The Whigs and the Peninsular War, 1808-1814 Author(s): Godfrey Davies Source: Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Vol. 2 (1919), pp. 113-131 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Royal Historical Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3678254 Accessed: 27-06-2016 03:54 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Royal Historical Society, Cambridge University Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Transactions of the Royal Historical Society This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 27 Jun 2016 03:54:42 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms THE WHIGS AND THE PENINSULAR WAR, i808-1814 BY GODFREY DAVIES, M.A., F.R.HIST.S. Read March 13, 1919 THE attempt of George III to revive personal govern- ment tended to embitter politics and to accentuate the differences between the two rival parties in the State. At the same time the distrust existing between the various sections of the Whigs proved that personal animosities were unusually prominent. Conciliation seemed to be regarded as a sign of weakness, and the general antipathy to compromise was strengthened by the unpopular union of Fox and North in I783. Consequently it proved im- possible to form a real Coalition Government in 1794, when only the Portland Whigs joined Pitt's administra- tion. Fox's reckless assertion that Pitt could suggest nothing he would not oppose is an example of the unreason- ing party spirit, intensified by private prejudices, displayed by the Whigs during the twenty years of war against revolutionary France. Even when the character of the war was completely changed-when the champions of internationalism at Paris were replaced by a military autocrat, and when a war begun to preserve the Low Countries was transformed into a struggle for national existence-the Whigs did not relax their factious opposi- tion. By continually prophesyinig disaster and by oppos- ing a war upon whose issue the fate of England and of Europe depended, they forfeited the confidence of the country, and alienated patriots like Wordsworth and TRANS. 4TH S.-VOL. II. (I13) I This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 27 Jun 2016 03:54:42 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms I 14 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY Southey, who were disgusted by the intolerance of the Tory Government, but who believed that honour and prudence alike demanded the continuation of the conflict with France to the bitter end. To survey even in outline the various tactics of the opposition during the Napoleonic war would be a very lengthy task. The present paper is, therefore, confined to a single topic, the Peninsular War, and is an endeavour to explain, by reference to the speeches and writings of the Whig leaders, their attitude towards the struggle and the criticisms they passed upon the campaigns of the British army in Spain and Portugal. During the short-lived administration of "All The Talents," the Whigs definitely abandoned Pitt's policy of subsidising European coalitions against Napoleon, with the intention of waiting for a spontaneous rising against French domination before employing the British army on the Continent. They therefore eagerly welcomed the news that the Spaniards had fled to arms to resist Napoleon's attempt to make his eldest brother, Joseph, King of Spain. In the House of Commons, Whitbread said that " from the bottom of his soul he wished success to the patriotic efforts of the Spaniards, and that the present glorious struggle might be crowned with the recovery of their liberty as a people, and the assertion of their independence as a nation ".' But although Grey wrote privately that "men, money, ships, to the utmost extent that the country will afford them, ought to be sent without delay " to the Penin- sula,2 the Whig leaders were careful to abstain from any hasty promises to help the Spaniards. Much to their annoyance, Sheridan refused to be restrained by political niceties. "Since the first burst of the French Revolution," 1July 4, 18o8. Parl. Deb., xi. 1142. 2 June, 18o8. Life and Opinions of Earl Grey, 218-9; cf. June 13, i8io. Parl. Deb., xvii. 598-9, Grey then said he should not have sent an army to Spain un- less he had seen "'a sufficient spirit in the people of that country to profit by our assistance," and "the means of providing a sufficient supply of provisions". This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 27 Jun 2016 03:54:42 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms THE WHIGS AND THE PENINSULAR WAR, 1808-I814 115 he declared, " there never existed so happy an opportunity for Great Britain to strike a bold stroke for the rescue of the world. Bonaparte has hitherto run a most victor- ious race. Hitherto he has had to contend against princes without dignity, and ministers without wisdom.' He has fought against countries in which the people have been in- different as to his success; he has yet to learn what it is to fight against a country in which the people are ani- mated with one spirit to resist him. ... I solemnly declare, that if the opportunity . of a vigorous inter- ference on the part of England should arise, the present administration shall have from me as cordial and as sincere a support as if the man whom I most loved were restored to life and power." 2 These patriotic words evoked no response from the opposition benches. If, however, less independent Whigs preserved a discreet silence in Parliament, their private correspondence was emphatic in its condemnation of French aggression in Spain. To Horner the contest seemed to be between freedom and militarism, between "a vast regular army and an enthusiastic people. This is indeed the very crisis of the fate of Europe, and the event (either way) will perhaps be the most decisive test of the genius and effects of the French Revolution. The one result would revive our original persuasion, in its first ardour, that the people are not to be subdued by foreign troops, unless the love of their country is lost in a contempt of their Government. The other would sink me in final despair of ever living to see prosperity or liberty again in any part of Europe . and ages more of darkness and idleness might protract the shame and misery of Europe." 3 1 In this category Sheridan included the English Cabinet: "The ministers of England have pursued a petty policy; they have gone about filching sugar islands, and neglecting all that was dignified and all that was consonant to the truly understood interests of their country ". 2June 15, i8o8. Parl. Deb., xi. 888-9. The reference is to C. J. Fox. 3 July 8, r8o8. Memoirs and Correspondetnce of Francis Horner, i. 454. This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 27 Jun 2016 03:54:42 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms I 16 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY While all Whigs were united in their detestation of the invasion of Spain, there was from the very commence- ment of the struggle the widest division of opinion as to the probable success or failure of the patriots. After the victories of the Spaniards in the summer of 18o8, some believed that Spain was "quite secure from ultimate sub- jugation by France, even if large French armies should once more penetrate the country, and gain general battles ".1 The spirits of others rose and fell in proportion as the news from the Peninsula was good or bad.2 Many, on the other hand, doubted from the first. Auckland, in his letters to Grenville, perpetually bewailed the inevitable disaster he expected. "The true state of our prospects is far gloomier than the gloomiest of our speculations and predictions. I confess that I begin to fear that both Spain and Portugal will fall. Our affairs in Spain are growing perilous, and hurrying to their catastrophe with a rapidity even beyond the fears that I have so long and so often expressed to you. I am perverse enough to despair more than ever." 3 However the special mouthpieces of the croakers were Brougham 4 and Jeffrey. In a letter to Grey, Brougham sarcastically describes the prevalent idea that the French would easily be expelled from the Peninsula, and the Bourbons restored to France by a fifth coalition. "I verily believe at this moment there are scarcely ten men in London who would give Bonaparte ?Ioo a year of half pay to retire to Ajaccio. So incurable a malady is hope." 5 In the Edinburgh Review, Jeffrey set himself the 1Oct. 27, i8o8. Memoirs and Correspondence of Francis Horner, i. 462. 2 The changes of opinion are admirably illustrated in the Correspondence of Sarah Spenser, Lady Lyttleton, 17, 24, 29, 33-4, 45, 48, 51, 59. 3Aug. 4, Sept. 16, Nov. x8, Dec. 17, 18o8. Drofpmore Pafers, ix. 210, 215, 243, 250; cf. Memoir of Sydney Smith, ed. I869, pp. 313, 315-I6. 4 Holland explains Brougham's pessimism by stating that he " had written himself into a persuasion that everything which postponed peace must terminate in disaster ".