Lloyd Steffen. Holy War, Just War: Exploring the Moral Meaning of Religious Violence. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007. xxviii + 300 pp. $35.77, paper, ISBN 978-0-7425-5848-9. Reviewed by Elizabeth Linehan Published on H-Catholic (April, 2008) Violence committed in the name of religion is something people do" (p. 7). It is dangerous be‐ a particularly troubling feature of our world. Cer‐ cause of its potential for creating violence. It is a tainly the phenomenon is not new; think of the virtue of Steffen's book that he does not beg the Crusades. The forms it takes today seem particu‐ question of religion's necessary goodness. "Good‐ larly acute and threatening, however. Lloyd Stef‐ ness" is a moral category, and religion can be good fen recalls these examples in the preface to his or bad. It is also a virtue that the discovery of de‐ book on religious violence: the People's Temple structive potential within religion does not lead suicides; the Branch Davidian events in Waco, him to reject it wholesale. Instead, he stakes out Texas; the Aum Shinrikyo gassings in Tokyo; and the moderate middle ground. of course the 9/11 attacks in the United States. Steffen's strategy is to examine the ways peo‐ Many responses to the connection of violence ple choose to be religious from the moral point of with religion are possible. On one hand, perhaps view. He claims, with ample justification, that reli‐ those doing the violence have misinterpreted reli‐ gious practice can be life-affirming, but it can also gion--or their own religious tradition--so that the be life-destroying or, as he says, "demonic" violence is not a product of "true" religion. Reli‐ (chapter 3 is entitled "Being Religious: the Demon‐ gion is refective of a good God, and so its counsels ic Option"). The key differentiating factor is rightly understood are necessarily good. At the whether what a religion takes to be "ultimate" is other extreme, some argue that the destructive also considered "absolute." "Violence," he says, potential of religion is strong reason for eradicat‐ "emerges from religion only when Ultimacy is ing it. I think here of Christopher Hitchens's writ‐ transformed and becomes equated with the idea ings, notably God Is Not Great (2007). of the Absolute" (p. 23). The notions of "ultimacy" Lloyd Steffen maintains that religion is pow‐ and "absolutism" are so central to Steffen's discus‐ erful and it is dangerous. It is powerful in that it sion that I wish he had defined them more pre‐ motivates action: "in human culture religion is cisely than he does. An approximation for "ulti‐ H-Net Reviews macy" is "that than which no greater can be con‐ cause appeal to God's will seems to transcend ceived," following Anselm's famous ontological ar‐ moral critique. With regard to Islam in particular, gument (p. 15). A clearer definition is "a source of Steffen concludes: "Whether Islam could advance meaning that has no superior and cannot be tran‐ the possibility of a holy war that is non-demonic scended" (p. 15). Ultimacy does not have to be and life-affirming must be subjected to moral cri‐ conceived in absolutist terms; that is, as a concept tique independent of any appeal for justification that "suffers no restrictions, admits no limitations, to heaven … but Islam itself does not sanction and allows no exceptions" (p. 25). In the abstract, such a move" (p. 229). however, it is unclear to me how "ultimacy" es‐ For American readers who lack wide acquain‐ capes becoming absolutized. tance with Islamic traditions, the detail and nu‐ Steffen's analysis of three ways religious peo‐ ance of this section are especially valuable. Stef‐ ple respond to violence, in the second part of the fen shows that resources exist within Muslim tra‐ book, does help to clarify what he is criticizing ditions to critique claims that particular wars are and what he is endorsing. In many ways the dis‐ willed by God. He also distinguishes "jihad" from cussion of pacifism, holy war, and just war is the "holy war," and shows how "jihad" can be inter‐ richest and most valuable part of the book. Each preted in a life-affirming way. Careful reading will of these can be found in life-affirming religious provide ammunition against current stereotypes forms, and in demonic forms. Although it is ini‐ of Islam. tially surprising to fnd pacifism portrayed in its Steffen's discussion of just war covers ground demonic form, as Steffen does here, he is surely that is more familiar to Western philosophers. I correct that there are radical forms of pacifism am in essential agreement with his construal of that disengage from human society and allow evil the theory, including his insistence that a moral to be perpetrated without opposition. His Tolstoy- presumption against the use of force "under‐ Gandhi contrast, representing life-denying and writes" the theory (p. 242). In its structure, a life-affirming commitments to nonviolence, is strong basic assumption with the possibility of well made. The form of radical pacifism Tolstoy justified exceptions (when the use of force is war‐ eventually embraced is an absolute (exception‐ ranted), just war theory exemplifies the sort of less) rejection of force of any kind, and ultimately moral thinking Steffen has all along implicitly ap‐ of engagement with human institutions in de‐ pealed to, against absolutist claims. fense of the good of life. Thus he leaves thefeld to A reader's response to this book will depend the forces of evil. Gandhi, on the other hand, ad‐ on the extent to which s/he accepts some assump‐ vocated nonviolent resistance to evil. Steffens tions which Steffen relies on but does not really says, of Gandhi's key principle of satyagraha, "As defend. There are many, but the most central is a nonabsolutist form of nonviolent but morally that moral evaluation can count on widely--or engaged pacifism, satyagraha serves to expand universally--shared moral presumptions. It de‐ the goods of life, promote the goods of life, and pends, also, on one's response to the dilemma enact a vision of goodness" (p. 81). Socrates posed in the Euthyphro: Is piety good be‐ The examination of holy war focuses primari‐ cause it is loved by the gods, or is it loved by the ly on Islam, although the chapter begins with an gods because it is good? If we are religious, should examination of ancient Israel. "Holy war" is de‐ we determine what God would have us do based fined generically as "any use of force justified by on our conception of the life-affirming and good, appeal to divine authority" (p. 182). The moral or should we depend on some revelation from presumption is against holy wars, precisely be‐ God (whose ways are not our ways)? Steffen 2 H-Net Reviews makes clear just how much turns on the answer to this classic question. If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the network, at https://networks.h-net.org/h-catholic Citation: Elizabeth Linehan. Review of Steffen, Lloyd. Holy War, Just War: Exploring the Moral Meaning of Religious Violence. H-Catholic, H-Net Reviews. April, 2008. URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=14392 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. 3.