View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Fordham University School of Law Fordham Law Review Volume 73 Issue 3 Article 10 2004 The Luxury of the Law: The Codification Movement and the Right to Counsel Norman W. Spaulding Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Norman W. Spaulding, The Luxury of the Law: The Codification Movement and the Right to Counsel, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 983 (2004). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol73/iss3/10 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Luxury of the Law: The Codification Movement and the Right to Counsel Cover Page Footnote Visiting Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. J.D., 1997, Stanford Law School; B.A., 1993, Williams College. This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol73/iss3/10 THE LUXURY OF THE LAW: THE CODIFICATION MOVEMENT AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL Norman W. Spaulding* Professor Deborah Rhode's Access to Justice offers a rich and provocative set of arguments for making the legal system more open and responsive to low- and middle-income Americans. Perhaps the most compelling aspect of the book is its encyclopedic collection of data revealing a wide gap between our ideals-expressed in constitutional mandates, popular platitudes about equal justice for all, and our sense of superiority as a constitutional democracy committed to the rule of law-and the abysmal services available to average Americans when they turn to law. As she has done many times before, Professor Rhode enters a field and defines and dominates it by the sheer breadth of her fact-gathering and analysis. Her presentation is clear and forceful, inviting both legal and nonlegal audiences to engage the question of how to ensure access to justice. The descriptive work of the book alone makes an invaluable contribution to the literature on the adversary system, access to legal services, and professional ethics. But the book also should have an impact outside legal academic circles as a corrective to popular misconceptions about American litigation. As Professor Rhode forcefully argues, sensationalist press coverage and a steady barrage of conservative attacks on "greedy" trial lawyers and "excessive" consumer litigation have fostered distinctly counterfactual perceptions about the adversary system and the interests it serves. Television and print media, stump speeches, and a vast array of internet sites regularly enjoin us to worry about excessive jury awards even though "juries are no more likely than judges to be swayed by sympathy for injured victims and to award punitive damages," and "the vast majority of tort victims are undercompensated, not overcompensated."1 We are further encouraged to worry about runaway punitive damage awards and excessive consumer litigation * Visiting Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. J.D., 1997, Stanford Law School; B.A., 1993, Williams College. 1. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice 30, 40 (2004) (emphasis added); see also id. at 33 ("[M]edia coverage that disproportionately focuses on huge damage awards encourages... skewed perceptions. Cases reported by the press have verdicts between four and twenty times larger than the average."). FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 even though punitive damages "occur in only about 4 percent of cases that plaintiffs win in court," and "disputes between businesses are the largest and fastest growing category of civil litigation";2 to worry about tort litigation hampering the competitiveness of American enterprise even though studies estimate "that tort liability could represent no more than 2 percent of the total expense of United States goods and services, an amount 'highly unlikely' to have a substantial effect on American competitiveness"; 3 and to worry about slick criminal defense lawyers tricking juries into acquitting guilty but rich defendants even though "[o]ver 90 percent of cases are resolved by guilty pleas, generally without any factual investigation... [and in] the small minority of cases that go to trial, convictions have been upheld where defense counsel were asleep, on drugs, suffering from mental illness, or parking their cars during key parts of the prosecution's case."4 Each of these messages distorts public awareness of deeper and far more disquieting facts about the failure of American civil and criminal law to meet basic standards of decency and fairness for low- and middle-income people. It is impossible to solve a problem we don't even recognize, and, as Professor Rhode contends, for the last twenty years misperceptions have driven "reforms" that arguably exacerbate the problem.5 Access to Justice thus offers a roadmap for improving not only the quality and distribution of legal services, but the terms of public and professional debate that determine the content of reforms. I. THE CODIFICATION MOVEMENT-AMERICA'S FIRST FAILED REVOLUTION IN ACCESS TO LAW The terms of public and professional debate, indeed the entire reform agenda on access to law, had a dramatically different valence 2. See id. at 30; see also id. at 29. Current litigation rates in the United States are not exceptionally high, either in comparison with prior eras or with many other Western industrial nations not known for contentiousness. Americans were more likely to sue a century ago than they are now. Court filings in the United States now are in the same range, when adjusted for population, as those in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, England, and Denmark. Id. 3. Id. at 32; see also id. Other estimates suggest that businesses' total liability for all legal claims, including torts, is about 25 cents for every 100 dollars in revenue. Given these modest costs, it is not surprising that corporate risk managers have reported relatively little adverse effect from liability on larger economic indicators such as gross revenues or market share. In managers' experience, the major impact of tort claims has been to improve product safety and warning efforts. Id. 4. Id. at 4; see also id. at 122-44. 5. See, for example, her discussion of the funding and positional constraints imposed on federally subsidized legal aid attorneys. Id. at 61-64, 108-10. 2004] THE LUXURY OFTHE LAW for much of the nineteenth century. Egalitarians of the period were, in a sense, more ambitious, more politically powerful, and less deferential to the profession than their modern counterparts. Rather than demand subsidized access to lawyers, they sought direct access to law through "codification." But we miss the most dynamic aspects of this movement for legal reform if we concentrate exclusively on the right to counsel-as Professor Rhode rightly observes, charitable and publicly subsidized legal aid for criminal defendants and civil litigants are of fairly recent origin.6 To modern lawyers, codification calls forth images of technical drafting undertaken by legislators and expert advisory committees. As the restatements and uniform codes indicate, codification purports to offer guidance and provide a foundation for uniformity and generality in law. But the result is often hopelessly obtuse statutory language or unenforceable recapitulations of law only a specialist can decipher. It was not always so. In the nineteenth century, codification represented a democratic movement for access to justice-for reforming the legal system so that laypersons could not only understand, but operate, the machinery of law. In its strongest form, it presented a direct threat to the legal profession, to judicial authority, and to the doctrine of common law reception. A perfect legal code would require no intermediaries, no self-appointed class of authoritative interpreters, between law and the people. And with precedent and practice reduced to principle, everyone could know the law and everyone could be his own lawyer. The politically operative form of codification was less utopian, and was led by lawyers who embraced the democratic impulses animating the movement, but by no means believed it should eliminate the bench and bar.7 Their focus was on reducing the expense, delay, excessive formality, and confusion of common law litigation, not doing 6. See id. at 47-78. Poor and low-income Americans had no affirmative right to legal assistance in the nineteenth century, so if they received help from lawyers, it was usually by professional grace. The extent of pro bono service in the nineteenth century is impossible to measure, but there was ample incentive for young lawyers to take litigation work for free, especially criminal cases or other trial work likely to attract public attention and, thereafter, paying clients. Still, it is unlikely that the supply of pro bono service met demand even when combined with legal services offered by lay practitioners under the lax unauthorized practice laws of the period. 7. See, e.g., Thomas Smith Grimke, An Oration of the Practicability and Expedience of Reducing the Whole Body of the Law to the Simplicity of a Code, Address to the South Carolina Bar Association (Mar. 17, 1827), in The Legal Mind in America: From Independence to the Civil War 147, 150, 158 (Perry Miller ed., 1962) [hereinafter The Legal Mind in America] ("[B]eyond question, the era never can arrive, when every man will be his own Lawyer."). Indeed, there is evidence that these lawyers hoped codification would help improve the standing of the profession. Id. at 156; see also David Dudley Field, Study and Practice of the Law, in Speeches, Arguments, and Miscellaneous Papers of David Dudley Field 484, 490 (A.P.