ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES ELECTORAL OBSERVATION MISSION GENERAL ELECTIONS HONDURAS NOVEMBER 26, 2017 FINAL REPORT CONTENTS 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................. 1 2. BACKGROUND .............................................................................................................. 5 3. PRE-ELECTORAL PHASE ................................................................................................ 9 4. ELECTION DAY ............................................................................................................ 10 5. POST-ELECTORAL PHASE ............................................................................................ 11 6. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY TOPIC ............................................... 22 7. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................ 31 8. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................. 32 iii 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY General elections were held in Honduras on November 26, 2017 to elect officials for 3,016 positions nationwide: 1 President and 3 Vice Presidents, 20 regular members and 20 substitute members of the Central American Parliament, 128 regular and 128 substitute members of the National Congress, 298 mayors and 298 deputy mayors of municipalities, and 2,120 councilors. In a communication addressed to the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, dated August 22, 2016, the Government of the Republic of Honduras requested the presence of an OAS Electoral Observation Mission (OAS/EOM) to cover the Primary and General Elections held, respectively, on March 12 and November 26, 2017. The Secretary General, Luis Almagro, appointed Jorge Tuto Quiroga, former president of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to head the mission. In the weeks prior to the election, the OAS/EOM deployed a team of 82 specialists and international observers, which made it possible to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the process. Following is a discussion of the main reasons why the EOM Honduras has ongoing doubts regarding the electoral process. Familiarity with the abundance of irregularities and errors described not just in these few pages but in the report as a whole is vital to be able to grasp the sequence of events and the different objective assessments made by the EOM. Even before the elections were convened, the legitimacy of the electoral process for the General Elections of November 26, 2017 was questioned by various segments of the population opposed to presidential re-election. A lengthy section in this report is devoted to that topic. It concludes that the manner in which re-election was authorized -- by a judicial ruling -- constitutes a bad practice found in other countries of the region, as well. The OAS Mission ascertained that the judges reflected the political party bias in the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE). That jeopardizes the impartiality and neutrality with which an electoral body should act. On Election Day, the Mission visited 1,257 Polling Stations (Mesas Electorales Receptoras -MER) in 451 voting centers in 17 departments. The observers reported a few instances of voters being urged to vote publicly. Under Honduran law, the vote is supposed to be secret. The Mission also noted that representatives of political parties approached voters to keep track of voting intentions. Massive movements of voters were observed in different parts of the country and in three departments observers reported the buying of votes. Toward the end of Election Day, it was not clear what time polling stations were supposed to close. While the law states that they must close at 4 p.m., there was confusion as to the possibility of extending the voting to offset some of the delays in the morning, as had been the case in previous elections. The OAS observers reported that, on average, polling stations closed at 4:35 p.m. and that in 8% of them some citizens were still in line and unable to vote. On the night of the election, the results were announced in the early hours of the morning, when the processing of election tally sheets (some 16,000) was way below target. - 2 - On Monday, November 27, the TSE began to receive the electoral cases (containing the election materials) coming from various parts of the country in the collection center (INFOP), where the OAS/EOM had been present throughout the process. The observers noted that no pre-established protocols were followed for the reception and unloading of materials. Furthermore, they noticed that some trucks transporting the cases arrived at INFOP unaccompanied by guards and that, in order to open them, TSE personnel sometimes had to break the locks due to the absence of the military personnel responsible. The observers also ascertained that the order in which the cases were processed and unloaded changed: first it was in order of arrival; then other undisclosed criteria were used. As for the electoral material, the observers reported that some cases arrived at INFOP opened and incomplete, whereby in some cases the minutes of the tally were missing, and in others the sheet listing incidents that had occurred at the polling station and/or the notebooks containing the polling station's registry of electors who voted were missing. Some cases arrived without any security devices. The Mission filed a written request with the TSE for the inventory of cases processed in which the final voting record (acta de cierre) or other sensitive material was missing and for the report on minutes scanned at INFOP, as well as all the images of the minutes being scanned during reception of the cases in INFOP and the plan for unloading the trucks and delivering the cases. Unfortunately, the Mission did not receive that information from the Tribunal. The uncertainty, lack of transparency, and information deficit experienced that week were preventable and could have been addressed. Logistical coordination issues, plus high levels of improvisation in resolving situations, delayed the scanning of the election material. In addition, there were flaws in the processing of the tally sheets on Wednesday, November 29, between 9:47 a.m. and 11:30 p.m., with no information available for 8.5 of those hours, which triggered even more uncertainty. The TSE reported that this was due to a technical problem with one of its servers, which reached its maximum capacity and had to be replaced. The Mission was unable to ascertain the origin of the problem, but it did note that the system began working at around 11:30 p.m. The Mission noted with concern that in 4.7% of the special vote count boards votes were regarded as valid even though they lacked the marks that indicate handling by the voters and by members of the polling station when counting them. In some cases, they were still attached to the stub showing the polling station data: i.e. the voting slip had not been separated from the block. Those voting slips looked new, with no signs of even having been folded. The TSE explained to the OAS that when they are put back into the electoral cases, the tally sheets are rolled up, which could explain why they looked so smooth when unrolled again for the special vote count. The fact that those vote slips were counted is highly relevant given the narrow margin of difference between the two candidacies. Several political parties shared their concerns with the Mission about the larger parties allegedly purchasing credentials from parties lacking the capacity to name representatives to all polling stations. Although the Mission was not able to corroborate that practice, it was striking that in some stations where there were representatives of small political parties, those parties did not obtain a single vote. VAMOS was the only party to return credentials it could not use to the TSE (18,000 of them). - 3 - In connection with its post-electoral observation, the EOM analyzed a large number of election tally sheets corresponding to the Integrated Electoral Vote Counting and Dissemination System (SIEDE) and special vote counts, as well as the contending political parties (Partido Nacional, Partido Liberal, Alianza de Oposición contra la Dictadura, and Partido Liberal). Based on that review, the EOM is able to conclude that almost all the official tally sheets match those received by the parties. However, there are some cases of inexplicable differences between the election tally sheets of the three parties and those of the TSE. It is important to note that there are no safeguards to prevent the alteration or falsification of the copies of the tally sheets in the possession of the parties. The Mission considers that the copies of the tally sheets handed out to the political parties do not constitute a foolproof security measure. The reason for this is that the parties do not have all of them; some were filled in by hand, have no security measures, and differ from one another. According to information provided by the TSE, there were breakdowns in the SIEDE on Wednesday, November 29, between 9:47 a.m. and 11:30 p.m., with no information available for 8.5 of those hours. When the server began breaking down, it became apparent that it had reached its storage capacity. Nevertheless, to this day the real reason why one of the servers crashed is unknown because the flaw continued even after the storage capacity was increased. None of the technical reports