Naomi Oreskes and John Krige (eds.), Science and Technology in the Global Cold War (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015), 343-369. 11 The Cold War and the Reshaping of Transnational Science in China Zuoyue Wang In an article in the October 1967 issue of Foreign Affairs , former vice president Richard Nixon advocated a more active US foreign policy toward China, declaring “ There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation. ” 1 During the next several years, the perception of a China insulated from the outside world would receive confirmation as the country spiraled further into the Cultural Revolution maelstrom at home and engaged in conflicts with both the United States and the Soviet Union abroad. In science, technology, and education, almost all universities and research institutes were shut down, international scientific interactions ceased, and importation of foreign journals and books stopped. Yet less than five years later Nixon, as president, would land in Beijing, and a new era in the history of the Cold War and in China ’ s scientific relations with the rest of the world would begin. In this chapter I will sketch, in very general terms, how the Cold War reshaped China ’ s scientific enterprise, especially its transnational character. The Cold War will be understood here not as a straightforward bipolar US-Soviet competition, but rather as a series of triangular US-Soviet-Chinese geopolitical interactions with alternating periods of alliance and hostility as seen from the Chinese perspective. 2 The dynamics of the Cold War conditioned China ’ s choice of major partners in international scientific exchanges and shaped domestic scientific priorities and institu- tions, which served to alter the existing patterns of Chinese transnational scientific interactions, sometimes in surprising ways. Thus, chronologically, the chapter takes into account both the conventional periodization of the Cold War— from the late 1940s, as US-Soviet tension rose, to the early 1990s, when the Soviet Union fell apart — and two major events in the history of modern China: the establishment of the People ’ s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 after the Communist revolution and a series of dramatic changes in late 1980s and the early 1990s that included not only the government ’ s crackdown on a pro-democracy movement at Tiananmen Square in 1989 but also the subsequent acceleration of reform and opening up. Although the chapter focuses on the period 1949 – 1989, it also examines the years before and after 344 Wang that period in order to illuminate the background and the legacy of the development of transnational science in China during the Cold War. Specifically, the chapter exam- ines five periods: the half-century before the 1949 revolution, when the influence of the United States was dominant; the decade that followed it, shaped by an alliance with the Soviet Union; the 1960s, the era of self-reliance; the Nixonian exchange of the 1970s, which reopened US-China scientific interactions; and the reform era of opening to the outside world that began in the late 1970s. Here the term transnational science refers to the movements of scientists, scientific institutions, practices, instruments, and ideologies across national boundaries and how such movements interacted with the indigenous traditions and contexts within any particular nation-state to shape and shift scientific developments within it and internationally. As such, the concept of the transnationalization of science includes both formal, state-sponsored international activities and the informal, private cross- national networking that scientists engaged in outside the framework of the nation- states. It also refers to aspects of scientists ’ activities as they confront and even challenge the authority of the nation-states. 3 It should be noted that to characterize science in modern China as transnational does not mean that nationalism didn’ t play an important role. 4 Clearly, both the pre- 1949 Nationalist government and its Communist successors sought foreign aid, including technological aid, for the purpose of fulfilling their own national develop- mental aspirations. 5 Even the Western-trained Chinese scientists held a strong sense of Chinese nationalism, often sharpened by the history of national humiliation at the hands of Western powers and Japan, and generations pursued various versions of the dream of “ saving China through science.” 6 The Cold War, however, accentuated the latent tensions between the national and the transnational for both the Chinese party state and the Chinese scientists: the former had to balance its need for technical manpower for national security and its political distrust of Western-trained scientists; the latter had to deal with the intensified role of the party state in their scientific and personal lives, and also to reconcile their Chinese nationalism and their transnational scientific background and ideals. In this chapter all Chinese names, except for those of overseas Chinese, are rendered in pinyin , with the family name first and the given name second. Americanization before the Cold War, ca. 1900 – 1949 In the case of science in China, transnationalism predated the Cold War. International politics and scientific currents defined the social and political context of the intro- duction of modern science in China from the late nineteenth century onward. 7 The Sino-Japanese war of 1895 led to the end of the traditional civil service examination system and the introduction of the modern educational system in 1905, with the inclusion, for the first time, of natural science as part of formal schooling. Both before The Cold War and the Reshaping of Transnational Science in China 345 and after this educational reform, missionaries, most of them from the United States, established schools in China in which some modern science was taught. The anti- foreign Boxer Rebellion of 1900 and the subsequent intervention by Western powers and Japan eventually led to the establishment of the Boxer indemnity fellowships, first and foremost by the United States and later, on a much smaller scale, by other countries, to sponsor Chinese students to study abroad. These fellowships were made possible by funds remitted to China when it became clear that the massive indemni- ties ($330 million) that China was forced to pay the foreign powers were often based on exaggerated claims. The Boxer fellowships also played an important role in the emergence of the US as a dominant influence in the development of science in China in the first half of the twentieth century and thus deserve closer examination. As the historian Michael Hunt convincingly argued, even though the United States publicly touted its first partial remission of the Boxer indemnity as a gesture of good will in 1908, its original claim of $25 million, with 4 percent of interest amortized until 1940, had been widely recognized from the beginning as excessive and subse- quently proved to be so. Furthermore, when the US later forced the Chinese govern- ment to use the remission to send Chinese students to the US, it acted out of self-interested calculations at least as much as out of altruism. 8 Such a move would enable the US to influence China and, as Edmund J. James, president of the University of Illinois, put it in a letter to President Theodore Roosevelt, even control it with “ the intellectual and spiritual domination of its leaders.” 9 Roosevelt largely agreed. On December 3, 1907, in a message to Congress, he declared: This Nation should help in every practicable way in the education of the Chinese people, so that the vast and populous Empire of China may gradually adapt itself to modern conditions. One way of doing this is by promoting the coming of Chinese students to this country and making it attractive to them to take courses at our universities and higher education institutions. Our educators should, so far as possible, take concerted action toward this end. 10 Yet, even though the Boxer indemnity funds emerged from one of the most humili- ating episodes in modern Chinese history, as a transnational institution it probably played a more important role than any other financial and educational programs in the making of modern science and especially in the training of the first generation of modern scientists in China. During the negotiations leading to the establishment of the Boxer fellowship program, the Chinese government and the US government both agreed to emphasize science and technology. The “ Proposed Regulations for the Stu- dents to Be Sent to America ” prepared by Yuan Shikai, head of the Chinese Foreign Ministry (wai wu bu ) in late 1908 contained this stipulation: The aim in sending students abroad at this time is to obtain results in solid learning. Eighty per cent of those sent will specialize in industrial arts, agriculture, mechanical engineering, mining, physics and chemistry, railway engineering, architecture, banking, railway administration, and similar branches, and 20 per cent will specialize in law and the science of government. 11 346 Wang According to these regulations, the Chinese Foreign Ministry and one official from the American legation in China would together design “ the detailed method of pro- cedure ” for implementing the program. In the end, an Office for Students Going to the United States was established jointly by the Chinese Foreign Ministry and the Chinese Ministry of Education (xue bu ) to oversee the selection of 180 students in China and their distribution in the US for the period 1909 – 1911 (47 in 1909, 70 in 1910, and 73 in 1911). 12 In 1911, the Tsinghua (Qinghua) School was set up in Beijing under heavy American influence to take over the job of preparing the Boxer fellows before their departure for the US and to supervise their activities thereafter. In all, from 1909 to 1929, the Boxer fellowship program brought about 1,500 Chinese men to study in the US, a majority of them studying engineering, science, agriculture, and medicine.