CHAPTER 12 May 2007 Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo by Kees Homan in: European Commission : Faster and more united? The debate about Europe’s crisis response capacity, May 2007, pages 151‐155 Summary In June 2003, the EU sent Operation Artema's, its first military mission outside Europe and independent of NATO, to the Democratic Republic of Congo. While it ultimately received an EU badge, its origin, command and control were French. The objective of Operation Artemis was to contribute to the stabilisation of the security conditions in Bunia, capital of lturi, to improve the humanitarian situation, and to ensure the protection of displaced persons in the refugee camps in Bunia. Its mandate was to provide a short‐term interim force for three months until the transition to the reinforced United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (UMMOC). Although the EU can be said to have passed the first "test" of its the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mechanisms for the conduct of an autonomous operation, this test was a limited one. Operational constraints were caused by inadequate strategic lift capabilities, inadequate communications systems between headquarters and staff, and the lack of a strategic reserve. Operation Artemis Ituri. The IPC was held from 1‐14 April 2003 This chapter focuses on the EU‐led Inter‐ with an all‐inclusive involvement of the national Emergency Multinational Force Iturians, the participation of the DRC and (IEMF), codenamed Artemis, in the Ugandan governments, and the support of Democratic Republic of Congo in summer the United Nations Mission in the Democratic 2003. Republic of Congo (MONUC) and the broader international community. It provided a peace In Ituri, an unstable region in the north‐east building and reconciliation roadmap for of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ituri, which was to be led by a newly created some 50 000 people were killed in factional Ituri interim administration (IIA). MONUC fighting between 1999 and early 2003, and a committed itself to providing security for the further 500 000 fled the district to other IIA. Unfortunately, the grave crisis that took regions of Congo or to neighbouring states. place in Bunia and Ituri following the Ituri has a long history of ethnic conflicts withdrawal of the Ugandan Peoples' Defence over access to land, mineral resources and Force (IIPDF) units in early May 2003, made control of local positions of power. The it impossible for the IIA to function normally. conflict shaped up as a proxy war, with sponsors from Kinshasa, Goma, Rwanda and As the last Ugandan troops left Bunia on 6 Uganda backing rival factions, and shipping May 2003, Lendu‐based militias and the pre‐ in weapons. dominantly Hema Union of Congolese Patri‐ ots (UPC) attempted to take control of the Under the Luanda agreement signed in town. In an attempt to escape the ensuing September 2002 between the governments violence, thousands of civilians either aban‐ of Uganda and the DRC, the withdrawal of doned the town or gathered around MONUC the Ugandan army was scheduled to take Sector 2 headquarters and the airport, where place after the holding of an Ituri Pacification the Uruguayan battalion had established its Commission (IPC), setting‐up a peace base. building strategy for the troubled district of Netherlands Institute for International Relations ‘Clingendael’ 2 Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo Tensions in Ituri mounted again and the local the capacity of the EU to act autonomously militias were fighting at a growing cost in from NATO and the operation was renamed civilian lives. The militias fought for the “Artemis” when “Europeanised” in the con‐ control of the town, committing large‐scale text of the ESDP. The decision by the Elysée atrocities on the civilian population. Two to create an EU mission was strategic.3 weeks of total chaos unfolded in Bunia and led to an international outcry about UN On 30 May 2003, the UN Security Council irresponsibility and the risk of a new authorised the deployment, of an Interim genocide in the Great Lakes region. Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) in Bunia until 1 September 2003, when a rein‐ Under its Chapter VI mandate, MONUC was forced UN mission in the Congo (MONUC) already obliged to protect civilians under could be deployed. The mission of the IEMF imminent threat. Yet its 700 strong was “to contribute to the stabilisation of the Uruguayan battalion completely abdicated security conditions and the improvement of its responsibilities to protect civilians, and the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to just a handful of peacekeepers and ensure the protection of the airport, the humanitarian workers succeeded in keeping internally displaced persons in the camps in alive 5 000‐8 000 civilians who had sought Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to refuge at a market located next to the UN contribute to the safety of the civilian compound and near Bunia airport. population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town”.4 Proposed French deployment During the weekend of 10 and 11 May, the EU launches ESDP operation Secretary‐ General of the UN, Kofi Annan, On 12 June 2003, the Council of the European spoke with President Jacques Chirac, who Union adopted a decision to launch its first indicated that France would be willing to fully autonomous (outside the “Berlinplus” deploy a force to Bunia. framework agreed with NATO) crisis In his letter of 15 May 2003, the Secretary management operation outside Europe.5 It General called for “the rapid deployment to was the first ESDP operation in Africa, which Bunia of a highly trained and well‐equipped took place within the framework of UNSC multinational force, under the lead of a Mem‐ Resolution 1484 adopted on 30 May 2003, ber State, to provide security at the airport and the Council's Joint Action adopted on 5 as well as to other vital installations in the June 2003. town and to protect the civilian population”.1 While the French forces represented a large majority of the military personnel involved The force would temporarily relieve the UN in the operation it is important to note that peacekeepers from Uruguay until 1 Septem‐ the planning of the operation and the rules of ber, when a larger UN force led by engagement were decided by the EU‐15. In a Bangladesh could be in place. very brief space of time, EU Member States committed staff officers and troops to work France agreed to intervene, provided (a) it with Paris. Apart from the French troops on was granted a UN Chapter VII mandate, (b) the ground (90% of the force) a special countries in the region involved in the operations unit from the United Kingdom fighting (DRC, Uganda and Rwanda) officially and a medical team from Belgium were supported its intervention, and (c) the involved on the ground. The operational operation was limited in time and scope. On headquarters, where the operation was 28 May, France officially announced its planned and conducted, was based in Paris intention to lead such an operation, with the and included 80 officers drawn from all contribution of other nations, and serve as European countries. The force headquarters Framework Nation.2 was set up in Entebbe, which served as a logistical hub to dispatch the necessary Operation Mamba as it was initially called by forces to Bunia. the French, was already being prepared, when French President Chirac realised this intervention would be the ideal case to prove Netherlands Institute for International Relations ‘Clingendael’ 3 Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo The Political and Security Committee, under The transition in September to the the responsibility of the Council to which the Bangladeshi‐led MONUC forces, nicknamed PSC reports regularly, exercised the political the Ituri brigade, took a further two weeks, control and strategic direction of the opera‐ during which time the EU‐led multinational tion, including the power to amend the oper‐ force continued to take part in common ational plan, the chain of command and the patrols, provided logistical support and rules of engagement. participated in the MONUC planning programme. The first French forward elements had been deployed to Bunia on 6 June 2003, closely MONUC has subsequently had mixed success followed by engineers to help maintain the in continuing the pacification of Ituri. Arms very poor airfield for the numerous strategic smuggling continued and on 6 October 2003, and tactical airlifts of personnel and 65 people, primarily women and children, equipment. As Bunia was plagued by rival were massacred in an attack in Katshele, militiamen openly carrying small arms, an about 60 km northeast of Bunia. Given its initial measure of the IEMF was to declare numerical constraints, however, it is the town and a 10 km area around it a doubtful that an extended EU mission would “weapons‐invisible” zone. have had very different results.6 Starting with some initial skirmishes with Lessons learned Lendu militia on 14 June, through to more Although limited in time, scope, geographical serious clashes with the UPC in early July area of action and the number of forces that reportedly left 20 militiamen dead, the involved, Operation Artemis was IEMF left no doubt as to its willingness to use nevertheless significant in many different force, not against one parry in particular but ways. against any challenges to its authority or threats to the security of the population. The operation was, for several reasons, not typical of an autonomous EU operation with By early July, all elements of the operation future reference. Both operational and force were in place. The operation was managed planning were already well underway at a by French Major‐General Neveux (Operation national (French) level, even before the EU Commander) and French Brigadier‐General actually became involved.