Naval War College Review Volume 72 Article 8 Number 3 Summer 2019 2019 Origins of a “Ragged Edge”—U.S. Ambiguity on the Senkakus’ Sovereignty Robert C. Watts IV Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Watts, Robert C. IV (2019) "Origins of a “Ragged Edge”—U.S. Ambiguity on the Senkakus’ Sovereignty," Naval War College Review: Vol. 72 : No. 3 , Article 8. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/8 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Watts: Origins of a “Ragged Edge”—U.S. Ambiguity on the Senkakus’ Sovere ORIGINS OF A “RAGGED EDGE” U.S. Ambiguity on the Senkakus’ Sovereignty Robert C. Watts IV n May 15, 1972, the United States returned Okinawa and the other islands in the Ryukyu chain to Japan, culminating years of negotiations that some have 1 Ohailed as “an example of diplomacy at its very best�” As a result, Japan regained territories it had lost at the end of World War II, while the United States both retained access to bases on Okinawa and reaffirmed strategic ties with Japan� One detail, however, complicates this win-win assessment� At the same time, Japan also regained administrative control over the Senkaku, or Diaoyu, Islands, a group of uninhabited—and uninhabitable—rocky outcroppings in the East China Sea�2 By 1972, both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan also had claimed these islands�3 Despite passing con- trol of the Senkakus to Japan, the United States expressed no position on any of the competing claims to the islands, including Japan’s� This choice—not to weigh in on the Senkakus’ sovereignty—perpetuated Commander Robert C. Watts IV is the executive of- the underlying dispute and fostered tensions that ficer of USS John Paul Jones, a destroyer based in recently have found new expression� Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. He also served in a cruiser and destroyer in Norfolk, Virginia, a destroyer in Ja- To this day, Japan administers the Senkakus, pan, and a minehunter in Bahrain. He served ashore China and Taiwan claim them, and the United at U.S. Fleet Forces Command, in the office of the States ostensibly maintains its neutral position Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and in the Navy For- 4 eign Liaison Office. He was commissioned in 2002 with regard to their sovereignty� U�S� leaders through the Navy ROTC unit at the University of across recent administrations have stated publicly, Virginia, where he majored in history and foreign however, that treaty obligations to defend Japan affairs. He earned a master’s degree in national secu- 5 rity and strategic studies from the Naval War College include the Senkakus� So, although the United in 2009 and a master’s in public policy from Prince- States takes no explicit position on the Senkakus’ ton University in 2017. sovereignty, it has committed to defending them� Naval War College Review, Summer 2019, Vol. 72, No. 3 Washington’s seemingly contradictory stance on Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019 1 NWC_Summer2019Review.indb 101 5/2/19 11:35 AM 102 NAVAL WAR COLLEGENaval REVIEW War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 3, Art. 8 the Senkakus contributes to the risk of misunderstanding and conflict over these islands, which some analysts describe as the “most likely flash point” in Sino- Japanese relations�6 Beijing’s military, political, and economic efforts to uphold its claim and challenge Tokyo’s are of particular concern� Militarily, China operates naval and paramilitary forces near the Senkakus to challenge and erode Japan’s control over the islands�7 Politically, in November 2013 China attempted to regulate air traffic in the East China Sea by declaring an air-defense identification zone (ADIZ) that encompassed the Senkakus�8 Economically, China reprimands companies that do not acknowledge Beijing’s claim; in one recent example, the Chinese government ordered Muji, a Japanese housewares company, to “seal and scrap” catalogs that featured “faulty maps” of China that did not include the Senkakus�9 China’s ap- parent desire to challenge the status quo in the East China Sea may increase the risk of a conflict that likely would involve the United States� This risk could increase if Beijing and Tokyo doubt Washington’s commitment to defend the islands on Japan’s behalf� Political scientist Thomas C� Schelling once described the Taiwanese island of Quemoy, just off the coast of China, as “a ragged edge about which [U�S�] intentions were ambiguous�” Schelling argued that because the United States appeared unwilling to defend Quemoy on behalf of its ally Taiwan, China may have felt emboldened to attack it�10 During the 1950s, Beijing and Taipei fought over the island in two wars, both of which involved the United States� Despite public assurances of U�S� resolve, the Senkakus could become a similar, modern “ragged edge” if Beijing doubts the credibility of Wash- ington’s commitment to these isolated islands� This risk may increase further if, as Eric Heginbotham and Richard J� Samuels suggest, “some Japanese question the extent of the U�S� commitment to the defense of the Senkaku Islands�”11 Why did the United States sidestep questions raised during the Okinawa re- version negotiations about the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands? Washington’s preference for successfully reverting Okinawa, including the Senkakus, while walking a fine line regarding the sovereignty question—neither placating nor ag- gravating other claimants—most likely shaped U�S� policy choices� To understand the factors that influenced the transactional U�S� approach to returning admin- istrative control over the Senkakus to Japan, this article first will review existing theories about U�S� decision-making� These explanations discount the context of the decision and the complex interactions within the U�S� government and among Washington and the three claimants� Second, the article will review the historical roots of each claim to the Senkakus and describe how the United States gained control of the islands at the end of World War II� Third, the article will analyze post–World War II U�S� decision-making toward Okinawa, culminating https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/8 2 NWC_Summer2019Review.indb 102 5/2/19 11:35 AM Watts: Origins of a “Ragged Edge”—U.S. Ambiguity on the Senkakus’ Sovere WAT T S 103 in the decision to return it to Japan, and the choices subsequently made—or avoided—about the Senkakus� On the basis of this analysis, the article finds that U �S� decision-making on the Senkakus’ sovereignty may have emerged from a complex policy-making process focused on achieving the proximate policy objectives of returning Okinawa and reaffirming the U�S�-Japan alliance, while accepting future strategic risk� Fourth, the article will conclude with a review of the contemporary policy implications of this understanding of the origins of U�S� policy toward the Senkakus� ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS: STRATEGIC GAMBIT OR BUREAUCRATS RUN AMOK? Analysts have proposed several different explanations for why the United States returned the Senkaku Islands to Japan in the way it did� Some argue that the United States saw the ambiguous status of the islands as a means to a strategic end in East Asia, while others argue that bureaucratic behavior or existing precedent constrained U�S� options� These explanations take a too-narrow perspective on this complicated issue and provide an incomplete analysis, which could have misleading policy implications� Several scholars argue that the United States made decisions about the Sen- kakus with a strategic eye toward shaping the future western Pacific security en- vironment� Kimie Hara, a historian at the University of Waterloo, Canada, argues that Washington deliberately left this territorial dispute unresolved to sustain Sino-Japanese tensions and act as a mechanism to ensure that Tokyo would con- tinue to permit U�S� access to military bases in Japan�12 Jean-Marc F� Blanchard, a political scientist at East China Normal University, makes a nearly opposite argu- ment� Writing before many U�S� archival sources were available, he speculates that the United States “betrayed” Japan by not endorsing its sovereignty claim, in an effort to “curry favor with the Chinese whom [the United States] was seeking as allies against the Soviet Union�”13 Hara and Blanchard make realpolitik cases and suggest that giving Japan administrative control, rather than full sovereignty, over the Senkakus was a ploy either to maintain Sino-Japanese tensions or to promote Sino-U �S� rapprochement� China similarly ascribes strategic motives to U�S� policy� A December 1971 statement by the Chinese foreign ministry argues that “U�S� and Japanese reac- tionaries � � � barter[ed] China’s Diaoyu [Senkaku] Islands and use[d] Chinese territory to sow dissension between the Chinese and Japanese people�”14 A 2012 white paper uses less-inflammatory language to assert that the U�S� government both administered the Senkakus and transferred them to Japan in an “illegal and invalid” fashion, constituting “acts of grave violation of China’s territorial Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019 3 NWC_Summer2019Review.indb 103 5/2/19 11:35 AM 104 NAVAL WAR COLLEGENaval