Thomas Ruttig How Tribal Are the Taleban? Afghanistan’s largest insurgent movement between its tribal roots and Islamist ideology EXECUTIVE SUMMARY and their institutions within Afghan society. A distinction is made between what is real and what Recent developments in Afghanistan have is myth, as constructed by Afghans and also by underscored that there is still an immense lack of foreign observers. understanding – and even of interest – with regard The paper then discusses the origins of the Taleban 1 to the nature of the Taleban movement. movement, the (limited) role of Islamist ideology Discussions about whether ‘moderate’ Taleban and the extent to which it can be considered a exist have overshadowed deeper questions about Pashtun nationalist movement. Furthermore, this the character of the Afghan Taleban movement. As paper looks at the beginning debate about a result, there is considerable confusion as to whether the Taleban have morphed into a ‘Neo- whether the largest and most influential insurgent Taleban’ movement. movement is mainly driven by ethnic, religious or Today’s Taleban movement is dualistic in nature, political motives. This paper aims to clarify the often complex forces that shape the Afghan both structurally and ideologically. The aspects are Taleban movement. It explores several central interdependent: A vertical organisational questions, including the following: Are the Taleban structure, in the form of a centralised ‘shadow a Pashtun tribal or even nationalist force or are state’, reflects its supra-tribal and supra-ethnic they, as they claim to be, supra-ethnic Islamists Islamist ideology, which appears to be ‘nationalistic’ – i.e., it refers to Afghanistan as a who do not acknowledge tribal, ethnic and nation2 – at times. At the same time, the linguistic differences but ‘only know Muslims’? In addition, this paper discusses the place of tribes movement is characterised by horizontal, network- like structures that reflect its strong roots in the segmented Pashtun tribal society. The movement 1 This paper further develops thoughts laid out in Thomas is a ‘network of networks’. Religious, tribal and Ruttig, The Other Side: Dimensions of the Afghan regional components overlap even when it comes Insurgency: Causes, Actors – and Approaches to Talks, to the organisational principles of the Taleban. Kabul/Berlin: Afghanistan Analysts Network, Thematic Report 01/2009, July 2009. It builds on two presentations given at a workshop organised by the Abbassi Program in 2 This term is not specific enough. In Europe, it even has Islamic Studies, at Stanford University on 3 December a chauvinistic undertone. ‘National’ would fit better, and 2009, and at the Jamestown Foundation’s 2009 Terrorism many Afghans therefore often refer to ‘national’ (melli) Conference ‘The Changing Strategic Gravity of Al Qaeda’ in almost synonymous with ‘patriotic’, another word Washington on 9 December 2009. disliked by many in Europe. 2 Thomas Ruttig: How Tribal Are the Taleban? Individually, the Taleban are deeply rooted in their nirkh) are used. In cases of conflict between tribal societies. But, in their self-identification, the groups, a decision would be made in advance balance between being Pashtun and being Muslim whose nirkh to use. has changed, as is the case with many Afghans. The Taleban movement emerged from religious In thirty years of conflict and gradual state networks from the 1978–89 resistance, i.e., it is a collapse, Pashtun tribal society has undergone broader movement that saw itself as religiously drastic changes. Traditional social and political motivated. Only when the mujahedin, in the eyes relations have increasingly been weakened and of the later Taleban, violated their own religious dissolved. The younger generations questioned principles, did the Taleban establish their own, the authority of the ‘elders’ who they held now ultra-orthodox movement. Only after their responsible for these conflicts. This had negative initial moves, were the Taleban ‘adopted’, impacts on intra-tribal cohesion. As a result, the supported and instrumentalised by the Pakistani jirga as the major conflict-resolving mechanism of military establishment. Today, many Taleban the Pashtuns has lost much of its authority. activities in Afghanistan’s southeast and south3 still Powerful newcomers are able to ignore jirga centre around networks of ulama-led madrassas decisions with impunity. Might often trumps and mosques. pashtunwalai and even Islamic law. Rising levels Politically, the Taleban movement aspires to aims of education have changed the character of tribal that are larger than its individual tribal realms: representation. Diaspora communities of certain political power on the ‘national’ Afghan level and tribes have emerged in the big cities. Their the re-establishment of its emirate. They are members absorbed modern skills but maintained nationalists, but cannot be called Pashtun links to their original tribes. This way, influences irredentists, i.e., they do not strive for a of modernism penetrated even the rural ‘reunification’ of all Pashtun areas in a communities. This diaspora-tribe relationship ‘Pashtunistan’. intensifies in times of crisis. The Taleban movement’s supra-tribal ideology, i.e., In many Pashtun tribes, the more-permanent tribal Islamism, keeps the door open for non-Pashtun shura has replaced the jirga. Some of them still elements. This has allowed it to systematically represent a form of ‘traditional’ self-organisation, expand into non-Pashtun areas of the North and but many others are convened by the new West. ‘Islam’ provides an umbrella that creates strongmen. This makes them hierarchical in cohesion in an otherwise – ethnically as well as structure, in contrast to the egalitarian jirga where politically – heterogeneous movement. ideally all male members of a certain tribe find a consensus about a certain conflict. Meanwhile, a The system of reference individual Taleban or their shura deliberates and gives advice to the leader leaders allude to – tribal, nationalist and Islamist – who then decides whether he makes use of it or depends on the circumstances under which a not. Many Pashtuns use both terms, jirga and particular decision is taken and on the particular shura, interchangeably now. tactical or strategic aim at stake. Today, some tribes cover such a large area that The combination of vertical (religious/ideological) they are simply too big to have a single leader – and horizontal (tribal) structures gives the Taleban although it is doubtful whether there was always movement a high degree of cohesion while one undisputed leader at any given time on any maintaining organisational elasticity. This elasticity given level of the tribal pyramid. In ongoing in its horizontal dimension – based on Pashtun competition, various aspirants for leadership individualism – allows discussion and even dissent. would fought each other for prestige and It allows a sufficient degree of autonomy of local influence. Leadership and power within any tribal commanders and prevents them from feeling over- segment resembled an ever-changing equilibrium. controlled. Subsequently, the movement has The lack of a ‘dynastic principle’ amongst Pashtuns experienced no splits, or at least none that have stands in the way of a coherent and continuous seriously weakened its organisation. tribal leadership. The movement has shown more continuity than Furthermore, the ‘tribal code’ of Pashtuns, discontinuity between the pre- and post-2001 pashtunwalai, needs to be understood as an phases in the major aspects that characterise such idealised concept. As the Pashtuns’ genealogical chart, it can change in time and space. Categories 3 In this paper, ‘Southeastern region’ is used for the used by outsiders as if set in stone (like the much- three provinces of Loya Paktia and ‘Southern region’ for discussed Durrani-Ghilzai divide) are fluent. Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan and Zabul. The latter Different local versions of pashtunwalai (called region is referred to as ‘Southwestern region’ by some. AAN Thematic Report 04/2010 Thomas Ruttig: How Tribal Are the Taleban? 3 armed insurgent movements: the organisational cohesion of certain tribes and their particular structure including the composition of its institutions by supporting their abilities to re- leadership, ideology, political aims and establish functioning, legitimate decision-making programme. Most importantly, the movement still bodies (jirgas, shuras). External actors, however, adheres to its undisputed and single most should only provide a level playing field, a important leader, Mulla Muhammad Omar, the framework of security and possibly – where amir ul-mo’menin. The Taleban Leadership Council requested – take on the role of neutral arbiter. stems from the pre-2001 phase and is still mainly They should refrain from being seen as taking Kandahari. The presence of non-Kandahari Taleban decisions on Afghans' behalf and be aware that leaders in this council is more symbolic than interference often deepens, instead of remedies, significant. The influence of newly recruited, existing rifts. younger-generation Taleban foot-soldiers on The Afghan government’s draft Afghanistan Peace strategic decision-making is still minimal although and Reintegration Program – as well as the West- the presence of Mulla Omar’s two new deputies dominated approach that creates an artificial (after the arrest of Mulla Baradar) indicates that division between ‘reconciliation’ and now both the old and the new