7 Testing the Limits of a Special Relationship: US Unilateralism and Dutch Multilateralism in the Twenty-first Century Giles Scott-Smith Since World War II, the Netherlands has built a solid reputation as a ‘loyal ally’ of the United States. There have been serious disagreements between the two countries on specific policy issues, but there has remained an underly- ing recognition among the Dutch that these should not disrupt a relationship considered fundamental. Within the context of US global power, the Netherlands have fulfilled several important functions. The country has been a close ally within international organizations such as NATO and the UN. It has acted as an ideal middle-power operating as a ‘bridge’ between Americans and Europeans (arguably far more suited to and more successful in this role than the United Kingdom). It has a long tradition as a nation defending the moral-legal order in international relations. And it has long been a proponent of free trade.1 Yet, in the early twenty-first century all these issues have been put to the test due to the increasing tendency towards US unilateralism. After surveying the importance of NATO for Dutch foreign relations since World War II, the chapter continues by outlining the issues of the last few years that have caused Dutch–American rela- tions to become unsettled through the clash of security interests and international law. How has this close bilateral relationship been affected, and what are the prospects for the future? The Cold War, NATO, and the End of Neutrality After World War II, the Netherlands abandoned its policy of neutrality, held since 1839, by first signing the Brussels Treaty in 1948 and then joining NATO as a founding member in 1949. This move was backed by all the major political parties, not so much with enthusiasm, but as a logical necessity to bind the United States to the security system of Europe. The religious input (both Protestant and Catholic) into Dutch political and social life, combined with the standpoint of the strong Social Democratic party, resulted in solid anti-communist sentiments.2 Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker, who signed the treaty, did attempt to withhold Dutch support in return for concessions from the United States, but this was not taken seriously in Washington.3 There was certainly discontent with the failure of the United States to wholeheartedly support the attempt to regain control of the East Indies, but the loss of this major colony in 1949 also proved pivotal in DDumbrell.inddumbrell.indd 110909 66/11/2009/11/2009 22:07:27:07:27 PPMM 110 Giles Scott-Smith redirecting Dutch security concerns to the Atlantic region.4 NATO immediately became and has remained the bedrock of Dutch security policy, leading to the much-used epithet of the Netherlands as a ‘loyal ally’.5 There have been three Dutch NATO secretary-generals (Dirk Stikker, Joseph Luns, and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer), a record only matched by the British, a sure sign of American support for the binding role that the Dutch play so well in the Alliance. There are many examples of the positive Dutch attitude towards NATO. The country supported the entry of the Federal Republic of Germany into the organi- zation, and the integration of German forces into a US-led Atlantic alliance was considered far more preferable than the option of a European defence commu- nity. Although the Dutch disagreed with how President Dwight D. Eisenhower dealt with Suez, believing that the United States undermined the unity of the alliance, in the same month (November 1956) the parliament accepted the stationing of US nuclear weapons on Dutch soil to upgrade NATO defences. In 1958, the Netherlands was the first NATO ally were jet fighters were duly equipped with these weapons, which remained under the control of the US mili- tary.6 In the 1960s, the Netherlands again proved to be steadfast in its backing for US leadership by rejecting the opportunity to develop a European nuclear force (the Multilateral Force plan). The Dutch also reacted quickly when de Gaulle withdrew from NATO’s central military command structure in 1966, swiftly agreeing to host US forces and the Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) command centre in Heerlen.7 In the late 1960s the US embassy in The Hague confirmed that ‘US–Netherlands relationships in NATO can be characterized as “special”’, and that it was essential to recognize ‘the value of a continued “special relationship”’.8 However, from the late 1960s onwards NATO did start to become the focus for criticism within Dutch politics and society. The rise of the New Left within the Labour party led to votes being held at its party congresses on whether the Netherlands should leave NATO. Despite being heavily defeated, these motions were a clear sign that the instinctively pro-NATO Cold War politics of the Dutch social democratic left was now over.9 Under the Labour-led coalition of 1973–77 policy was dominated by pro-atlanticist ministers for both foreign affairs and defence, but the increasing dominance of the left in the party led to it opposing NATO’s 1979 Twin Track decision, involving the upgrading of NATO’s nuclear forces, throughout the following decade.10 The period from 1980–85 was the most tense for Dutch–American relations. The combination of a powerful peace movement with anti-nuclear sentiments within the large Labour and Christian Democratic parties created a vulnerable situation for a series of governments to accept the deployment of Cruise missiles on Dutch soil.11 Walter Laqueur’s typology of the Dutch idealist penchant for neutralism as ‘Hollanditis’ exemplified the perceived transformation of the Netherlands from loyal ally to the weak link in the NATO chain. Yet, the political and policymaking elite held firm, manoeuvring their way through both domestic opposition and foreign pressure to sustain the Dutch contribution to the Alliance.12 DDumbrell.inddumbrell.indd 111010 66/11/2009/11/2009 22:07:27:07:27 PPMM US Unilateralism and Dutch Multilateralism in the Twenty-first Century 111 The end of the Cold War brought with it a re-evaluation of Dutch foreign policy. Under Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo (1994–98) a deliberate attempt was made to shift attention to European developments in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty and the effort to build a common foreign and security policy. However, these deliberations only resulted in a major policy paper in 1995 that referred as much to the need to maintain traditional interests (transatlantic rela- tions) as it did to new factors in world politics, such as the EU and the rise of East Asia.13 The choice for the transatlantic option, as Robert Russell pointed out almost 40 years ago, was a choice for freedom of action separate from the interests and demands of the Netherlands’ larger European neighbours, and this factor remained pivotal throughout the 1990s.14 US Unilateralism v. Dutch Multilateralism: Security Policy Nevertheless, after 2000 the unilateralism of the Bush administrations put Dutch atlanticism to the test. Three examples are given here to illustrate the conse- quences for the Netherlands of loyalty to the Western alliance under American leadership: Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Joint Strike Fighter. Iraq Two days before the invasion of Iraq, on 18 March 2003, the Dutch government under Jan Peter Balkenende announced that they would adopt a position of political but not military support for the imminent war. This was despite the fact that there was considerable public opposition to the war, divisions in the government over its legitimacy, and a widespread belief that the path through the UN should be followed. In late May 2003, with President George W. Bush having declared the war to be over, Balkenende announced the placement of 1,350 Dutch military in Muthanna province in southern Iraq as part of the international stabilization force. In June 2004, following a visit of Balkenende to Bush and heavy pressure from the United Kingdom, the government proposed and parliament agreed to extend the troops’ stay in Iraq until March 2005, but insisted that they would stay no longer. The troops were then withdrawn without much incident, having sustained two fatalities. However, since then the Iraq issue has continued to rumble in Dutch politics. Firstly, in November 2006 the Volkskrant presented its readers with a Dutch Abu Ghraib. The newspaper released information that Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) personnel had carried out violent interrogations in November 2003 in buildings of the Coalition Provisional Authority in the town of Samawah, about 230 miles southeast of Baghdad. Prisoners were forced to wear darkened goggles, which were sometimes removed and bright lights were shone at them. They were also kept awake for long periods by being soaked with water, and were exposed to high-pitched sounds.15 Coming 5 days before the national elections, these revelations seemed to be deliberately timed to have an impact on the results, and Defence Minister Henk Kamp demanded a full enquiry into how and why the information was released at that time.16 DDumbrell.inddumbrell.indd 111111 66/11/2009/11/2009 22:07:28:07:28 PPMM 112 Giles Scott-Smith Secondly, there has been the question of why the Dutch government joined the ‘Coalition of the Willing’, in stark contrast to the Belgians, Germans and French. In September 2002 Balkenende had received a ‘for your eyes only’ report from Tony Blair that held the intelligence information on the military threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, including the background to the ‘45 minute’ claim. This was revealed in August 2003 by Balkenende during a parliamentary debate, and it became apparent that he had not discussed the issue with any of his ministers.