tition and creating an alternative to NATO. If the EU’s military, industrial and civilian tools are properly managed and coordinated, they may serve as a useful complement for the Alliance. However, in certain areas com‑ petition for member states’ resources and involvement could arise. The growing tension between the US and Western Europe may also generate a strong impetus to deepen European military cooperation, which would include controversial discussions about European nuclear deterrence and collective defence. • The decision to set up the DG for Defence Industry and Space in the new European Commission is a political signal indicating that defence policy is becoming increasingly important within the EU. Its establishment was in‑ tended to meet the expectations of some member states which would like the EU to have increased competence in this field. At the same time, the tasks of the new DG and its place in the structure of the European Commis‑ sion represent a compromise with those member states which are sceptical of enhancing the Commission’s role in defence policy. The new DG is the smallest that could be established in this area; its competences are limited to the defence industry and space programmes. • However, so far nothing indicates that the enhanced cooperation between the EU member states will lead to a true integration of their defence poli‑ cies and militaries. The new EU instruments, even if the member states use them actively, will to only a small extent increase European military capa‑ bilities, lead to innovation in the European defence industry, or improve the capacity of the military and civilian crisis management missions. The lim‑ ited resources which the EU member states are willing to assign to security and defence policy in the multiannual financial framework for 2021–2027 show that this is only a secondary priority in comparison with the others. • In the future, the framework for closer European security and defence co‑ operation will not be limited to the EU. Military ‑industrial cooperation in Europe will also, and perhaps above all, be shaped by the largest countries: France, Germany and the UK. They will use different formats for bilateral 11/ 2019 and multilateral cooperation, such as Germany’s Framework Nations Con‑ cept (FNC), France’s European Intervention Initiative (EI2), or the UK’s Joint T Expeditionary Force (JEF). REPOR W OS 7 • It is not the substance of the EU’s security and defence policy but the narra‑ tives about a ‘European army’, a ‘European Security and Defence Union’, or ‘European strategic autonomy’ that are the biggest problem. None of these will come with the EU’s new military, industrial and civilian instruments. None of these are reflected in the real military capabilities and defence spending of the EU member states. The gap between rhetoric and reality has been deepened by the far‑reaching French proposals on creating a new Eu‑ ropean security architecture or bolstering the EU’s mutual defence clause. This has also been exacerbated by the Commission’s rhetoric, which has treated closer cooperation between member states under the banner of the European Security and Defence Union as a vehicle for further European integration. All this has resulted in misleading ideas about the EU’s present and future options in security and defence, as well as in misunderstandings between member states and between the EU & the US. 11/ 2019 T REPOR W OS 8 I. CONCEPTS 1. A European Security and Defence Union? (A) The European Union Global Strategy (EUGS). Since mid‑2016, the EU’s security and defence policy has been developed more dynamically than before1. This is due to several external factors: the result of the referendum to leave the EU by the UK, which had hitherto blocked such initiatives; the Trump pres‑ idency in the US, which has provoked negative reactions in Western Europe; and the European agenda of French President Emmanuel Macron. These fac‑ tors coincided with the presentation of the EUGS2 in June 2016, which became a policy document for the further development of the EU’s security and de‑ fence policy. On the basis of the EUGS and the following implementation plans, the Council set out the level of the EU’s ambitions in security and defence in November 20163, highlighting three priorities: • responding to external conflicts and crises, which covers the full range of CSDP tasks in civilian and military crisis management outside the EU, in accordance with Article 43 of the TEU (joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, con‑ flict prevention and peace ‑keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace ‑making and post ‑conflict stabilisation)4; • capacity building of partners, which covers tasks in training, advice and/or mentoring within the security sector in order to contribute to the resilience and stabilisation of partner countries recovering from or threat‑ ened by conflict or instability.